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1. Introduction 
The primary purpose of this research is to investigate the causes and effects of 
corruption as it affects the delivery of infrastructure and services to the poor in South 
Africa. The research also assesses the efficacy of anti-corruption measures in protecting 
the interests of the poor. The research was designed and implemented by a South 
African company, Mbumba Development Services, according to the guidelines and 
principles provided by the contracting agency – WEDC (the Water Engineering 
Development Centre) at Loughborough University, UK.  
The agreed objectives of the research include: 
1.  Determine the main causes of corruption. 
2.  Determine the effects of corruption on services (in particular water supply, sanitation, 
drainage, access roads and paving, transport and solid waste) and service users who 
are poor. 
3.  Outline the type of anti-corruption measures that have been applied. 
4.  Assess whether anti-corruption measures impact on pro-poor livelihoods and can be 
used effectively by the poor. 
5.  Assess the effect of corruption and anti-corruption measures on shared community 
assets and the capabilities of the poor. 
6.  Outline the extent to which the views of the poor are included in policy deliberations 
on corruption. 
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2. Research methodology 
The research mainly involved a case study approach that focused on particular acts of 
corruption involving public finance related to municipal service provision. The case 
studies were selected loosely according to the following criteria:  
• The corruption involved significant public finance or other resources (value in excess 
of R100,000). 
• The misappropriation of the finance / resources resulted in negative consequences 
for service delivery to poor communities. 
• Anti-corruption measures were deployed and resulted in successful prosecution, and 
such measures have generally attracted community interest and/or participation. 
• The particular case of corruption is sufficiently resolved that stakeholders are willing 
to comment and review the proceedings. (Ideally the guilty parties should have been 
convicted and sentenced). 
The anticipated research activities included: 
• A literature review (specific to South Africa): The review will include an overview of 
the relevant legislative and policy instruments intended to combat corruption. 
• A scan of recent cases of corruption in the South African province of the Eastern 
Cape: This activity will include liaising with select stakeholder groups (for example, 
the agency responsible for investigating the corruption) in order to identify which 
cases best match the above criteria. This may require accessing the databases of 
certain government bodies or NGOs. 
• Development of research instruments: Development will be based on the 
Methodology Outline in the Research Pack. 
• Planning the research strategy: This process will assess the specifics of the selected 
case studies and choose both the approach best suited to local circumstances and 
the particular configuration of stakeholders. In broad terms, the research strategy will 
interact with three distinct groups, namely anti-corruption agencies, service users / 
community stakeholders (the victims of corruption) and people involved in or 
convicted of corruption. 
Not all of these research strategies proved to be feasible during the actual 
implementation of the research. Interviews were conducted with the following agencies: 
• The Directorate of Special Operations (Scorpions) – two respondents 
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• The Special Investigations Unit 
• An internal investigator in the Department of Social Development 
• The internal auditor in a municipality 
• A civil servant currently facing charges of irregular conduct 
• A special advisor from the National Treasury attached to the Eastern Cape Provincial 
Treasury 
• Two officials within the Eastern Cape Department of Housing, Local Government and 
Traditional Affairs  
• The Office of the Auditor General (informal discussions) 
• A private investigator (informal) 
A few limitations to the original planned methodology must be noted. It did not prove 
feasible to hold focus groups with community members who had been directly exposed to 
corruption, largely because these groups proved difficult to identify in relation to specific 
instances of corruption. One of the cases studied (social grant fraud in the Department of 
Social Development) was chosen because of the willingness of the informant to share 
information, the direct impact on the poor and the fact that very significant amounts of 
money were involved. Although the case study did not fall completely within the focus on 
municipal infrastructure corruption, it does contribute to the broader contextual 
understanding of corruption in South Africa. This study also illustrates a very concerted 
effort by the relevant government department to eliminate corruption. One of the reasons 
for selecting the social grant case study was the anticipated benefit of being able to 
interview those convicted of corruption. Although the internal investigator in the 
department was of great help in this regard, the response of the Department of 
Correctional Services to repeated requests was disappointing – no permission for the 
interviews could be secured over a three-month period of both written and informal 
approaches. Given the difficulties of assembling different stakeholders around a 
particular act of corruption, it was not possible to assemble the anticipated stakeholder 
workshops. In June 2006, however, a paper summarizing some of the research findings 
was presented at a seminar hosted by the NGO Afesis-corplan. Participants at this event 
included the Auditor General, members of the provincial treasury and representatives of 
municipalities and government. Document analysis for this research project has been 
extensive and ranged from national survey documents to technical reports from the 
Auditor General and the National Treasury, to the Integrated Development Plan of 
Qaukeni municipality. The case study on Qaukeni proved to be difficult as none of the 
investigators or other people involved were prepared to answer specific questions on the 
case or to release their reports. There is some discussion on this aspect of the case 
study in the last section of the report.  
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3. Report structure 
The report begins with an overview of corruption in South Africa and how corruption is 
presented in some of the more authoritative surveys and publications. The study of 
corruption has to be related to the broader social and economic aspects of South African 
society in order to fully understand its significance in policymaking and political discourse. 
This part of the paper includes a brief sample of levels of corruption in the civil service 
and the control measures that are invoked. This is followed by a brief examination of how 
corruption is defined and how the term is used in current discourse. Of importance here 
is the idea that corruption and measures to combat it have both a literal or practical 
dimension as well as a figurative or symbolic importance. The next section of the paper 
describes how the public experiences corruption and how this understanding is 
represented in various survey instruments. The general findings of these surveys, 
including comparisons with other countries, are used to ask the question ‘How corrupt is 
South Africa?’. The paper then outlines the various anti-corruption agencies and their 
programmes. This includes an outline of the relevant legislation and some discussion of 
the manner in which these multiple programmes intersect and complement each other. A 
lengthy section is included on the role of civil society in combating corruption. The report 
then moves on to its main purpose, focusing on local government and emerging patterns 
in financial practise and management problems. This section contains an outline of the 
Eastern Cape municipal environment, including a brief list of most councils and the 
typical problems related to procurement and other financial issues. The section includes 
examples of corruption countrywide, a detailed description of the services that are a 
municipal responsibility and the manner in which service infrastructure is funded and 
delivered. Minor case studies are used to show how difficult it is to discern ‘corruption’ 
from other instances of poor municipal service strategy. Finally the case study of Qaukeni 
is presented, showing that although this municipality is generally regarded as uniquely 
corrupt and anarchic, the breakdown in municipal governance is in fact traceable to much 
more endemic problems in allocating service responsibilities and linking the necessary 
financial resources. 
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4. Overview of corruption in SA 
4.1 Corruption and development 
Research into corruption in South Africa proves to be surprisingly difficult, not just 
because of the sensitivity and confidentiality issues that arise when approaching primary 
sources, but because the literature itself is scattered across many different thematic 
sectors and few agencies involved in social research seem to have dedicated 
publications or databases. The same situation appears to apply to government records: 
… there is no central database of detected corruption incidents or cases, or of 
suspected corruption, or of studies of systematic weakness. Almost all of the 
work that that has been done on the qualification1 of corruption has been 
based on perceptions – of households, of business, of elite groups. Little has 
been done to relate perceptions to actual experience (UN and DPSA, 2003). 
Corruption is an issue that dominates political and administrative discourse in South 
Africa. It is an issue of both substantive and symbolic importance. South Africa has 
developed an impressive array of pro-poor infrastructure and service delivery 
programmes based on what are generally regarded as socially enlightened policies. Two 
of the best-known macro-level programmes are the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) and its more conservative successor, Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR). These programmes consist of interlinked administrative and 
social policies and principles designed to overcome the legacy of underdevelopment and 
inequality that resulted from apartheid. 
In brief the RDP was the mandate given to the ANC-led government to 
transform society in fundamental ways. As in other areas of South African 
society, all types of infrastructure came under policy scrutiny when the new 
government assumed power in 1994 (Khosa, 2002). 
The fortunes of the ANC government – indeed the entire notion of a developmental state 
– rest on their ability to ensure that the principles and social investments set out in the 
RDP/GEAR are seen to be optimized through a responsive, effective and delivery-
oriented civil service (see, for example, ‘Batho Pele’ section of GSA, 1998a). Clearly this 
requires that those spheres of government charged with particular service responsibilities 
have sufficient revenue to meet their obligations – the Division of Revenue Bill published 
annually by the Treasury ensures that this is the case. According to the Minister of 
Finance’s Budget Speech 2003/04, since 1994 public spending on health, education, 
welfare, housing and other social services has increased from 52.9 per cent of non-
interest expenditure to 58.3 per cent (2003/04). There are other legal provisions, such as 
the Public Finance Management Act, that seek to ensure that public finance is effectively 
and legitimately deployed by government and the civil service at large and that the 
expenditure and outcome are reported and in the public domain. 
South Africa became a democracy in a period when international initiatives to prevent or 
control corruption had significantly increased (ISS, 1997). The Institute of Security 
Studies (ISS) notes that in this period of about two decades the United Nations, the 
OECD, the Council of Europe and the Organisation of American States have all been 
involved in programmes to combat corruption (ibid). The Southern African Development 
                                                   
1
 It is presumed that this is an error and is meant to read ‘quantification’ 
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Community (SADC) and subsequently NEPAD (the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development) have also taken a position on corruption, drawing attention to its impact on 
national economies and investor confidence (ibid). Perhaps most importantly, South 
Africa is currently (February 2006) nearing the end of the first step in implementing the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM is a voluntary exercise entered into 
by member states of the African Union as a form of self-monitoring. The blueprint for this 
exercise is the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate 
Governance that sets out values, codes and standards in these sectors (NEPAD, 2003). 
The purpose of the APRM is to ensure that members meet these norms and standards in 
both policy and practice, thus creating the conditions for ‘political stability, high economic 
growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic 
integration …’ (ibid). Member states engage in four types of review, namely: 
• A country review 
• Periodic reviews at intervals of two to four years 
• Self-initiated reviews 
• Reviews undertaken in response to impending political or economic crisis. It is 
suggested that these can be ‘called for by participating Heads of State and 
government in a spirit of helpfulness to the Government concerned’ (ibid). 
It is common knowledge that one of the main obstacles to the ‘normalization’ of South 
African society are the high levels of crime that have prevailed since the first democratic 
elections in 1994. This resulted in the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) being 
launched in May 1996: 
Fraud, corruption and graft involving government funds are seen to be 
undermining public confidence in democratic government itself, and therefore 
deserving urgent attention (ibid). 
There is a body of opinion within South Africa that believes that the emergence and 
growth of corruption are more than simply a malaise that affects the public service, and 
that it constitutes an affront to the new democratic order and the principles it represents. 
Corruption and mal-administration are inconsistent with the rule of law and 
the fundamental values of our Constitution. They undermine the constitutional 
commitment to human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms. They are the antithesis of the 
open, accountable, democratic government required by the Constitution. If 
allowed to go unchecked and unpunished they will pose a serious threat to 
our democratic state (Chaskalson, 2000). 
 
4.2 Corruption in the civil service 
The Public Service Commission (PSC) in South Africa has also involved itself in 
measures to combat corruption, including ethical / integrity frameworks. In September 
2004 the PSC launched the National Anti-corruption Hotline that allows government 
employees, the public and concerned third parties to report corruption. Since its 
establishment the PSC has referred 1,390 corruption complaints to departments for 
further investigation – about 70 per cent of these could not be substantiated after the 
departments were investigated. In 2005 the PSC also conducted 45 investigations on its 
own initiative or because it had received complaints. These related to alleged corruption, 
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mal-administration (including alleged human resource management and procurement-
related transgressions), unethical behaviour and service delivery complaints. The Public 
Finance Management Act (PFMA), read in conjunction with the Treasury Regulations, 
requires that the department report finalized financial misconduct cases to the PSC. (In 
terms of the PFMA, financial misconduct is any material losses through criminal conduct, 
unauthorized, irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure.) In the 2004/05 financial year, 
513 such cases were reported to the PSC, down from 582 in 2003/04, however the 
decrease may have been due to non-reporting by departments (ibid). The majority of 
cases involved fraud and theft, however there was a decrease in this form of misconduct 
from the 2003/04 level (50 per cent). Where employees were charged, 77 per cent were 
found guilty of financial misconduct and 38 per cent of those found guilty were dismissed. 
The PSC claims that this indicates that government does not tolerate this form of 
corruption. The total cost of this misconduct was estimated at over R120 million, of which 
about R97 million was recovered (ibid). The PSC also co-operates with the National Anti-
Corruption Forum (NACF), a body consisting of representatives of the public and private 
sector and civil society (ibid). A summit of the NACF in March 2005 adopted resolutions 
which created the basis for the National Anti-corruption Programme (NAP), to be initiated 
in April 2006 and run over the next three years. The Department of Public Service and 
Administration is also monitoring the implementation of the Public Service Anti-corruption 
Strategy due to run until the end of 2007 at a cost of R10.5 million. The NAP will include 
the establishment of ‘a cadre of over 400 anti-corruption practitioners…’ (Fraser-Moleketi, 
2006). 
The civil service relies to a large extent on ‘whistle-blowers’ to reveal corruption and 
therefore it is important that they be protected. The PSC acknowledges that it knows of 
whistle-blowers who have not been adequately protected. Deputy Chairperson of the 
Public Service Commission, John Ernstzen, acknowledged that the identities of many 
whistleblowers had ‘somehow’ been revealed, resulting in them having to receive 
‘maximum protection’ and becoming subject to ‘hardships’. As a result ‘a number of other 
people were too fearful of exposing other cases of corruption’ (ibid). Norman Maharaj 
(PSC Commissioner for the Western Cape) suggested that the best the PSC could offer 
public servants who ‘blew the whistle’ was protection from unfair dismissal, intimidation or 
any other risk to their job security – personal safety was ‘probably outside of the PSC’s 
domain’ (ibid). 
 
4.3 Defining corruption 
Since the experience of corruption varies greatly from country to country and is often 
shaped by cultural values, it makes sense to focus on a specifically South African 
definition. Sam Sole is a journalist with the Weekly Mail and Guardian who has 
specialized in cases of government corruption and mal-administration. Sole is particularly 
interested in the connection between corruption and accountability and argues that South 
Africa’s democratic trajectory has been marked by considerable effort to ‘contain and roll 
back corruption’ (Sole, 2005) and increase individual accountability, however this has 
been accompanied by a ‘drift’ towards institutional immunity in the political sphere. Sole 
notes that simple definitions of corruption do not suffice because corruption may take 
clearly illegal forms, such as fraud, or it may be the vastly more subtle practices of rent-
seeking, patronage and abuses of power (ibid). Sole therefore offers a broad definition of 
corruption that seeks to encompass the many irregular practices and habits that 
undermine the core values of the democratic programme in South Africa:  
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Corruption is the wilful subversion (or attempted subversion) of a due 
decision-making process with regard to the allocation of any benefit (ibid). 
Sole argues that this definition is apt for the South African context because the emphasis 
is on subversion of the decision-making process. The subversion may take place through 
inducement or through the exercise of patronage or other forms of collective behaviour, 
or even ‘by dint of ideological conviction’ (ibid, p.87). Of interest is Sole’s idea that the 
motivation for the subversion is less important than its result, i.e. to be corrupt the 
subversion of the decision-making process need not be motivated by graft. This definition 
seems particularly well suited to the grey area in many irregular transactions where the 
motivation can be a combination of graft, patronage or an undisclosed common purpose 
between the parties perpetrating the corruption. 
Key to Sole’s understanding is the question of ‘accountability’, a value that is as 
important at the level of prevailing business and political culture and the ‘social bedrock 
of ethical standards and norms’ (ibid) as it is within legal frameworks, statutory oversight 
bodies, etc. One of the few ways of understanding the gap between formal policy and 
principle on corruption, which is generally of a high order, and the day-to-day evidence of 
fresh misappropriation and self-enrichment, is the recognition that informal cultures of 
secrecy and collusion and networks of solidarity may be stronger and more pervasive 
than formal accountability systems (ibid). Sole also cites accountability failure in the 
private sector, often due to expediency; for example it is easier, cheaper and less 
damaging to a company profile to allow a corrupt executive to resign rather than take 
effective disciplinary / legal action. By implication, then, accountability is not a 
consideration limited to public office. 
Sole notes that rent-seeking and patronage are critical elements in understanding 
corruption. Drawing on a paper by Jonathan Hyslop, Sole defines rents as ‘something for 
nothing’ or nodes of competition for ‘easy money’. The idea is that the resulting 
transaction yields income that is higher than the minimum that would have resulted had 
there been alternative opportunities. Rents may be legal (subsidies and transfers 
organized through the political process or ‘super-profits’ made by innovators before the 
competition catches up) or illegal (transfers by private mafias) (ibid, p.88). 
Using Hyslop’s definition of patron–client relationships, Sole draws attention to the 
repetitive nature of such relationships between patrons and clients that exist in a long-
term relationship of exchange. The power and status of the patron and client invariably 
differ, but the relationship is nonetheless personal and under normal circumstances may 
entail nothing more than legal donations or recommendations. Under conditions of fierce 
competition, however, the patron who is unwilling to break the law finds that they cannot 
retain their client base. While not always based on the family, ‘in societies where the idea 
of the family has a particular power and prestige, patronage relations are likely to be 
stronger than in those social orders which emphasize individualism’ (Hyslop, 2004). 
Hyslop suggests that such networks may well operate in modern forms of organization 
where the links are ideological or institutional loyalty (Sole, 2005, p.89). This insight, 
notes Sole, is particularly important in South Africa, with its ruling ANC party. 
A contrasting and more generic definition of corruption is offered by Stiaan van der 
Merwe (ECNGOC, 2001): 
The abuse of public power for private or sectional gain or sectional profit. 
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Van der Merwe, however, goes on to critique his own definition in terms of its 
exclusionary effect. By defining corruption as an action in the public sector, for example, 
this understanding of corruption does not extend to bribery of bodies within civil society. 
Van der Merwe suggests that a broader understanding of corruption demands a look at 
issues of power, be it military, physical, economic, political, cultural, technological, 
bureaucratic or gender based, and that this has ‘to be factored into a profile of corruption’ 
(ibid). Framing a concept of ‘public power’, i.e. power exercised by public officials in the 
public interest, it is obvious that this form of power can be abused: 
Instead of using public power to the benefit and well being of relevant publics 
it is used for selfish, greedy and ulterior purposes. Ultimately such abuse of 
public power takes place directly or indirectly, at the expense of those 
supposed to benefit from exercising public power and responsibility. Public 
power is abused for individual gain or for sectional gain (for example, my 
friends, my family my race) (ibid). 
Van der Merwe also alludes to two dimensions of corruption, namely the micro and the 
macro. Micro refers to the behavioural aspects of corruption, i.e. attitudes or actions by 
groups or individuals in different sectors and different social levels which lead to abuse of 
public power for sectional or individual gain. The relative proportions of that gain are less 
important than the behaviour or attitudes that lead to the problem (ibid). This is the 
dimension of corruption that is commonly examined in research and reports on 
corruption. 
By contrast, the macro or systemic dimension of corruption refers to structural aspects 
and systems. Here entire social systems – be they political, economic, organizational, 
cultural or religious – operate in a manner that facilitates the abuse of power and justifies 
the fact that personal or sectional gain occurs at the expense of a broader public. Van 
der Merwe suggests that this is a poorly understood dimension of corruption. The abuse 
of power occurs, for example, at the level of powerful economic and political players in 
the international or transnational arena where monopolistic and discretionary practices 
occur in ways that defy accountability. These, van der Merwe suggests, need to be 
‘unpacked and cited as corruption per se’ (ibid). The problem in using this definition is 
that it easily spreads into the realm of political economy or economic justice and the 
parameters of its application become increasingly blurred, as van der Merwe recognizes 
(ibid): 
Undoubtedly this dimension of the problem might cause the most discomfort 
and controversy, even to many who are at the moment very active in 
highlighting the problem of corruption and the need to address it in all its 
forms and wherever it rears its head. 
There appears to be insufficient evidence to argue that institutional reform initiatives and 
reconfiguring broad-level policies for large-scale public service reform are misdirected 
(what interventions would change by virtue of recognizing the corruption dimension rather 
than the acknowledged problems of justice, morality and institutional rationality?) Van der 
Merwe warns, however, that macro-level corruption becomes more controversial when 
‘ideological differences enter the stage to inform and guide analyses of problems and the 
processes to address structural corruption on all levels’ (ECNGOC, 2001). Under these 
circumstances it is invariably a more conservative and limited understanding of corruption 
that prevails, thus the study of corruption is often tainted with the notion of ‘corruption as 
(a luxury) item on a conservative, individualistic, behaviourist agenda’ (ibid). As van der 
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Merwe implies, this often lends studies into corruption a ‘politically incorrect’ quality or a 
sense that such concerns are strategically misdirected or even serve a neo-conservative 
agenda. The issue of corruption is therefore vulnerable to attack from politicians in 
speeches ostensibly designed to contextualize, but which in fact often distract from or 
cloud major problems of corruption in government. 
Frequently government seems more concerned to moderate public views on corruption 
than address the problem itself. As Sole suggests, the reasons for this may be largely 
political, i.e. exposure of corruption can be used to undermine the credibility of political 
opponents – a scandal thus becomes the terrain of political contest (Sole, 2005, p.88). 
But South Africa’s history and cultural / ethnic diversity, make this a double-edged sword: 
Loud and frequent accusations of corruption and mismanagement from 
government’s opponents have been met with counter-accusations of racism 
and wanting the democratic state to fail. 
In February 2006, at the time that deputy president Zuma was appearing in court on rape 
charges – he is still expected to face corruption charges – and Parliament was plagued 
by fresh allegations of fraud by MPs involved in the ‘Travelgate’ scandal, Parliament 
adopted a report of the joint co-ordinating committee on the self-assessment process of 
the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which claimed that corruption in South 
Africa is ‘exaggerated’. The committee stressed the ‘major strides in curbing corruption’: 
There are perceptions that exaggerate the true state of affairs with regard to 
the prevalence of corruption in the country (South Africa Press Association, 
2006). 
One aspect of anti-corruption activity in South Africa that clearly has substance is the 
legal framework. Corruption in South Africa is prosecuted in criminal terms through the 
Corruption Act (No.94 of 1992) that effectively makes corruption a criminal offence. There 
is an important distinction between the laws designed to promote clean and transparent 
governance and financial accountability and laws that deal with the mechanics of 
corruption and criminality and its prosecution. Some of the key legislation to deal with the 
latter emerges from South Africa’s experience with international organized crime and 
money-laundering syndicates and includes: the International Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters Act, the Proceeds of Crime Bill, the Money Laundering Bill and the Special 
Investigating Unit and Tribunals Bill. This last Bill is the legal underpinning for what is 
arguably the country’s most effective programme to combat corruption. A full outline of 
the institutions involved in anti-corruption activities is provided in the section on Anti-
corruption programmes. For the record it must also be noted that since 1994 various 
commissions of enquiry have been launched into alleged corruption including: 
• Skweyiya Commission (corrupt practices by officials and the misuse of state funds in 
a former apartheid ‘homeland’) 
• Budlender Commission (irregular use of assets in former homelands) 
• Heath Commission (state and other property in the Eastern Cape and forerunner to 
the Special Investigations Unit) 
• Browde Commission (irregular contracts, appointments, promotions and 
improvements to service contracts), which also led to the White Commission (on 
salaries for civil servants) 
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• Krugel Commissions (conduct of attorneys practicing under the Transvaal Law 
Society) (see ISS, 1997) 
• Jali Commission (conditions and corruption in prisons) 
There are many important forms of corruption in South Africa that will fall outside the 
scope of this study. One of the most damaging forms of corruption, in that it calls into 
question fundamental matters of justice and rule of law, is corruption in the criminal 
justice system. 
In South Africa, corruption in the criminal justice system is said to be 
pervasive. This obviously has severe consequences for public perceptions of 
the institutions of criminal justice, which many South Africans (especially the 
poor) already doubt, as the legal system was previously perceived as one of 
the main vehicles for enforcing apartheid (ISS, 1997). 
This commonly manifests itself in the theft and sale of police dockets, and a scan of 
those officials charged with such corruption suggests that the police, prosecutors and 
court interpreters are all involved (ibid). The theft of warrant vouchers and the withdrawal 
of charges for payment are also common in the Department of Justice, according to the 
Institute for Security Studies. This results in dangerous criminals often going free, many 
wasted hours of police investigative work and the loss of credibility of the system in the 
eyes of the public. 
 
4.4 Patterns of corruption and public perception 
As already noted, generally the quantification and statistical analysis of these incidents of 
corruption is lacking and much of the analytical writing on the topic is based on 
perception surveys. The Country Corruption Assessment Report: South Africa, April 2003 
by the United Nations and the Department of Public Service and Administration suggests 
that the South African public generally perceives a high incidence of corruption in the 
public sector, but does not have the personal experience of corruption to substantiate 
their views. 
It is very likely that similar factors influence the perception of corruption. In a 
country with a low level of corruption, perceptions of corruption, like those of 
crime, are often based on what happened to a friend of a friend, rather than 
on direct experience. Most people interviewed aren’t able to cite an example 
where they were themselves subject to corruption. Further, the perception 
surveys do not capture the extensive work which has been done to establish 
a comprehensive and effective legal database, or to strengthen departmental 
capacity to deliver services and to deal with corruption (UN and DPSA, 2003). 
Various studies that attempt to access the views of those who have been the victims of 
crime have been carried out by the United Nations, the Department of Safety and 
Security, Statistics South Africa in collaboration with South African universities (ibid). 
From the early 1990s to date these point towards slightly increasing concern about the 
prevalence of corruption, particularly within the police and an increased public propensity 
to report corruption. 
In all three surveys, police officers were perceived as being the public officials 
who were the most vulnerable to incidences of corruption. Moreover 
policemen were also perceived as the public officials most likely to be 
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involved in corruption. Reporting levels of corruption have increased in South 
Africa during the period 1996–2000. Reporting corruption to police has 
increased from some 3 per cent to 6 per cent when it comes to reporting to 
the police, and from 2 per cent to 9 per cent in terms of reporting corruption to 
other public agencies. Nevertheless, more than half of the respondents 
contend that it is now more difficult to ‘get the right official to deal with a 
problem’ or to ‘get a fair treatment’ (ibid, p.95). 
The October 2001 Markinor Omnibus survey of 2,000 metropolitan and 1,500 rural 
respondents included questions on corruption. One of the questions gives some 
indication of the relative levels of corruption that were perceived across different 
government functions at this time: 
During the past 12 months, has any government or public official asked or 
otherwise made it clear to you or anyone in your family, that he/she expected 
money, a present or a favour (i.e. more than the official charge) in order to get 
the following: 
 
Table 1. Respondent’s personal experience of corruption 
No. Category Yes No Don’t know 
1. Any 10.8%   
2. Job 4.4% 91.6% 4.1% 
3. Pension or other welfare payment 2.3% 93.5% 4.2% 
4. Electricity or water 3.2% 92.5% 4.4% 
5. Housing or land 2.6% 92.2% 5.1% 
6. Medical care  1.0% 93.9% 5.1% 
7. Schooling  1.7% 93.8% 4.5% 
8. ID document, passport, birth or death 
certificate, other documents or licenses 
3.2% 92.2% 4.6% 
Source: Markinor Omnibus Survey 2001 
 
The Markinor results suggest that requests for bribes occur most commonly in job 
seeking, in obtaining municipal services (electricity and water) and in obtaining services 
from the Department of Home Affairs (identity documents, etc.) The impression that there 
is a particular corruption problem within the police, Department of Home Affairs and local 
government is reinforced by the results of another question in the same survey, namely: 
How likely is it that a person in need of services from government to which 
he/she is entitled, would have to offer money, a present or a favour (i.e. more 
than the official charge) to get it? 
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Table 2. Likelihood that citizens have to use bribery to access services 
No. Category V. Likely  Likely  Unlikely  V. Unlikely 
Don’t 
know 
1. Customs official 6.6% 16.0% 23.0% 32.5% 21.9% 
2. Police officer 14.7% 22.4% 20.3% 29.5% 13.2% 
3. Home Affairs 9.6% 17.6% 22.4% 31.9% 18.6% 
4. Local Govt official 9.4% 18.8% 21.1% 32.2% 18.6% 
5. Tax/revenue 4.2% 9.4% 24.0% 37.2% 25.2% 
6. Doctor/nurse 4.2% 11.0% 25.0% 42.5% 17.4% 
7. Teacher/Professor 4.4% 12.7% 24.4% 40.9% 16.5% 
8. Official in court 9.8% 16.4% 20.2% 34.3% 19.3% 
Source: Markinor Omnibus Survey 2000 
 
In terms of the Markinor results, it appears that most cases of corruption go un-reported, 
as only 11.2 per cent of those who had experienced corruption said that they or someone 
else had reported it to the police or another government agency. 
Obviously the qualifying factor that the respondent had to actually be exposed to 
corruption, in most of these questions does not do justice to what the respondent may 
know about corruption. Research reports are typically, and sometimes justifiably, 
dismissive of perceptions relating to both discussions with friends and rumour. This does 
not always do justice to citizens’ efforts to gain knowledge by talking to connected 
acquaintances or by simply reading the newspaper and listening to radio news. First-
hand experience of corruption is not necessarily a pre-requisite for holding a view on the 
issue and being concerned, although the factual basis of that view can obviously be 
questioned. 
The Markinor survey suggests that there is more concern about corruption than the first-
hand experience might initially suggest: 
What is your interpretation of the seriousness of corruption in South Africa? 
With which one of the following statements do you agree most? 
 
Table 3. Respondent’s perception of the seriousness of corruption 
Statement Agree 
South Africa has a lot of corruption and it is one of the nmost serious problems the 
country is confronted with 41.1% 
South Africa has a lot of corruption, but this country is confronted with other, more 
serious problems 39.1% 
South Africa does not experience a lot of corruption, but it is still one of the most 
serious problems the county is confronted with 11.6% 
South Africa does not experience a lot of corruption and it is not among the serious 
problems the country faces 2.9% 
Don’t know 5.2% 
Source: Markinor Omnibus Survey 2000 
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The Country Corruption Assessment Report suggests that the demographic pattern of 
these results must be recognized. For example of the 41 per cent of respondents who felt 
that corruption is a very serious problem in South Africa: 44 per cent were 35 years or 
older, 45 per cent were employed, 48 per cent had a tertiary education, 54 per cent were 
from the Indian community and the same percentage were from white communities (54 
per cent) (both racial minorities who constitute a disproportionate percentage of the 
upper and middle class). The Country Report notes, ‘This is consistent with the 
pessimistic view, which is commonly found in these communities in surveys on crime and 
police effectiveness… Still some 80 per cent of respondents think that there is a lot of 
corruption in South Africa’ (ibid, p.96). 
As already outlined, the South African government has taken a range of anti-corruption 
measures, including legislative and policy reform as well as special programmes and the 
establishment of anti-corruption agencies. The Markinor survey also looked into the 
public’s views about these efforts. 
How well would you say government is handling the following? 
 
Table 4. How well is the government handling corruption? 
 
Very / fairly 
well 
Not very / at 
ll well Don’t know 
Reducing the Crime Rate 36.4% 62.3% 1.3% 
Fighting Corruption in Government 35.3% 57.0% 7.7% 
Maintaining Transparency and 
Accountability 35.1% 46.2% 18.7% 
Source: Markinor Omnibus Survey 2000 
 
The majority of respondents do not think that government is reducing the crime rate or 
fighting corruption in government very well, and the largest percentile in the transparency 
/ accountability option have concerns about this aspect of government. 
A slightly different enquiry by Afrobarometer in 2004 seems to reinforce the picture that 
when forced to pay a bribe, offer a gift or do a favour, South Africans have the most 
serious problems with obtaining a document or permit (much of this may relate to 
previous observations about the Home Affairs Department). Similar problems are 
experienced with the police (already discussed), obtaining household services (typically a 
municipal function), getting a child into school and avoiding problems with tax officials. 
Significantly the problem has increased since 2002 for all transactions except the tax 
officials, where it remains static. Of particular interest is the ‘household services’ issue 
where experience of corruption has increased by 4 per cent since the 2002 survey 
(Afrobarometer, 2005). 
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Figure 1. Victimization by corruption in South Africa 
 
Source: Afrobarometer Briefing 10, March 2005 
 
South African politicians and civil servants often remind the public that corruption is a 
two-way process. For every corrupt politician or official taking a bribe there is a business 
or individual offering the bribe (or as the operational head of one of the Special 
Investigation Units (SIU) noted in an interview, it is a relationship of ‘corruptor and 
corruptee’.) There appears to be a worrying inference here, namely that corruption in 
government should be less strongly condemned if civil society demonstrates an equal 
propensity to become corrupt – or what might be termed ‘corruption by popular mandate’. 
The propensity for business to engage in corrupt interaction with government is an 
essential element of on-going and expanding corruption. Business surveys are important 
but usually treat the business sector as any other respondent. This approach ignores a 
critical distinction, namely that while the poor may be forced to pay bribes for services to 
which they are entitled, business may confront the same demands for government 
services but – unlike poor citizens – they are able to pro-actively offer bribes to secure 
unusual advantage / increased profit. 
 
4.5 How corrupt is South Africa? 
Generally South Africa fares slightly worse than average, according to the measure used 
by Transparency International (TI) when it comes to perceptions of corruption. The 2001 
Transparency International Annual Corruption Perception Index ranks South Africa at 36 
among the 102 countries it surveyed. With a score of 4.8 out of 10 South Africa is slightly 
under the ‘acceptable’ average score of 5. In terms of the TI index, South Africa is less 
corrupt than Tunisia, Mauritius, South Korea, Greece, Brazil or Poland but slightly more 
corrupt than Namibia, Taiwan, Italy, Hungary and Malaysia. By contrast, the 2004 
Afrobarometer survey claims that the 24 per cent of South Africans who perceived MPs 
to be involved in corruption are more positive about their elected representatives than 
Malawi (36 per cent), Mali (38 per cent) or Nigeria (53 per cent) (Afrobarometer, 2005). 
South Africans see corruption as a serious problem ‘but perhaps not as pressing as 
problems such as poverty, unemployment, HIV/Aids and crime in general’ (UNDPSA, 
2001; GSA, no date). 
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The most recent Afrobarometer survey (October / November 2004) suggests that South 
Africans are likely to see less corruption in government in 2005 than they did during the 
1990s. In 1997 nearly 50 per cent of the survey respondents felt that ‘all’ or ‘most’ 
national government officials were involved in corruption, but this had dropped to 21 per 
cent in October / November 2004 (ibid). Similar perceptions relating to Members of 
Parliament had dropped from 50 per cent to 24 per cent. A significant body of the 
respondents feel that the South African Police Service is corrupt (36 per cent). 
Afrobarometer compares this to perceptions of the police in Namibia (37 per cent), 
Senegal (41 per cent), Tanzania (44 per cent), Zambia (47 per cent), Malawi (48 per 
cent), Ghana (53 per cent), Kenya (59 per cent), Uganda (67 per cent and Nigeria (70 
per cent). Against these states, South Africa compares favourably, however in Lesotho 
(28 per cent), Botswana (23 per cent) and Cabo Verde (8 per cent) there appears to be a 
significantly more healthy public perception of the police. The fact that the highest 
percentile of the South African respondents perceive corruption in the police is consistent 
with the Markinor and other United Nations surveys already mentioned. Again local 
government officials and councillors are the next level of government where negative 
public perceptions prevail, with 24 per cent of the public perceiving corruption; Members 
of Parliament are similarly perceived (ibid). 
 
4.6 Anti-corruption programmes and measures 
South Africa has an unusually impressive array of legislation, programmes and dedicated 
organizations which function to criminalize, expose or in other ways combat corruption. 
But as Lala Camerer of the Institute of Security studies warns, in the light of the opening 
up of the political process in South Africa and the exposure of politicians and civil 
servants to public scrutiny and sometimes harsh media attention, ‘… it should come as 
no surprise that anti-corruption rhetoric forms part of the political agenda’ (Camerer, 
1999, p.1). Camerer points out that in Nigeria the production of political rhetoric around 
corruption has replaced the actual tackling of the issue. Camerer is not the only analyst 
to warn of similar risk in South Africa – Sole, a journalist who specializes in corruption 
assignments, has made similar observations. In the interviews with corruption 
investigators summarized in a section of this report, the extent to which these agencies, 
especially the Special Investigations Unit, are under extreme pressure to produce 
outcomes that are politically favourable to government, is very evident. 
The symbolism and the message that the state is ‘getting tough on corruption’ often 
seems to be regarded as more important than the actual functioning of the anti-corruption 
bodies that have been set up. 
The establishment of an anti-corruption agency or agencies with extensive 
investigate powers, a high public profile, honest staff and government 
support, is a key aspect of such reforms. However, even when such agencies 
are created, it is common that they are often starved of resources needed to 
achieve their purpose. Analysts have warned that repetitive rhetoric that is not 
matched by sustainable reform will lead to indifference… (ibid). 
It must be acknowledged, however, that the budgets assigned to the SIU and the 
Scorpions have in recent times become more realistic. Perhaps more importantly, the 
integrated and more holistic measures to prevent and deter corruption are also growing 
stronger, namely public service training, codes of ethics, proper disciplinary procedures, 
staff circulation systems (in customs, revenue and contract-awarding agencies) and 
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watchdog units within departments (ibid). It is self-evident that any anti-corruption agency 
will need adequate resources, sufficient staff that are appropriately skilled and 
experienced and the capacity to manage and co-ordinate information from diverse 
sources. Furthermore such an agency will not be effective unless it is free to deploy 
these capabilities in an independent manner, free of political and bureaucratic influence. 
Camerer, for example, suggests that anti-corruption experts should be drawn from the 
fields of law, finance, economics and accounting (ibid, p.2). These experts need to be 
organized into units or teams that have broad powers including the right of access to 
information and the legal instruments to seize both evidence and the proceeds of 
corruption. As we shall see later, the SIU and the Scorpions are generally understood to 
be particularly well equipped in this regard. Centrally co-ordinated access to all 
departmental information is also critical to ensure that information held across different 
agencies is not compartmentalized. Camerer states further that anti-corruption agencies 
need to be shielded from political pressure that may seek to impinge upon the ambit of its 
work and its staff must be free from political, economic and personal pressures. In South 
Africa the matter of independence is critical, given the history of persistent political 
pressure to bring certain agencies under the authority of the South African Police Service 
(SAPS), an agency that is widely perceived to have serious problems of corruption and to 
be subject to political influence. 
An outline of the respective anti-corruption agencies is presented below: 
 
Table 5. South Africa’s anti-corruption agencies 
Agency Role 
South African Police Services 
– Commercial Branch 
Investigates all forms of commercial crime – including extensive 
investigations into fraud in SA government departments, for 
example, fraud within the Department of Social Development 
(previously welfare) (see case study that accompanies this report). 
Office for Serious Economic 
Offences (OSEO) 
Established in 1991 with its own Act, the OSEO prioritizes cases 
involving large sums of money and uses multi-disciplinary teams 
with extensive powers. It was widely regarded as poorly staffed. 
Special Investigation Unit 
(formerly the Heath Special 
Investigating Unit) 
Established in June 1995 under Justice Heath, the unit 
investigates state corruption or mal-administration with a view to 
recovering assets.  
Directorate of Special 
Operations (Scorpions) 
Established under the National Prosecuting Authority in January 
2001, the Directorate investigates and prosecutes organized 
crime, particularly that deemed to be serious and complex or 
which alternatively involved money-laundering or racketeering. 
Independent Complaints 
Directorate 
Acts on complaints of police misconduct, including alleged 
corruption. 
National Directorate Public 
Prosecutions 
Controls and guides prosecutions and institutes criminal 
proceedings and oversees Scorpions. 
National Intelligence Agency Gathers intelligence and work may include corruption cases. 
Public Service Commission Monitors, evaluates and investigates the public service. 
Chapter 9 Institutions: These are state institutions charged with supporting constitutional democracy 
and are required to be independent and impartial and to answer only to the Constitution and the law. 
Auditor General (AG) Audits the accounts of government at all levels and thus provides 
control over the financial activities of the executive. When required 
the AG also undertakes forensic and performance audits of 
government institutions where corruption is alleged. 
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Public Protector The Public Protector acts in accordance with the Public Protector 
Act of 1994 and the Constitution and may investigate state mal-
administration, abuses of state power or tardy performance by 
state officials and corrupt or improper use of public funds. The 
main focus is mal-administration rather than crime. 
Sources: Institute of Security Studies: Monograph No.15 September 1997 and Occasional Paper 
No.38 of March 1999, www.siu.org.za/news.asp accessed 23 January 2006, and 
www.ndpp.gov.za/dso/dso-introduction accessed 18 may 2006. 
 
Two anti-corruption institutions, the Auditor General and the Special Investigations Unit 
(SIU), are probably the most important when considering corruption at municipal level 
and corruption that affects infrastructure services. These institutions are therefore 
discussed separately below. 
 
4.7 The Auditor General (AG) 
In the early to mid-1990s the AG’s reports were mostly concerned with irregularities in 
state finance emerging from the legacy of apartheid, in particular the state of accounts in 
former apartheid structures and the problems that arose in taking over the accounts of 
former ‘homeland’ governments (ISS, 1997). The AG has also probed fraud in the 
payment of social grants and highlighted irregular registration of pension beneficiaries 
and general problems in the verification of beneficiary details (ibid). Unauthorized 
expenditure by state bodies seems to affect all spheres of government (national, 
provincial and local) according to the AG’s findings. 
Details of the AG’s comments on local government financial reporting are documented 
later in this report, but it is worth emphasizing a few general observations now: 
In recent years a growing trend of non-submission of financial statements by 
accounting officers of local authorities has been observed. This in effect 
delayed and impeded the public accountability process (Auditor General, 
2003, p.6). 
Municipal financial statements were often unavailable for the preceding four years: 
Given the inherent problem of inadequate accounting records and the 
resultant failure to compile financial statements, a more concerted effort will 
have to be made in order to update the financial records of many of the local 
authorities (ibid, p.5). 
As a result of working with incomplete financial records, the AG’s role was largely 
reduced to ‘conducting audit tests on the compliance with legislation as it pertains to 
financial matters’ (ibid, p.6). This weakened the role of the AG in so far as this office was 
supposed to act in protecting the public interest. ‘In short, without financial statements, 
public accountability cannot be achieved’ (ibid). This is an important insight to which this 
report will return repeatedly. 
As a Section 9 institution with limited influence over other organs of state, it appeared 
that the AG tended to report the same shortfalls year after year and to get little 
assistance from other spheres of government who were supposed to exercise an 
oversight function: 
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A significant number of findings contained in the previous report were 
repeated in the above report. As such it is disappointing to note that the first-
mentioned report has not yet been dealt with by the legislature (ibid, p.5). 
Further concluding comments by the AG for the period ending 2002 also suggest that the 
appointment of municipal managers and management teams after the December 2000 
elections (that introduced new municipal forms with supposedly enhanced administrative 
and managerial capability) had done little to enhance financial management in 
municipalities and much of the work undertaken in this regard was done by consultants. 
The AG warned of fruitless expenditure where consultants were employed while ‘existing 
financial staff are already remunerated to do the task’ (ibid, p.17)’. 
The Auditor General’s office exists as powerful proof that the new South African state is 
serious about tackling corruption and outlawing wasteful or irregular government 
expenditure. The AG meets many of the criteria suggested by Camerer; it uses expert 
auditors, it has the power to access government financial records and as its reports 
illustrate, it is independent. However, its actual impact appears weak in terms of its ability 
to enforce correct public accountability, and thereby ensure that resources that are 
directed – as policy dictates – to the poor. The case studies in this report will show that 
alone, the AG cannot guarantee that fiscal resources are not lost to corruption and 
actually reach those in greatest need. Eastern Cape municipalities routinely ignore the 
reports of the AG and fail to furnish the AG with the necessary financial records on which 
to base a meaningful audit. The AG can reveal and investigate corrupt municipal 
tendering processes for example, only if the council concerned are prepared to approve 
follow-up forensic audits. As this report will show, however, much municipal corruption 
emanates from councillors and especially those in senior office. In order to move beyond 
the simple reporting of corruption, the AG needs to involve other organs of state and/or 
some of the anti-corruption agencies and, more challengingly, it needs to develop 
working relations with organized civil society. In the case of the anti-corruption agencies, 
evidence of co-operation is strong, but in the case of the municipalities, especially the 
Eastern Cape provincial government, the picture is more mixed, as the above comments 
of the AG illustrate. 
Nor is the AG ‘untouchable’, in the manner that other anti-corruption initiatives worldwide 
have shown themselves to be above departmental politics. Eastern Cape politicians and 
mayors routinely criticize the AG when they are the targets of unfavourable reports and 
attempt to mislead the public about the AG’s mandate. Local press reports in 2003 
indicated a particularly strong political challenge by the OR Tambo District Municipality to 
the reporting and investigative powers of the AG. In February 2003 Zoleka Capa, 
executive mayor of the OR Tambo District Municipality, accused the AG of producing a 
‘flawed report’ on her municipality after the AG report implicated both Capa and the 
municipal manager Moffat Qithi in financial irregularities (Daily Dispatch, 14 February, 
2003). Capa said the report was ‘not authentic’ and based on unknown informants. She 
further suggested that the provincial MEC did not have the right to authorize 
investigations by the Auditor General and that the AG should have sought permission 
from the municipality before launching its investigation. Councillors failed to attend the 
meeting where the AG’s report was to be presented to council by staff of the provincial 
department and AG – the councillors said they were busy with ‘joint operations’ and 
outreach projects (ibid). Nor was Capa prepared to respond to the MEC’s request for an 
explanation of the irregularities identified in the AG report – instead she sent a memo 
questioning the legality of the AG’s investigation. Over a period of slightly less than one 
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year, Capa and the council found various reasons, including overseas trips, to avoid 
providing explanations to the provincial government (ibid). But where the province has 
generally supported the mandate of the AG in relation to municipalities, it has also 
launched its own criticism of the AG in relation to provincial-level reports. In November 
2001, for example, provincial treasury called for the withdrawal of audit reports after the 
AG detailed about 40 possible instances of criminal misconduct by civil servants in the 
finance department (Daily Dispatch, 29 November, 2001). The problem is not confined to 
the Eastern Cape. Former national Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs Penuell 
Maduna also attacked the AG in relation to investigations regarding the Strategic Fuel 
Fund and the minister’s own conduct. Another Section 9 institution, the Public Protector, 
vindicated the AG’s position and found that Maduna’s attack on the AG was 
unconstitutional. The ANC, however, used its majority in the parliamentary committee to 
shield Maduna from sanction (Ellis, 2001). 
The examples suggest that while government is anxious to publicize the existence and 
operation of Section 9 institutions and other anti-corruption agencies, it frequently has 
some difficulty in coming to terms with the actual outcome of such investigations. 
 
4.8 The Special Investigation Unit (SIU) 
This unit began its life as an Eastern Cape-based programme geared towards recovering 
state assets through the civil courts. The success of the unit, then headed by Justice 
Heath, was noted by President Mandela, who then authorized an expanded brief for the 
unit that would include the protection of state assets countrywide. The current role of the 
SIU is to investigate (SIU, 2004/05): 
• serious mal-administration in any state institution; 
• improper or unlawful conduct by employees of the state; 
• unlawful appropriation or expenditure of public money or property; 
• any irregular or unlawful acts or transactions that relate to state property; 
• intentional or negligent loss of public money or damage to property; 
• corruption in the affairs of any state institution; and 
• unlawful or improper conduct by any person who has caused or may cause serious 
harm to the interests of the public. 
The SIU uses civil legal action to remedy corruption or wrongdoing, for example to 
compel the repayment of wrongful benefit, to cancel irregular contracts, or to stop 
transactions that were not properly authorized (ibid). A special court, the Special 
Tribunal, has been set up to deal solely with SIU cases and thus avoid the delays that 
plague the ordinary courts. It has been suggested that the early success of the unit arose 
in large part from its purely civil nature: 
While the unit does not institute criminal prosecutions, in terms of the relevant 
legislation, all matters of a criminal nature that come to its attention are 
referred to the relevant prosecutorial authorities… (Camerer, 1999, p.4). 
The SIU works closely with the National Prosecuting Authority, the Auditor General, the 
Public Protector, the Attorney General and the South African Police Services. The SIU 
does not have powers of arrest or prosecution, but is able to hand a court-ready 
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document to the police or the Scorpions (Directorate of Special Operations). It institutes 
civil actions through the Special Tribunal that is headed by judges. The Special Tribunal 
is able to follow up successful civil actions by granting judgements that include the 
attachment of assets, ‘In this manner, transactions, measures or practices leading to 
losses by state institutions may be prevented, set aside or losses may be recovered’ 
(ibid, p.5). The SIU frequently uses the Assets Forfeiture Unit of the NPA, although it can 
seize property itself (SIU, 2004/05, p.2). Although the unit focuses on public entities, it is 
able to investigate private agencies that are linked to or accomplices in public sector 
corruption (ibid). Under Justice Heath the unit concentrated on the recovery of money 
lost to corruption rather than criminal proceedings. Heath’s rationale was that this 
approach would not only replenish the state coffers but also act as a deterrent to those 
considering corrupt practices: 
Criminal action should be secondary. The recovery of money proves that 
economic crime does not pay and this is essentially the message to convey. 
Recovery will not only act as a deterrent, but will replace what has been 
removed from the coffers and thus strengthen the economic climate (Heath 
quoted by Camerer, 1999, p.5). 
To date the SIU remains an independent statutory body, accountable only to parliament 
and the President who has to approve its investigations (SIU, 2004/05, p.2). In 1999 the 
unit employed 71 staff that included a mix of experienced investigators, attorneys, 
auditors and accountants and information technology experts (Camerer, 1999, p.5). 
Heath at the time considered this complement inadequate and sought to expand both the 
resources and the powers of the SIU. In a typical business-like manner, Heath proposed 
that the SIU boost its resources by appropriating a percentage of the monies recovered 
through its investigations – government dismissed this idea (ibid). The powers of the SIU 
are considerable and extend to (ibid): 
• the searching of premises when authorized by a magistrate or judge; 
• seizing documentation and other evidence; 
• ordering people to appear before it to answer questions; and 
• making an order for the return of money or property and issuing interdicts to 
prevent the loss of such money or property. 
Concern has understandably been expressed about the extent of these powers and, in 
conjunction with independent funding, the prospect of the SIU becoming ‘untouchable’. 
The SIU has generally responded to these concerns by pointing out that it is bound by 
the Constitution and the Special Investigating Unit and Tribunal Act No. 74 of 1996 (ibid). 
For example the Act requires that the SIU first refer allegations of corruption to the 
necessary authorities, then after a lengthy process the Department of Justice submits a 
draft proclamation to the office of the President. Only once the office of the President has 
issued a formal proclamation of referral can the SIU begin investigating. This process 
hampers the timely initiation of investigations and ultimately makes them less effective 
(ibid). In recent times the process has been partly streamlined but the authorizing 
proclamation from the President’s office remains a key check on the powers of the SIU. 
The SIU is answerable to both the Minister of Justice and the President and both 
authorities appear to regard the SIU as sufficiently powerful and are not disposed to 
removing procedures that would further streamline its operation. In 1998 the SIU was 
publicly criticized for exercising undue powers that by-passed the courts (ibid). Although 
  
22
such criticisms were often linked to those who had become ‘victims’ of SIU investigations, 
and it was never demonstrated that the rights of innocent people had been abused by the 
SIU, the government appeared to take the criticism seriously. It warned of litigation 
arising from the SIU operating outside of its legal parameters and in October 1998 the 
Minister of Justice proposed that the SIU no longer operate independently but be 
rationalized with other anti-corruption agencies and answer to a special committee within 
the cabinet (Cape Times, 8 October, 1998). Justice Heath responded by accusing 
government of political interference and the Justice Ministry amended its position and 
affirmed its support for an independent SIU (Camerer, 1999, p.6). The SIU was 
established anew on 31 July 2001 with Willie Hofmeyer as its head. 
As Lala Camerer notes, calls for the rationalization or improved co-ordination of anti-
corruption agencies are difficult to analyse according to political intent. Improved 
departmental efficiency and reduced duplication are convincing motives for  rationalizing 
the structure. Camerer makes the point, however, that diverse forms of corruption require 
diverse anti-corruption agencies and that the real answer to improved effectiveness is 
better communication and co-ordination. She also notes that, ‘Talk of rationalization to 
form a single anti-corruption agency clearly threatens the independence of existing 
structures’ and that one government proposal at least ‘reeks of centralized political 
control’ (ibid). Perhaps the most worrying government suggestions in this regard are 
those that would place the most effective anti-corruption agencies under the South 
African Police Service – an institution with its own corruption problems and with huge 
deficiencies in investigative capacity and subject to a politically sensitive Ministry. 
Various high-level political interventions have sought to ‘rationalize’ the functioning of the 
SIU and it appears that its survival as an independent investigative agency rests primarily 
on media / civil society reactions to these proposals and secondly on the SIU’s own 
efforts to show that it is highly cost effective in recovering state assets and deterring the 
theft of further assets. In July 2001 after Willie Hofmeyer, a former ANC activist, was 
appointed to head the SIU, the unit proceeded to have a less prominent profile in the 
media, however Hofmeyer has been widely acknowledged as a credible head who has 
greatly advanced its anti-corruption drive. Hofmeyer did not press as strenuously as 
Heath for additional SIU funding (Redpath, 2004). The SIU has a current budget of about 
R50 million per year and employed 200 staff in 2005 with a projected growth to 550 by 
October 2006 (Le Roux, 2006). Hofmeyer has consistently cited lack of skilled 
investigators as the main inhibitor to the growth of the SIU. In 2004/2005 the SIU claimed 
to have saved the government ‘projected future losses’ of R3.5 billion, which would have 
been lost to the state over the next ten years (ibid). The largest projected savings was 
nearly R500 million a year linked to false claims against the Department of Correctional 
Services medical aid fund (ibid). In 2004/05 actual cash recoveries were only R12 million, 
however, the unit projected that it had saved further losses of R92 million anticipated for 
the year (ibid). Evidence gathered by the unit for that period contributed to 45 civil cases, 
165 criminal proceedings and 207 disciplinary actions. The SIU is paid by the 
departments it investigates although these departments are not officially obliged to use 
its anti-corruption services. Hofmeyer has tended to stress the co-operative relationship 
between the SIU and government: 
…departments are increasingly turning to the SIU rather than private forensic 
firms to assist them with the investigation of corruption. The fact that they are 
prepared to pay the costs of the investigation is an indication of how keen 
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they are to use the services of the SIU, and of their commitment to root out 
corruption’ (SIU, 2004/05).  
While claims like these have something of a public relations element to them, the SIU’s 
future sustainability seems to rest, in large part, on being contracted by these 
departments. Between 2006–08 the SIU planned to generate income from the 
Departments of Correctional Services (R6 million), Social Development (R22 million), 
Transport (R16.8 million) and the Eastern Cape Department of Housing, Local 
Government and Traditional Affairs (R6 million), the latter being mostly related to 
corruption within municipalities (ibid). The main forms of corruption under investigation 
within these departments / sectors are outlined in the table below: 
 
Table 6. The main forms of corruption under investigation in key sectors 
Agency Focus of Investigation 
Department of Social 
Development 
About 43,700 officials illegally drawing child support, old age, disability 
and other welfare grants 
Department of 
Transport 
About 15 per cent of the driver’s licences issued at certain ‘problem’ 
licensing stations were found to be fraudulent. By September 2005 734 
cases had been referred to the police for arrest.2 (One traffic official was 
found to have made an illegal income of about R75,000 per month over a 
five-month period by issuing fake licences. A driving school station in 
Mpumalanga was found to have forged 1,240 foreign licence 
conversions.) 
Department of 
Correctional Services 
This investigation followed up on the work done by the Jali Commission in 
2001. The SIU investigated general corruption in the DCS, procurement 
irregularity and, most critically, the defrauding of the medical aid fund 
through false claims, estimated at R500 million per year. The Provincial 
Commissioner of the DCS in the Eastern Cape was dismissed for false 
travel claims, the head of a prison was dismissed for facilitating the 
escape of inmates and various officials were prosecuted for fraud, theft 
and corruption (ibid). 
Eastern Cape 
Department of 
Housing, Local 
Government and 
Traditional Affairs 
Municipal councillors and officials from 13 municipalities found to be 
involved in the irregular procurement of goods and services, non-recovery 
of loans, irregular appointments and ‘councillors having an interest in front 
companies granted contracts they were unable to fulfil’. Various forensic 
reports had indicated widespread instances of corruption ‘but very little 
corrective action was taken’ (ibid, p.16).In December 2003 the corruption 
in Qaukeni local municipality was deemed to be of such a serious nature 
that the MEC for Local Government and Housing suspended the entire 
council and the SIU was asked to appoint an administrator. This created 
the basis for a larger investigation (through proclamation R26/2005 in 
June 2005) that covered several municipalities. As of September 2005 the 
SIU had recovered R1.9 million, issued summonses for R732,398 million, 
and set aside contracts to the value of R3 million. In addition 16 criminal 
cases had been registered, six police investigations had been launched, 
three arrests had been made, four staff had been dismissed and six 
disciplinary actions had been launched. 
 
The Directorate of Special Operations (Scorpions): As a result of the pressure for 
rationalization (already outlined), South African anti-corruption agencies tend to operate 
in a highly competitive environment where comparisons are continually made between 
investigations launched and finalized, the number of arrests, the number of successful 
prosecutions, timelines from launching investigations to successful conviction and the 
value of the assets recovered. Staffing and institutional costs also have to be reasonably 
commensurate with the results obtained (see for example Redpath, 2004). 
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In 2002/03 the budget of the Scorpions was much higher than that of the SIU; it was 
R267 million and employed 531 people – more than twice that of the SIU. In that year the 
Scorpions arrested 318 people and obtained 117 prosecutions, of which 104 were 
successful – a further 177 prosecutions were pending (Redpath, 2004, p.1). The average 
time from the declaration of an official investigation to the last date of prosecution was 23 
months and three weeks and the average court time per prosecution was 11.7 days. 
Institute of Security Studies researcher Jean Redpath interprets these figures as an 
indication of business-like practice and focus by the Scorpions. 
On average 90 per cent of cases prosecuted result in convictions. In one 
region of the DSO, the rate is even higher, at 97 per cent. This suggests that 
the DSO is astute in choosing to prosecute only those cases likely to be 
successful in court. The data also suggests that the DSO is unlikely to make a 
frivolous arrest: the ratio of envisaged and finalised prosecutions to arrests is 
92 per cent, suggesting that almost all arrests lead to prosecutions (ibid). 
This increasing tendency to measure the performance of anti-corruption agencies in 
monetary or ‘business’ terms was not limited to the DSO, and the annual reports of the 
SIU tend to reflect the same conceptual criteria. The impact of such thinking on anti-
corruption endeavours, particularly in terms of which cases are prioritized and the 
possibility that important cases of abuse of state assets may be ‘dropped’ due to lack of 
certainty of a successful outcome or because the recoverable assets do not match the 
potential investment by the investigators, have yet to be fully analysed. The DSO has 
enjoyed a high profile and largely positive media coverage (up to the point when it was 
linked to the high-profile prosecution of political figures such as Shabir Shaik and the 
Deputy President Jacob Zuma, where then-head of the National Prosecuting Authority, 
Bulelani Ncuka, was alleged to have urged prosecution due to political differences). 
According to Redpath, the DSO enjoyed a high public approval rating in 2002/03 that was 
based largely on media reports (ibid, p.2). 
The successful cases in which the DSO has been involved include: 
• A fishing company, Hout Bay Fishing Industries, involved in illegal harvesting and 
exporting of marine resources, including hake and lobster, in collusion with officials 
from the Department of Environmental Affairs and Customs and Excise. Total 
penalties imposed on the company, including the forfeiture of vessels, amounted to 
R40 million (ibid). 
• ‘Advance fee fraud’ or ‘419’ scams by 18 Nigerian nationals using the identity of 
South African institutions were prosecuted under racketeering law (Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act). Fines imposed amounted to R700,000 and three people 
were imprisoned for a total of 50 years (ibid). 
• The Road Accident Fund, which compensates victims of road accidents, was 
defrauded by claimants including doctors, attorneys and touts. The investigation 
was originally begun by the Heath SIU but was passed on to the DSO. In 2001/02 
27 professionals had been arrested and as of March 2004 the matter was still 
under investigation (ibid). 
• The Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa was defrauded through false loan 
applications, false and inflated securities, corrupt bribes and payments by officials 
in the amount of R100m. In 2002 three of the accused were sentenced to periods 
of between five and 15 years (ibid). 
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Redpath notes that it is very difficult to make comparative assessments between the SIU, 
the DSO and the National Prosecuting Service (NPS), for example. The DSO has a high 
conviction rate as already outlined but then so do ordinary prosecutors (about 80 per 
cent). Redpath calculates that in cost terms, each DSO conviction is worth 214 ordinary 
NPS convictions, however she also makes the point that the vast volume of NPS 
convictions (88 per cent) are heard in the lower courts and therefore must involve less 
serious crimes (ibid, p.4). In other words the vastly more expensive DSO conviction – on 
average about R2.6 million as against R2.231 for the NPS, may be ‘value for money’ 
given the likelihood of more serious / complex crime. Furthermore NPS prosecutions 
declined significantly after 1994 and are only picked up again to this level towards the 
end of 2004 (ibid). 
 
4.9 Legislation 
As outlined in the introduction to this paper, the democratically elected ANC government 
has been vigorous in legislating against corruption since coming to power in 1994. After 
apartheid, the entire value framework for governance had to be built anew and the 
project followed international trends in this regard. 
The 1996 Constitution: This document effectively established South Africa as a 
constitutional state governed by the rule of law. The emphasis of this constitution is one 
of building unity, respecting human rights, ensuring equality between citizens and 
restoring lost citizenship (see GSA, 1996, Sections 1-12). The constitution established 
both protection of economic and social rights (food, health care, housing, social security, 
etc.) and property rights (arbitrary deprivation of property is outlawed, expropriation is 
subject to the law and payment of compensation, the state must help citizens to gain 
access to land on an equitable basis, past deprivation of property on racial grounds must 
be reversed, etc.) (ibid, Chapter 2 Bill of Rights). The Constitution created a framework of 
social and governmental accountability by providing that all executive organs of state 
must account to the National Assembly and setting out mechanisms for this to be 
enforced – parliamentary portfolio committees for instance (Sole, 2005, p.94). A key 
mechanism in this regard – and one that is unpacked in some detail by Sole – is the 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts (Scopa) which functions to oversee government 
spending. The establishment of Scopa ‘followed the convention of other liberal 
democracies in appointing an opposition Member of Parliament to sit as Committee 
chair.’3 Chapter 9 of the Constitution established a number of oversight bodies including 
the Auditor General, the Public Protector and the Human Rights Commission – the 
functioning of these bodies had already been discussed. 
The Public Finance Management Act: Sets out the fiduciary responsibilities of finance 
officers and managers in government and allows them to be held personally responsible 
for financial misconduct or other governance failures. At local government level the Act is 
mirrored by the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), whose functioning will be 
discussed in more detail under the local government section and also in relation to the 
Qaukeni case study (ibid, p.95). 
The Finance Intelligence Act: Obliges banks to keep improved records regarding the 
banking activities of clients and to report suspicious transactions – the purpose being to 
detect and trace money laundering (ibid). 
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The Special Investigations Act and other legislation related to the seizure of assets and 
the recovery of government funds: Allows special units like the SIU and the Asset 
Forfeiture Unit to investigate fraud and theft and for the proceeds of crime and irregularly 
acquired assets to be seized (ibid). 
The Promotion of Access to Information Act: Allows the public broad access to 
information held by government and the private sector. 
The Protected Disclosures Act: Provides special protection for whistle-blowers through a 
series of set procedures that must be complied with. 
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act: Applies to both private and 
public sector and outlaws the offer or receipt of ‘gratification’ that has not been earned 
and requires persons in authority to report corrupt activity. More severe sentences are 
introduced for offences against the Act (ibid). 
 
4.10 Measures 
It is not feasible to review all anti-corruption measures that are invoked in South Africa, 
but it is important to record a number of linked initiatives. South Africa has set up a Public 
Service Anti-Corruption Strategy that seeks to improve the co-ordination of anti-
corruption activities across line departments. The concentration of prosecuting authority 
in a National Director of Public Prosecutions has allowed stronger co-ordination through 
this office and aided the functioning of intelligence gathering, investigation and 
prosecution – the Scorpions are an example of this operational capacity (ibid, p.96). 
Corruption, excessive use of force, or other forms of irregular conduct by the police are 
taken up by the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), which has earned a 
reputation for fierce independence in the turbulent period of political transition and in the 
SAPS’s difficult experiences of introducing a more service-orientated form of policing. 
The South African Revenue Service (SARS) has restructured itself along more corporate 
lines and now works less as a government bureaucracy. It has tried to plug gaps in the 
tax revenue net and deal in a more business-like manner with registered taxpayers (ibid). 
The Competition Commission and Tribunal checks all major mergers and acquisitions 
and responds to complaints of uncompetitive behaviour – in 2005 the Commission 
imposed serious sanctions on the motor industry. 
One example of these provisions in action is the Public Service Commission. The PSC is 
charged with setting standards for and monitoring the performance of the civil service. 
One of the most commonly used measures for preventing corruption is disclosure 
provisions amongst civil servants. Public office holders and senior managers are required 
to disclose their financial interests regarding shares, directorships, sponsorships, 
property and remunerated work outside of the public service. These measures are only 
effective, however, if there is compliance – in this case a form has to be completed by all 
senior mangers and returned. The following table indicates that such compliance is often 
hard to achieve (Ernstzen, 2006). 
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Table 7. Public office holders’ compliance with financial interests reporting 
Province Forms 
returned 
National departments 72% 
Eastern Cape 32% 
Free State 48% 
Gauteng 22% 
KwaZulu-Natal 45% 
Limpopo 49% 
Mpumalanga 65% 
Northern Cape 53% 
North-West 81% 
Western Cape 80% 
  
While these figures may be very loosely indicative of integrity patterns amongst 
government officials across the country, there is some concern that between 19 and 78 
per cent of government managers who received the forms neglected to return them, thus 
resulting in a very incomplete assessment of potential or real conflicts of interest. The 
PSC has indicated that it would only regard a 100 per cent return ratio as acceptable. 
4.11 Civil society and corruption 
Civil society in South Africa has played a major role in creating the value framework and 
the institutional strategies for preventing and combating corruption. Much of the core 
rational for the ‘Section 9’ agencies, for example, emerged from the experiences and 
knowledge generated by human rights organizations, para-legal advice offices and victim 
support initiatives that protected or tried to protect vulnerable citizens from the worst 
abuses of the apartheid state. 
South Africa has a relatively well developed and sophisticated NGO sector that has 
invested extensively in the building of a strong and independent civil society sector which 
is capable of monitoring and acting as a check against the exercise of untoward state 
power. The 2003 Country Corruption Assessment Report for South Africa urges that: 
Civil Society can play both a creative role in promoting democracy by 
educating and socializing citizens into a democratic modus operandi which 
includes for example, ethics training and remaining critical and vigilant of the 
state apparatus lest it abuses its monopoly of power (UN and DPSA, 2003, 
p.82). 
In fact it can be argued with some certainty that this project is already well advanced. 
Dozens of NGOs in South Africa have programmes dedicated to precisely these 
objectives. The Country Corruption Assessment report refers to some of these 
organizations (Idasa, ODAC and the Black Sash) (ibid, p.79). The Country Assessment 
Report notes an ‘obvious’ role for civil society organizations, including the media, in 
fighting corruption and acting as a ‘watchdog’ to promote public sector accountability and 
service delivery. In outlining impediments to this relationship between state and society, 
the report focuses less on the extent to which government has accepted an independent 
and vibrant civil society scrutinizing government practice and more on issues confronted 
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by the civil society organizations (CSOs) themselves in adjusting from an adversarial 
relationship with the apartheid state to a co-operative but critical relationship with the new 
democratic state. 
Many CSOs have had to struggle with defining a new role post-1994. In 
particular, civil society has had to confront the issue of how to be critical of a 
government that led the liberation struggle and how to confront allies now in 
government who are involved in corrupt activity without being seen to 
question the integrity of the ruling party. CSOs, as well as the media, are 
confronted with the dual challenges of promoting dialogue with government to 
increase transparency, while being at the same time a critical partner in the 
dialogue (ibid, p.82). 
This is an important and often overlooked dimension of the unfolding relations between 
state and CSOs. However since the government was co-author of the report, the above 
observation is also slightly disingenuous, in that it appears to remove any responsibility 
from the shoulders of government itself for creating the social conditions for constructive 
independent and critical interaction between itself and CSOs. Despite enjoying 
unrestricted legal and constitutional space for their activities, NGOs have often been 
subjected to criticism and exclusion for questioning government policy or practice and 
some experience a steady narrowing of the space for independent interaction with 
government (Smith et al., no date). It is interesting therefore that the Country Assessment 
Report acknowledges the unique resources that CSOs bring to the fight against 
corruption, not just in terms of particular skills but also in terms of superior access to 
particular constituencies and communities (ibid, p.82). 
The Country Assessment Report assigns these organizations to categories according to 
their main function. Thus the Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC) an initiative of the 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and the Black Sash, are cited as good 
examples of advocacy around anti-corruption legislation. The Public Service 
Accountability Monitor (PSAM) and Transparency South Africa (T-SA) are also regarded 
as particularly strong examples of advocacy organizations (despite the fact that there are 
significant differences between these institutions in operational terms). Under research 
the report notes the work of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
(CSVR) for its work corruption in the South African Police Service (SAPS) and a handful 
of other NGOs for more sporadic research programmes around corruption (ibid). In 
relations to ‘research’, the report suggests that the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) ‘is 
the only applied policy research organization with a dedicated anti-corruption programme 
(the Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Programme) which also has a regional focus’ 
(ibid). 
Of the organizations listed as undertaking work around corruption, all bring slightly 
different but linked strategies to the issue. The ODAC, for example, offers advice and 
training on the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) and the Protected 
Disclosures Act (PDA), thus ensuring that government information is placed in the public 
domain and strengthening the position of whistle-blowers. The Public Service 
Accountability Monitor (PSAM) is based at Rhodes University and its focus is the Eastern 
Cape government departments. The PSAM has developed a strong reputation for 
tracking departmental mal-administration and specific cases of reported misconduct. 
Through strong media liaison and an effective website the PSAM has proved highly 
adept at publicizing breakdowns in governance and the abuse of public office (ibid). 
However the PSAM experience also illustrates government’s ambivalent reaction to the 
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exposure of irregular or corrupt practice. The following quote from the Country 
Assessment Report is an understatement given the furious and sometimes defamatory 
responses that the PSAM has often received from government. (It is also curious that the 
Country Assessment Report makes no analysis of the antipathy between government 
and the PSAM.) 
Although respected by many in the provincial government, much of the 
whistle blowing and subsequent monitoring activity is regarded with suspicion 
by some members of the public sector in the Eastern Cape (ibid). 
By contrast Transparency South Africa (T-SA) has a remarkably low public profile 
considering that it specializes in anti-corruption initiatives. T-SA seems to adopt a quasi-
academic approach to corruption work and links with similar organizations internationally 
through the Transparency network. T-SA has, however, played some role, along with the 
South African NGO Coalition, in bringing together CSOs concerned with corruption, and 
hosted the 2002 Civil Society Anti-Corruption Summit (ibid, p.83). The Country 
Assessment Report opines that the summit was of limited success due to its broad focus, 
but urges that T-SA has much potential to assist CSOs in mobilizing against corruption 
(ibid). 
The media and particularly certain sections of the print media continue to perform some 
of the most important exposure functions related to corruption, as the many press 
clippings and articles cited in this paper illustrate. The role of the media in this regard, 
however, is tenuous for several reasons: 
• A general trend towards low-quality tabloid-type journalism based on commercial 
pressures and a redefinition, purely in financial terms, of who constitutes an 
‘important readership’. Apart from the familiar shift towards ‘sensationalism’, this has 
been particularly damaging to proper investigative journalism. 
• Emerging evidence that the main state broadcaster is becoming increasingly subject 
to regulation and political intervention by government. The recent withdrawal of an 
authorized TV documentary on President Mbeki and the confirmation by senior SABC 
journalists that they may not air the views of certain analysts, is a recent indication of 
the above. 
• Journalists often work in an uncertain managerial environment where, among other 
concerns, the exposure of corruption can have unanticipated consequences. 
The Country Assessment Report captures these concerns in a particularly apt manner: 
Perhaps the single biggest source of whistle blowing, the South African media 
continues to play an important watchdog function, exposing abuse of power 
by the private and public sector in particular. Often accused of only seeking to 
sensationalize a story to ensure newspaper sales, South Africa is fortunate to 
have a free press. Increasingly also, and perhaps reflective of what is 
happening on the ground, the press are reporting on ‘good-governance’ 
related stories. The Media Institute of South African (MISA) reports that 
journalists are often under pressure from both interest groups as well as 
those who are alleged to be involved in corrupt activity to report the ‘right 
angle’. Political pressure is likely to exacerbate the practice of not following up 
on stories (i.e. a ‘sensationalist’ style of reporting on allegations of corruption) 
(ibid, p.84). 
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The Country Assessment Report acknowledges that it may not have fully captured 
corruption work being done within other sectors: 
Singling out the handful of CSOs with a specific focus on anti-corruption 
issues is an easy task, but may only give part of the picture. There is likely to 
be good work which is being done in the field about which little is known. A 
recent IDASA/Co-operative for Research and Education (CORE) survey of 
‘the State of Civil Society in South Africa notes that some 62 per cent of 
respondents run programmes and projects in an area defined as 
Transparency and Governance’ (ibid, p.83). 
One development that the Country Assessment Report does not capture is a recent NGO 
re-configuration that saw the closure of the Urban Sector Network and the establishment 
of the Good Governance Learning Network (GGLN) in 2003. The GGLN (no date) 
purports to create ‘an interface for institutions working on issues of local governance’ and 
to document and disseminate good practices and build awareness about the value of 
participatory local governance (GGLN, no date). Within the network there are several 
member organizations whose work relates to improving transparency and accountability 
in municipal government. The example of Afesis-corplan4 is set out below: 
 
Box 1. Afesis-corplan 
During the last four years Afesis-corplan has investigated indicator-based survey 
instruments at neighbourhood or ward level as well as a more general study that 
examines the perceptions of local governance by three key groupings, namely: elected 
officials, organized civil society and the general public (Afesis-corplan, 2000). The 
methodology involves in-depth interviews rather than large-scale survey formats, and 
the organization claims that it is well suited to revealing attitudes and interrogating 
perceptions as the draft findings are presented back to the respondents in focus 
groups. Afesis-corplan claims the methodology is both participatory and goal oriented 
– the goal being to direct stakeholder’s attention to key problems and achievements 
rather than simply to produce an evaluation or status quo report. According to the 
organization, the approach tends to highlight gaps in perceptions between stakeholder 
groups – which makes it particularly well suited to pre-empting the crises (protests and 
destruction of municipal property) that occurred at municipal level in 2005–06. Limited 
verification of reported information occurs through accessing relevant documents and 
reports. The most recent round of surveys, completed late in 2004, covered six 
municipalities across five provinces and incorporated one metro and five local 
municipalities. 
Some of the findings by Afesis-corplan include (Afesis-corplan, 2005): 
The key decision-making structures of council (i.e. mayoral committees or executive 
committees) are often closed to public scrutiny and even when they are not formally 
closed, the public and even some officials regard them as such. 
All respondent groups across all municipalities were ‘not happy’ with the level of public 
attendance at council meetings. 
Basic provisions for transparency and accountability, such as presentation of the AG’s 
report at a public forum, are often overlooked or conducted as a token exercise for 
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compliance purposes. The secondary city case study was a notable exception to this 
trend. 
In five out of the six case studies, ward committees were identified as the primary 
forum for community participation. (However the DPLG National Ward Committee 
Survey (conducted by Afesis-corplan and Idasa ) released in March 2005 indicated that 
the effective functioning of these structures is still questionable.) 
It appears that the public’s widespread lack of knowledge of their right to attend ward 
committee meetings is a key reason for non-attendance. Even when they do attend 
such meetings, many citizens do not think they have made an impact on decision-
making within the municipality. 
Most municipalities are implementing a system for disclosure of business interests. 
However implementation seems to be confined to filling out registers – no follow-up is 
undertaken. Across all case studies, no more than 25 per cent of all respondents 
regarded such systems as effective. 
Most of the proposals forwarded from ward committees, area-based management 
units and community participation and action forums to council are concerned with the 
issue of service delivery. 
A positive feature is that the majority of respondents (40–60 per cent) said that the 
service delivery standards of the municipality are made available to the public. 
(Opportunities to ensure that the standards are met remained an unknown factor.) 
In all case studies bar one, the largest percentile of respondents said that corruption 
had occurred within the previous year – the highest was 88 per cent. The most 
commonly perceived corruption was nepotism in the employment of municipal staff. 
 
4.12 Partnership with government 
Formal civil society partnerships with government around corruption are rare and mostly 
limited to provincial initiatives of limited impact. The Eastern Cape provides an example 
of a partnership that seemed to offer much potential but fell apart shortly after it was 
launched. The Eastern Cape’s anti-corruption strategy can be traced back to March 1998 
when the Speaker of the Eastern Cape Legislature, Mkhangeli Matomela, introduced a 
successful motion for a campaign against corruption and fraud (Cwati, 2004). This motion 
also proposed that all departments would have units against fraud and corruption that 
would report directly to Members of the Executive Committee (MECs) and be co-
ordinated by the Premier’s Office Unit reporting directly to the Premier (ibid). This co-
ordinating body was known as the Anti-Corruption Forum (ACF) and was regarded as the 
key structure for developing strategies against corruption. The ACF comprised 
government, criminal investigation agencies, business and civil society. Cwati describes 
the membership in April 2000 as follows: 
• Mvuyo Tom, Director-General of the Eastern Cape (Chair) 
• Mzwandile Msoki – Public Service Commissioner of the Eastern Cape 
• Sarah Hugo – a representative of the Eastern Cape NGO coalition (ECNGOC) 
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• Les Holbrook – Border Kei Chamber of Business Co-Chair 
• Cyril Langbooi – a labour representative 
• Wayne Malgas and Superintendent Witbooi – from of the Investigation Agencies 
• Lulama Ntshingwa – Eastern Cape Council of Churches 
With four of its seven members from civil society it would be tempting to view the ACF as 
predominantly a civil society structure. It is important to recall, however, that it reported to 
the Office of the Premier (OTP). The purpose of the ACF was as follows: 
… to strategize on and advance anti-corruption objectives and to advise and 
coordinate implementation of policy for the combating and prevention of 
corruption in society (ibid, p.40). 
The functions of the ACF were mainly to co-ordinate the different stakeholders and 
improve communication between them. It would also launch an anti-corruption campaign, 
and co-ordinate the components of that campaign and the contribution of the various 
stakeholders. It would also recommend and commission appropriate research, and 
establish a database of the incidence of corruption, misconduct and mal-administration 
and the form of response to these cases. Further it would assist and guide the various 
stakeholders in their own anti-corruption programmes and devise a broad communication 
strategy in conjunction with the OTP (ibid, p.42). Clearly the overall aim of the ACF, at 
least formally, was a more co-ordinated, timely and effective response to corruption that 
involved government and civil society. This was the overall impression created by Dr 
Tom in his briefing to the media after his first meeting with the ACF on 22 May 2000 
(ibid). According to Cwati (ibid) the ACF met on a number of occasions between April 
2000 and March 2001, but it was generally not regarded as a successful exercise largely 
because its champions did not get the required administrative and institutional support: 
‘little organizational capacity (human and financial resources) was allocated to support 
the Director-General’. Cwati also notes how the ACF’s terms of reference overlapped 
with those of the Network Against Corruption (NAC) (ibid, p.42–3). This explanation begs 
closer scrutiny. The NAC was set up by Premier Stofile shortly after the 2000 Eastern 
Cape anti-corruption summit, and at the time when President Thabo Mbeki was strongly 
backing a national campaign against corruption. The Eastern Cape legislature convened 
the Network Against Corruption, whose members were reportedly drawn from all 
provincial role-players (Daily Dispatch, 23 November, 2000). 
Membership of the Network Against Corruption (NAC) was drawn from 
representatives of the legislature, including the Presiding Officers, 
Chairpersons of Committees, Chairpersons of Standing Committees, Head of 
the Petitions Office, as well as representatives of all other stakeholders that 
have an interest in fighting corruption. The NAC was an attempt to involve 
NGOs and oversight / anti-corruption bodies (the Special Investigating Unit, 
the Auditor General of the Eastern Cape, etc.) in ensuring that the legislature 
effectively deals with corruption. It provides an interesting model of CSO 
intervention at a provincial level and may justify further research to ascertain if 
it would prove an effective model at local government level. The model for the 
Forum reflects developments in the early stages of the National Anti-
  
33
corruption Forum (NACF), based on the National Anti-corruption Summit’s 
resolution to create a structure in which all sectors of society take co-
responsibility to fight corruption, and the realization that corruption is not a 
problem unique to the public sector. This is reflected in the founding 
document (UN and DPSA, 2003, p.81). 
At the launch of the NAC in October 2000, Nomsa Thomas of the Public Protector’s office 
noted that public officials in the province had acquired a reputation for mismanagement 
of public resources, their corrupt activities, and for their failure to deliver services (Daily 
Dispatch, 16 October, 2000). The key civil society participant was the Public Service 
Accountability Monitor (PSAM) based at Rhodes University, a watchdog body which 
monitors the performance of the public service. The NAC was to use the good offices of 
the provincial legislature in an effort to improve the flow of information to and from 
standing committees, the public and even the Anti-Corruption Forum (ibid). The PSAM 
proved to be surprisingly effective and goal-oriented in its tracking of corruption, far more 
so than the rather limited efforts of the Eastern Cape NGO Coalition (ECNGOC). This 
probably surprised the provincial government and did not win it any friends within the 
ranks of the ECNGOC.5 
Cwati shows convincingly that the objectives and functions of the ACF and the NAC 
overlapped and led to deteriorating relations between the respective bodies – but does 
not ask why. Cwati also does not question the notion that a legislature and a provincial 
executive controlled by the same party (ANC) and with a handful of individuals in key 
powerful positions, could not frame a working relationship between these two governance 
structures on the matter of corruption. 
There is a general consensus – reflected by Cwati, the PSAM and media reports at the 
time – that the demise of the ACF and the NAC was occasioned by a particular incident 
of alleged corruption involving a senior provincial politician. In mid-2000 media reports 
began to emerge about Health MEC Bevan Goqwana, who was rumoured to be involved 
in private health-related businesses, including an ambulance service, whilst holding 
public office. Press reports at the time and the investigations of the PSAM indicated that 
these rumours had substance. Goqwana had admitted to owning a private specialist 
medical practice and an ambulance service whilst in public office at the end of October 
2000. He also allegedly admitted to owning and profiting from these businesses while he 
was a full-time public servant, working as a state doctor in Umtata (in the former 
Transkei) (ibid, p.47). Amidst considerable public concern and media speculation, the 
Speaker formally requested that the Premier either convene a Commission of Inquiry to 
investigate the matter or that it be referred to the Office of the Public Protector for 
investigation. In response to media questions the Speaker also announced that the 
Network Against Corruption (NAC) would seek an inquiry. 
This initiative was immediately criticized by Premier Makhenkesi Stofile who claimed that 
Goqwana had nothing to answer for and accused the NAC and Matomela of being 
‘clumsy’, ‘partisan’ and a ‘political critic of government’ (ibid). The PSAM claimed that the 
Speaker’s referral of the Goqwana matter to the NAC was in keeping with the constitution 
and simply a fulfilment of Matomela’s ‘parliamentary oversight obligations’. This led to 
strong public criticism of the PSAM by premier Makhenkesi Stofile, who indicated his 
distrust of the PSAM, labelled it ‘partisan’ and suggested that it needed a watchdog of its 
own (ibid). The Anti-Corruption Forum (ACF) – based in the premier’s office and 
supposedly the executive counterpart of the NAC – then condemned the NAC and called 
for its disbandment. 
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Soon after this, members of the ACF, who were closely aligned to the 
Premier, started to issue calls for the NAC to be disbanded. As reported in the 
local Daily Dispatch on 14 March, 2002, the Chief Whip of the Eastern Cape 
Legislature, Sicelo Gqobana, announced the closure of the Network Against 
Corruption due to its alleged ineffectiveness (ibid, p.48). 
The end of the NAC was described as follows by the PSAM: ‘As part of the ensuing 
stand-off between the executive and legislature, both the ACF and the NAC have been 
effectively disbanded’ (The Herald, 21 November, 2001). 
Cwati has described the measures that were invoked after the ACF and the PSAM had 
collapsed or were dormant. The Director-General of the Province, Dr Tom, asked the 
Public Service Commission (PSC) to investigate the matter in April 2001 (Cwati, 2004, 
p.48). A multi-agency team conducted the investigation, led by the Office of the Public 
Service Commission. Cwati (ibid, p.49) summarizes the findings of the investigation 
report concerning the reasons for the closure of the NAC/ACF: 
• Lack of capacity within the Office of the Premier and Provincial Director General 
(Chair of the Forum) to ensure that the Anti-Corruption Forum functioned well and to 
implement the Provincial Anti-Corruption strategy effectively. 
• The lack of a central database and monitoring and evaluation system for the 
recording, tracking and evaluation of corruption cases (whether criminal, civil and/or 
disciplinary cases). 
• The inability of the Provincial Administration to come to a successful resolution 
(whether criminal, civil and/or disciplinary) of corruption cases. 
• The Anti-Corruption strategy was not publicized effectively, with the result that 
stakeholders had a limited knowledge of its content. 
• Only head office staff and senior regional officials were trained in the Code of 
Conduct and Ethics, leaving out the regions where the majority of employees are 
deployed. 
• The lack of an interdepartmental Ethics Unit. 
• The lack of a centralized information database on appointments, performance 
agreements, job descriptions and financial disclosure and security-vetting practices. 
• The absence of a clear protocol for co-operation and co-ordination between the 
Special Investigative Unit, Auditor General and Public Protector, often leading to 
duplication of investigations. 
• The Provincial Administration had not started with implementation of the Protected 
Disclosures Act and with mechanisms to protect departmental whistle-blowers. 
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Besides some reference to the breakdown in trust between the Speaker and the Premier 
and allegations of conspiracies and ‘hidden agendas’, the task team explained much of 
the problem in terms of incapacity, poor systems, lack of training and missing institutional 
components. Such findings are familiar in that they are not necessarily ‘wrong’ but also 
manage to avoid assigning direct responsibility. Most remarkably these PSC findings fail 
to address the obvious need to find an explanation for the Premier’s response to what 
were clearly legitimate requests for a corruption investigation made by one of his own 
senior party members and a body that he himself had helped to establish. The report 
records but does not comment on the remarkable assertion by the Premier’s office and 
elements of the ACF that not only the civil society members but also some government 
actors were motivated not by the need to expose and investigate corruption but by a 
‘hidden agenda’ about ‘causing maximum embarrassment to the Premier and Provincial 
Administration’ (ibid, p.49). 
Taken at face value, the unhappy saga of the ACF and the NAC suggest that the Premier 
maintained an understanding that these anti-corruption initiatives existed and operated 
entirely at his own pleasure. The notion of partnership between civil society and 
government, a key element of the ACF/NAC publicity campaign at the time, implied a 
significantly different and more balanced relationship within this partnership. The OTP 
seemed to imply (in the statements already quoted above) that the NAC has exceeded its 
brief and launched an unreasonable demand for an inquiry into the Health MEC 
Goqwana’s affairs. 
The action against the NAC might have been reasonable if Goqwana had clearly not 
acted in any way that might be considered irregular. However Goqwana had admitted 
running his own businesses whilst in the employ of the state. The simple question 
therefore was: ‘Is this legally acceptable or not?’. In terms of the South African Public 
Service Act it is illegal for public officials to own, run, or be involved in private business 
interests without having obtained the prior authorization of their MEC. This authorization 
can only be given in very exceptional circumstances. Goqwana and the Premier then 
collectively asserted that such authorization had been obtained but the Premier did not 
disclose the exceptional circumstances that had led to him grant the waiver (Public 
Service Accountability Monitor, 2003). A further issue related to the period prior to 1999, 
when Goqwana was not yet an MEC but a state doctor answerable to then-Health MEC 
Trudy Thomas. Thomas publicly denied having any knowledge of Goqwana’s private 
business dealings in this period or of having approved such arrangements (ibid). In this 
last instance, therefore, the Premier was unable to provide the necessary confirmation of 
having legally approved Goqwana’s conduct – he was not in a position to do so. 
Premier Stofile then introduced further complexity into the matter by asserting that it was 
Dr Goqwana’s right to own the business of his choice on the grounds that this was 
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights in the new Constitution and that the Bill of Rights 
superseded the South African Public Service Act and the various codes of conduct 
applying to members of the Executive (ibid). This appeared to be an erroneous reading of 
the relationship between the Bill of Rights and any number of laws that regulate the 
behaviour and rights of those in the employ of the state. As the PSAM noted at the time: 
If generalized, the Premier’s argument would be a recipe for chaos in the 
public sector with officials being paid full salaries out of public funds and 
simultaneously running private businesses for the purposes of generating 
additional income (ibid). 
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The reasons for the Premier defending the behaviour of the Health MEC in the above 
instance may never be fully understood. The PSAM has suggested that: 
Arguably, the above examples serve to create the public impression that one 
set of legal and ethical standards is currently becoming entrenched for 
members of the Eastern Cape Provincial Executive, whilst a separate and 
more onerous set of standards is being applied to the conduct of ordinary 
public officials. Under circumstances in which officials can point to the public 
flouting of codes of conduct which apply to members of the provincial 
Executive it will prove increasingly more difficult to persuade these officials to 
comply with public service codes and regulations (ibid). 
Civil society participants within the ACF/NAC initiative may have overlooked the 
inevitable hierarchy of political authority that existed between the executive and the 
legislature. Whereas the legislature was supposedly constitutionally separate and 
independent from the executive, the events described above show that the legislature’s 
attempts to assert its powers in respect of alleged corruption were thwarted by the 
executive powers wielded by the Premier’s office. The implication of this is that anti-
corruption initiatives and partnerships will be supported in the Eastern Cape provided 
they do not regard the Province’s most senior political leadership as being within their 
ambit of inquiry. It is worth noting that this interpretation is supported by most of the 
informants who were interviewed for this study. For the provincial government the 
question may be, ‘Why then tolerate any form of anti-corruption activity and especially 
those risky initiatives that call for partnership with civil society?’ Answering this is a 
speculative exercise but without doubt considerations of symbolism and public opinion 
must be factored in. There is also every possibility that senior officeholders wish to have 
departments that are generally corruption free, provided this does not impinge upon their 
own discretion in matters of financial opportunity. 
For civil society some tentative lessons may be drawn: 
• Partnerships with government in anti-corruption programmes need to be carefully 
analysed against the broader context of governance and the demonstrated political 
culture of the time. Getting caught up in periods of high optimism and strong rhetoric 
can lead to naïve strategies that ultimately waste the time and resources of NGOs. 
• The terms of reference for state and non-state actors in joint initiatives need to be 
very carefully considered and the parameters of anti-corruption strategies should be 
defined ‘up front’. 
• Conflicting views on alleged incidents of corruption are inevitable when state and 
non-state actors are involved. This should be anticipated from the outset and a 
system for resolving disputes must be developed. Such a system should be capable 
of generating consensus on whether the matter requires further investigation and the 
extent of the investigation that is appropriate. If such consensus is impossible, 
resolution may have to be sought within the right of the respective parties to conduct 
their own research on the matter and publish findings independently. Such actions 
should not be conceived of as undermining the basic partnership. 
• Building a clear and informed understanding of the relevant legislation and policy that 
determines what is legal or illegal, regular or irregular, good practice or poor practice, 
is essential – even though it may be a long and ongoing exercise. Interim systems of 
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norms and values that summarize the legislative / policy provisions may be useful as 
temporary measures and for quick application in the longer term. 
• Civil society actors need to build networks of support outside of the partnership 
forums, i.e. with the media and civil society organizations that have relevant 
programmes. These should be arranged around principle and common purpose 
rather than populism or mass support. 
• Within the civil society component of these partnership arrangements there will be 
specialized organizations that focus on corruption. The role of such organizations and 
their overall strategy needs to be broadly understood by the CS sector, which must 
be in a position to support these organizations when they are (almost inevitably) 
criticized or attacked by government. A CS component that is more concerned about 
preserving its relationship with government (as the ECNGOC appears to have been) 
rather than effectively dealing with corruption, will ultimately undermine its own 
mission. 
• Civil society actors need to be wary of being drawn into departmental politics in 
government and it should be made clear from the outset that individual politicking and 
cabalism should be kept out of the partnership forum. Civil society actors do, 
however, need to think about how officials who show a strong commitment to 
transparency and accountability can be protected and supported, particularly when 
they fall out of favour with their government colleagues. 
• The overall outputs and functioning of partnership forums against corruption need to 
be monitored, recognizing that there is a necessary balance between government’s 
public relations needs and symbolism and the imperative for civil society to be 
involved in effective measures against corruption. Constant assessment of this 
balance should determine whether the forum is viable or whether the CS component 
should withdraw. 
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5. Local government 
5.1 Problems in managing municipal finances 
In response to weak financial controls and more serious irregularities, national 
government and provincial MECs have frequently signalled an intention to pull offending 
municipalities into line with administrative interventions and forensic audits. During 2004 
twelve Eastern Cape municipalities were targeted for forensic audits by the provincial 
MEC. In the Free State, three municipalities were placed under provincial administration. 
The actual state of municipal finances is often difficult to determine at any particular point 
due to belated reporting by most municipalities. The September 2003 report of the 
Auditor General cited a 57 per cent failure of municipalities to submit financial statements 
20 months after the due date. Thus the AG was obliged in many instances to provide the 
public with an incomplete ‘compliance’ report on the state of municipal finances. As of 31 
May 2003 the AG was owed R2.5 million in overdue audit fees by municipalities. 
 
5.2 Eastern Cape scenario 
When considering the comments of the Auditor General (AG) set out above it is clear that 
the situation in the Eastern Cape has not changed for some time. The Auditor General’s 
comments in 2003 on the period 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 reveal a constant battle to 
present the public with an accurate picture of the state of municipal finances and financial 
management. The first difficulty relates to the fact that although the province’s 202 
municipalities were amalgamated into 45 through re-demarcation in 2000, by 2002 these 
municipalities still had to be audited as the original 202 entities due to an incomplete 
financial and administrative merger process and because ‘Certain TLCs experienced 
significant problems in the presentation of financial statements prior to the demarcation 
process’ (Auditor General 2003, p.3–4). There were also weaknesses in the oversight 
role exercised by the provincial government, including its apparent failure to take action 
on the recommendations of its own Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). 
Of the 2002 municipalities, 79 per cent submitted financial statements late or failed to 
submit (57 per cent were outstanding 20 months after the due date) (ibid, p.7). The AG 
warned that due to the non-maintenance of key financial records, such as the debtor’s 
register, bank statements, funds and reserves register, general ledger, trial balance, etc., 
there was no certainty of identifying all irregularities. The most common deficiency (33 
cases) was the absence of a fixed assets register. Other problems included property 
valuations not being done according to schedule, stocktaking not being carried out and 
budgets not being approved (or being erroneously approved) and tax returns being 
absent or faulty. Councils were not collecting monies owned to them and were not paying 
their own creditors. Some municipalities did not seem to be solvent; about 20 had made 
inadequate provision for bad debt and at least four made continuous use of bank 
overdrafts (ibid, p.12). 
The AG’s special reports do not indicate cases of corruption or suspected corruption and 
on the face of it, any or none of the irregularities identified could be symptomatic of 
corruption. The AG does however report suspected corruption to oversight bodies like the 
provincial government and the anti-corruption agencies (interviews with corruption 
investigators). What is clear from the AG reports is that the Eastern Cape local 
government, as a sector of state, is one in which corruption may easily take root and 
remain concealed in the confusion of poor management and weak administration. 
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Based on the contents of this report, it is clear that the finances of many of 
the municipalities as well as the quality of their administrative functions 
require significant improvement. Cognisance is taken of the action taken in 
employing consultants to assist failing municipalities. However, this in itself is 
seen as a short-term solution that could result in fruitless expenditure, 
especially where existing financial staff are already remunerated to do the 
task…All too often councils in receipt of this assistance accept the situation 
as it is without having the will or realization to employ suitable and competent 
staff to establish and maintain a vibrant local government to serve the needs 
of its inhabitants. Furthermore a number of councils have for too long 
accepted the situation of cash handouts by government as a means of 
survival and have a reluctance to levy and, more importantly, to collect 
service charges from its consumers (ibid, p.17). 
 
5.3 Policy and legislation related to municipal corruption 
The principle policy instrument in addressing this problem in the foreseeable future will 
be the Municipal Finance Management Act (56 of 2003), signed into effect on 1 July 
2004. The Act aims to create more direct accountability within council, specifically with 
regard to the decisions and controls exercised by mayors, mayoral committees and 
finance officers. National intervention in municipal finances becomes possible after 
provincial intervention. A Municipal Finance Recovery Service was created which will 
investigate the reasons for financial crisis in the municipality in question, determine the 
overall state of its finances and prepare an appropriate recovery plan. While these 
technical controls are to be welcomed, they do not necessarily address the basic 
problems of political principle and the subverting of local accountability that have created 
the possibility of wasteful local bureaucracies led by avaricious politicians. 
As already indicated in the discussion of SIU investigations into local government 
corruption, an important component of that corruption relates to the defrauding of tender 
and contracting procedures by councillors and staff who receive kickbacks from the 
successful tendering organization or who, through other means, hold a financial interest 
in the outcome of the process. 
 
5.4 Municipal corruption: National examples 
One of the most prevalent forms of corruption at municipal level – and indeed in all 
spheres of government – is abuse of tendering and procurement procedures for private 
gain. Despite increasingly stringent measures to prevent councillors and senior officials 
from benefiting from tender awards, the irregular award of large infrastructure and service 
tenders seem to persist. ‘Local government is considered to be particularly vulnerable to 
corruption given both the size of its operations, the size of its budget allocation and the 
role that councils play in the tendering process’, noted the Institute of Security Studies 
researcher, Hennie van Vuuren (ISS, 2006). Recent high-profile cases include: 
• Cape Town Metro: Controversy resulted from a R100m security contract that was 
awarded to Jama Security, a company until recently owned by the provincial MEC for 
Transport and Public Works Mcebisi Skwatsha. Skwatsha resigned from the 
company six days before he had to declare his business interests to the 
provincial parliament and passed ownership of the company on to his brother. 
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The tender award was revoked following a court order in favour of the Western 
Cape Security Association (The Cape Times, 7 June, 2005). 
• The assignment, below market value, of prime beachfront property in Cape Town to 
companies that were linked to senior office holders in the ANC. (ANC Mayor 
Nomaindia Mfeketo later intervened to stop the deal.) 
• Cape Town Metro awarded tenders under the poverty relief programme to upgrade 
roads in the poor area of Gugulethu – the successful tendering organization, BTH 
Construction, was unable to meet the required project standards and the provision of 
the infrastructure suffered. It cost the city R13.6 million to repair the shoddy work 
done by the contractor. Mayoral committee member for roads and transport Danile 
Landingwe allegedly intervened to ensure that BTH Construction was kept in the 
running for the 2003 tender despite a tender committee finding that an award to BTH 
would expose the council to ‘extreme risks’. The Speaker launched an internal 
investigation after pressure from opposition parties and the Public Protector (The 
Citizen, 28 July, 2005). 
• In Gauteng Province more than 100 local officials and councillors were dismissed or 
forced to resign over the last five years as a result of investigations launched by the 
provincial government and Auditor General in the province’s 15 municipalities. Local 
government MEC Qedani Mahlangu notes that the most common offences were mal-
administration, fraud and corruption (Business Day, 16 January, 2006). 
• In the Free State province the legislature’s public accounts committee chairman Abrie 
Oosthuizen filed a report by the public accounts committee after meeting 
municipalities during August 2005 to consider reports of the Auditor General on the 
financial statements of all municipalities. The report found that in Matjhabeng, 
Tokologo, Naledi, Moqhaka, Kopanong, Maluti-a-Phofung, Nala, Dihlabeng, 
Phumelela and Xhariep District Municipalities financial controls were absent; ‘almost 
nothing was in place’. Matjhabeng and Mangaung municipalities were singled out for 
improper handling of tenders and for employees and councillors’ having interests in 
companies dealing with municipalities. ‘Evidence heard (from Matjhabeng) could not 
satisfy the committee that the transaction relating to a tender for mechanical 
equipment was valid, as an amount of R3,151,347 was paid to the contractor three 
days before he was awarded the tender’ (The Citizen, 16 September, 2005). In 2004, 
local government MEC Malefetsane Joel Mafereka appointed Zola Majavu to lead an 
investigation into alleged corruption and mal-administration in the Moqhaka local 
municipality. The report was due to be completed in January 2005, and was 
apparently handed over to the MEC and to the Premier, but never made public 
despite the fact that some officials have already been disciplined. The municipality’s 
weakness in service delivery caused it be targeted for Project Consolidate support 
but in the same period (2005) the municipal manager received a performance bonus 
of R106,000 and the four other senior managers in the municipality were awarded 
bonuses of R90,000 each (DA, 2006). 
• In Mangaung municipality Mojalefa Matlole, the municipal manager, and Mzwandile 
Silwana, the chief of operations, were formally dismissed in May 2006 after an 
internal investigation into their conduct. The two officials were arrested by the 
Scorpions in July 2005 along with Papi Mokoena, the executive mayor, his wife 
Granny, as well as Zongezile Zumane, the previous speaker of the Mangaung local 
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council. They were allegedly involved in fraud and theft involving municipal tenders 
worth R150 million. 
• In KwaZulu Natal province the municipal managers (and some former mayors) of 
Okhahlamba, Greater Kokstad, Umtshezi, Nqutu and Mooi Mpofana have been 
ordered to repay a collective total of R7 million which was regarded as irregular 
expenditure. Irregular expenditure included improper use of discretionary funds, 
pension schemes and appointments to management positions; interest-free loans 
and allowances for councillors; tenders and consultants' fees; leave pay and 
compensation; and the sale of prepaid electricity vouchers (The Citizen, 2006). 
An open and impartial procurement procedure is one of the most important safeguards in 
preventing corrupt practice in the securing of goods and services. In June 2005 the 
National Treasury issued new regulations aimed at curbing corruption in the tendering 
and procurement function and improving accountability and transparency for the award of 
municipal bids. These regulations mirror provisions within the Municipal Finance 
Management Act and include (The Cape Times, June 7, 2005): 
• Anyone who is in the service of the state is not eligible to bid for, or be awarded a 
municipal contract for, the provision of goods and services. 
• Tenders with a value in excess of R200,000 are considered ‘big tenders’ and require 
competitive bids. A three-stage process will ensure that specification, evaluation and 
adjudication are handled by different committees. 
• All bids must be published in a bid register which must be open to public scrutiny, 
including being published on the municipality’s website. 
• Councillors may not be involved in supply-chain management systems and are 
excluded from bid committees: 
No councillor of any municipality may be a member of a municipal bid 
committee or any other committee evaluating or approving tenders, 
quotations, contracts or other bids, nor attend any such meeting as an 
observer (GSA, 2003a, Section 117). 
• Officials who serve on bid committees must abide by a strict code of ethics regarding 
the receipt of gifts and must withdraw from any bid process where a family member 
has an interest. 
• Companies supplying goods and services to a municipality must declare any gifts, 
awards or favours to officials or risk being listed by the National Treasury as an 
organization prohibited from doing business with the public sector. 
• Any dispute regarding a bidding process must be mediated by an independent and 
impartial person. 
In addition to stronger supply chain management functions, the functioning of audit 
committees is expected to make a significant impact on the transparency of council’s 
financial decisions (personal communication with Geoff Walton, internal auditor, Buffalo 
City Municipality). The audit committee is an independent advisory body that must advise 
council and staff on matters relating to: internal financial control and internal audits, risk 
management, accounting policies, the adequacy, reliability and accuracy of financial 
reporting and information, performance management and effective governance. The 
committee must also ensure compliance with the Municipal Finance Management Act, 
the annual Division of Revenue Act and any other applicable legislation (GSA, 2003a, 
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Section 166(2)(a)). The audit committee must also review the financial statements of the 
municipality in order to provide council with a credible assessment of its financial position 
and to respond to any issues raised in the Auditor General’s report (ibid, Section 
166(2)(b)&(c)). The audit committee must carry out any investigations into the financial 
affairs of the municipality that council may direct (ibid, Section 166(2)(d)). In terms of 
section 166 (4) of the Act the members of the audit committee must have appropriate 
experience and the majority may not be in the employ of the municipality (no councillors 
may serve on audit committees). 
Why this need for such vigorously independent oversight of elected local politicians and 
their staff? An example of a governance incident from the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality illustrates the need for the empowerment of such committees and how, prior 
to the enactment of the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), such accountability 
structures might be sidelined by political forces within council. 
 
Box 2. Audit committee sidelined 
In September 2001 the local media in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan municipality 
(NMM) began to carry reports that executive mayor Nceba Faku had used the mayor’s 
discretionary fund to pay his own accounts. Payments made included parking fines, 
clothes and tuition fees for relatives (The Herald, 21 November, 2001). The mayor also 
reimbursed his driver R27,000 for payments made on his behalf. In the 2000/01 
financial year payments from the fund amounted to R87,000 and were R40,000 over 
budget (ibid). The audit committee had first indicated its concern regarding this matter 
in November 2000, however the alleged ‘irregular expenditure’ continued and further 
correspondence followed in January and again in July 2001. The audit committee 
questioned whether the principles of ‘good corporate governance’ had been followed 
and asked to meet the mayor so that he could explain why private payments from the 
fund continued after the committee had expressed its concern. The municipal manager 
Graham Richards replied to the committee that the mayor was not accountable to it 
and was not inclined to meet the committee to provide an explanation. The chairperson 
of the audit committee, Paul Leese accepted that the committee had no legal standing 
to enforce its request but pointed out that his committee had been trying for 12 months 
to clarify the use of the discretionary fund. Leese accused the municipal manager of 
ignoring the ethical aspects of the issue (ibid). Leese also referred to an opinion from 
the Auditor General that the matter should be explained. In reply the municipal 
manager Richards suggested that the audit committee had overstepped its authority: 
In that the executive mayor is not accountable to your committee, he is not inclined to 
provide you with the explanations in the current context (ibid). 
After much persistence by the audit committee, the matter was partially discussed in 
council but only as a ‘green paper’ i.e. subject to confidentiality limits that precluded full 
public scrutiny. The incident suggests that a ‘toothless’ audit committee may be a 
waste of time and resources and may simply lend a semblance of legitimacy to what 
are often very dubious governance practices. The reworked 2003 provisions of the 
MFMA appear to remedy this only partially, i.e. the audit committee functions at the 
pleasure of council and senior politicians. 
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Returning for the moment to tendering and procurement rules, it becomes clear that, 
while impressive in themselves, the effective use of these regulations and indeed other 
anti-corruption laws assumes that municipalities have a minimal level of administrative 
capability and are able of developing and following their own policies. Tangible evidence 
of such capability is not present in provinces like the Eastern Cape. In an October 2001 
survey of Eastern Cape municipalities, the Standing Committee on Housing and Local 
Government reported as follows (it should be noted that the table below is a ‘snapshot’ of 
these municipalities at this time – it does not imply that the situation has remained 
unchanged): 
 
5.5 Profiling financial problems 
Table 8. Snapshot of tendering and procurement rules in Eastern Cape 
municipalities as of 2001 
Municipality Procurement practice / other financial issues 
Sakhisizwe No procurement policy in place. Claim that tenders are advertised. No lists of 
service providers are kept. (Without such a record it is impossible to keep a ‘track 
record’ of the performance of specific service providers or to discern whether 
there is a history of favouring certain companies.) 
Engcobo Council adjudicates tenders – no policy in place. Claim that tenders are 
advertised. No lists of service providers are kept. 
Intsika Yethu Irregular hiring of project manager for housing development led to litigation and 
confiscation of municipal property. No procurement policy. Council sometimes 
has insufficient funds to advertise its meetings to the public. 
Nyandeni No treasury regulations to control finances. No procurement policies in place – 
but tenders are assessed by consultants who make recommendations to council. 
Due to a financial crisis, an amount of R343,000 intended for housing subsidies 
was used instead to pay salaries. 
Elundini Draft procurement policy in place. Council approves tenders but is assisted by a 
provincial government team (Municipal Mentoring Project). Heads of departments 
may approve tenders of less than R5,000. 
Ndlambe The procurement policy is in place but allows for council to approve tenders. Both 
Ndlambe and the district municipality for the area claimed to have no knowledge 
of how the contractor responsible for road maintenance was appointed. 
Senqu Reported to be using ‘outdated’ Treasury Regulations. Last audited statements 
were for year ending June 1996 and only for a part of the municipality. 
Procurement policy is not reported. No budget formulated at time of survey. 
Maletswai Reported to be using ‘outdated’ Treasury Regulations. Procurement and asset 
management policies still to be developed. Financial controls were absent and 
the billing system was described as ‘incorrect’. Cash flow problems foreseen with 
possibility that creditors and staff would not be paid. Alleged that contracts went 
to large consortiums in Port Elizabeth and East London. 
Gariep Procurement and asset management policies still to be developed. ‘The financial 
situation in Sterkstroom (a town within the new municipality, it was once a 
municipality in itself) is unclear and is being investigated by the Auditor General. 
Financial mismanagement has been noted in Sterkstroom, but the town clerk 
involved is still the acting head’. 
Tsolwana Procurement policies have been developed. Financial mismanagement was 
suspected with regard to a R38,000 IDP allocation that was unaccounted for. 
(This was not unusual; many planning grants in other municipalities could not be 
accounted for.) 
Emalahleni About R6.8 million outstanding to the municipality in property rates. Municipality 
operated three different credit-control policies. Municipality operating on bridging 
loan and owed substantial amounts to Eskom (electricity), Telkom 
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(telecommunications) and Department of Water Affairs (water). Financial 
statements outstanding for Lady Frere (one of the constituent towns) ‘…mostly 
due to the fact that the municipal offices were set alight and the town clerk 
murdered in 1997’. Procurement and asset management policies still to be 
developed. One consultant (Sakhisizwe) appointed to many projects that have not 
been completed – the district municipality indicates that R4 million is unaccounted 
for. 
Lukanji Sound financial management in the larger town (Queenstown) reported, but lack 
of controls in the smaller town (Whittlesea). Claims that all policies including 
procurement are in place. (Very little financial information is provided – sound 
financial standing of the municipality seems to have been accepted ‘on faith’ by 
the Standing Committee.) 
Ngqushwa No credit control policy in operation and previous year’s financial records were 
not audited. Council adjudicates tenders informally – no policy. Annual reports 
have never been compiled. 
Umzimkhulu Municipality able to generate revenue only from one town (Umzimkulu) and not 
from rural areas – its largest component. About 30 per cent of the people in the 
town pay for services. No accounts are issued due to theft of three computers – 
this also resulted in the loss of financial data. Financial statements were 
available. Procurement policy drafted but not yet adopted by council. Audit 
queries have resulted from the use of indigent funds – i.e. funds meant to 
subsidize services to the poor –  to pay for other operational costs. 
Mbizana Uses the procurement policy of the previous transitional council. No policy for 
asset management. Annual report is not produced. Very little financial information 
is provided. 
Ingquza Hill Previous financial records (from constituent municipalities) are mostly missing. 
Criminal investigations were pending and the new council (2001) requested a 
forensic audit. Procurement policy in draft form – council uses policy of the district 
municipality 
Umzimvubu About 93 per cent of the municipality’s revenue comes from transfers from 
national government, i.e. own revenue is negligible. Previous Mount Ayliff 
municipality financial records described as being in a state of ‘havoc’ – its 
telephone bill as at December 5, 2000 was R100,000 and it owed R1.8 million to 
the Department of Water Affairs. SAPS and Scorpions investigations underway 
into financial affairs. A procurement policy was being developed by consultants. 
Ntabankulu  Draft procurement policy has been developed. Financial statements were 
available. 
King Sabata 
Dalindyebo 
The municipality owed the following: pension contributions (R5.8 million), receiver 
of revenue (R39 million), staff allowance deductions (R13 million), Department of 
Water Affairs (R31 million), audit fees (R0.5 million), Public Investment 
Commissioner (R17 million) and district council levy (R1.1 million). Council was 
using the previous procurement policy (outdated) and had no asset management 
policy. 
Makana Financial statements were available. Procurement and asset management 
policies were being developed. Council had provided free basic water to indigent 
households over the previous 18 months but would not do so for the 2001/02 
financial year due to financial constraints. 
Sundays 
River 
Unspecified policy for procurement in place. Most non-transfer revenue comes 
from the sale of electricity. Very little financial information is provided. 
Mbhashe No Treasury Regulations are in place. Outdated legislation is used for 
procurement. No annual reports are compiled.  
Mnquma Do not adhere to Treasury Regulations. Standing committee found that financial 
controls were ‘lacking.’ There is no procurement policy. This is renowned as one 
of the worst run and most consistently conflict-ridden municipalities in the 
province and possibly the country – the report fails to indicate this. 
Great Kei No procurement policy in place but claim to comply with central government 
legislation. An asset register has been compiled.  
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Buffalo City Adhere to Treasury Regulations and able to produce financial statements and 
other documents. Have drafted own procurement policy. The complex financial 
situation and the state of financial controls are not reflected in the standing 
committee’s report on this, the second-largest municipality in the province. 
Nxuba No creditors had been paid over the previous seven months due to financial 
crisis. No procurement policy is reported. Annual reports are produced. 
Nkonkobe Appeared to be problems with the creditor’s register and age analysis thereof. No 
new policies with regard to procurement had been developed or applied.  
Amahlathi Statutory fund contributions not made due to lack of finance. Procurement policy 
under development – currently using outdated legislation. 
Inxuba 
Yethemba 
Municipality makes use of an R4 million overdraft facility with the bank. Financial 
statements are produced but no annual reports. Procurement policy not yet in 
place. 
Blue Crane 
Route 
Debt collection outsourced via tender. Financial statements had not been audited 
for two years due to outstanding payment to the AG. Of concern was the fact that 
the finance committee also acts as the audit committee 
Camdeboo Use national legislation for procurement, i.e. no policy in place. Council’s standing 
committees award tenders based on the type of work / service required. Also 
operate an ‘advisory committee’ in relation to tenders. 
Baviaans One of the amalgamated municipalities had not been audited for four years. The 
municipality was owed R121,000 in (illegal) advances to its own councillors. No 
report on procurement procedures. 
Kou-kamma Municipality claims that its Equitable Share transfer does not match its 
development need – it has minimal own revenue-sourcing potential. Audited 
statements available for one of the two constituent towns only. Procurement 
policy in place but process controlled by council. 
Kouga Financial statements were available and a procurement policy is in place.  
Source: Report of the Standing Committee on Housing and Local Government, 16 October, 2001  
 
The above extracts from the Standing Committee report are not intended to present a 
current or balanced picture of the state of municipal finance or financial controls. Instead 
the table illustrates in broad terms the kind of financial situation that prevailed in most 
municipalities and in particular the forms of irregularity that might constitute corruption or 
create the potential for corruption to occur. Pertinent issues include: 
• Decreasing cost recovery from service provision and increased reliance on inter-
governmental transfers. While the provision of the Equitable Share transfer was 
intended to ensure that the needs of indigent households were met, it was generally 
used to prop up the core running costs of the municipality, in particular salaries and 
allowances. This relinquishing of control over revenue may have increased the 
likelihood of corruption as the link between service provision and service payment 
became weaker. In other words, if local citizens were not paying for services, they 
were less likely to ask how municipal revenue is used. The example of Nyandeni, 
where R343,000 was allegedly intended for housing subsidies but was used instead 
to pay salaries, illustrates this point and suggests a level of institutional corruption 
occasioned by the abuse of pro-poor policy rather than a simple act of fraud or graft. 
• While the municipalities generally claim a ‘culture of non-payment’ for services, it is 
not clear that they have billed fairly or effectively or whether they have invoked any 
form of effective credit control directed to those consumers who can pay for services 
– the determination of indigence having long been a very uncertain and inefficient 
process in most municipalities. 
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• The municipal re-demarcation process 1998–2000 amalgamated two or three 
municipalities into single larger entities. ‘In many former TLCs the financial 
statements were not audited for the past two to four years’ The effects of the poor 
financial records and reports of the disestablished municipalities were carried over 
into the new municipality. In many instances therefore further corruption or irregular 
practice might have been encouraged by the absence of reliable base data on which 
to build accurate financial records. 
• The absence of a single and generally accepted set of Treasury Regulations also 
created the space for varying standards of practice in financial management and 
reporting. This latitude may have been abused by those who sought to benefit from 
practices that lacked rigor or where opportunities arose for circumventing proper 
checks and balances. Perhaps the most serious of these ‘gaps’ was the different 
forms of procurement practice – or in some cases the absence of any transparent 
system – used to purchase goods and services. 
 
5.6 Corruption and infrastructure services 
Why, in assessing infrastructure related corruption, is it important to look at 
municipal governance? 
In South Africa, local government is constitutionally assigned a broad range of functions 
that entail responsibility for infrastructure services. Section 156 of the Constitution 
provides that a municipality has the executive authority and the right to administer the 
local government matters listed in Parts B of Schedules 4 and 5. This is reflected in the 
tables below: 
 
Table 9. Municipalities’ responsibility for infrastructure services 
Part B of Schedule 4  Part B of Schedule 5 
Explanation: local government 
functions over which national 
and provincial government may 
(concurrently) pass laws and 
exercise oversight 
 Explanation: local government functions over which only 
province may legislate and exercise oversight but where 
national government may set minimum standards 
air pollution  Beaches and amusement facilities 
Building regulations  Billboards and advertisement displays 
Child-care facilities  Cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria 
Electricity and gas reticulation  Cleansing 
Fire fighting  Control of public nuisances 
Local tourism  Control of liquor outlets 
Municipal airports  Facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of animals 
Municipal planning  Fences and fencing 
Municipal health services  Licensing of dogs 
Municipal public transport  Licensing and control of food outlets 
Municipal public works  Local amenities 
Pontoons ferries, jetties, piers 
and harbours 
 Local sports facilities 
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Storm water management  Markets 
Trading regulations  Municipal abattoirs 
Water and sanitation services  Municipal parks and recreation 
 Municipal roads 
 Noise pollution 
 Pounds 
 Public places 
 Refuse removal 
 Refuse dumps and solid waste disposal 
 Street trading 
 Street lighting 
 
 Traffic and parking 
 
 In terms of the constitutional obligations allocated to different spheres of government, 
South African municipalities carry the primary responsibility for infrastructure services. 
Furthermore municipalities are, according to President Mbeki’s 2000 address to the 
nation, obliged to deliver free basic services (water, electricity, solid waste and sanitation) 
to households who could not otherwise afford these services. Municipalities are also 
required to provide these services in a way that is sustainable and affordable to all 
households. This policy essentially reflected an increasingly clear ‘reality’ in local service 
consumption where cost recovery has been very low. 
5.6.1 Consolidate Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CMIP) 
At the end of 2005 government committed to a revised set of basic service targets 
(Fraser-Moleketi, 2006): 
• Access to clean water for all communities by 2010 
• Electricity for all houses by 2012 
• Eradicating the bucket sanitation system by 2006/07 
These would be achieved by developing a Municipal Infrastructure Investment Strategy; 
technical ‘hands-on support’ to ‘less capacitated municipalities’ and twenty-one rural and 
urban nodes; implementing a national framework for local economic development to 
improve market and public confidence; extending and prioritizing Project Consolidate 
support to municipalities; and improving the capacity of Provincial Departments to 
provide improved support to local government. The South African municipal infrastructure 
development is driven by a well-co-ordinated programme of funding and management 
support, located within national government. At its launch in 1997 the Consolidated 
Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CMIP) was described as a ‘…national programme 
for upgrading, extending and rehabilitating municipal infrastructure’ (Idasa, 1997, 
p.23).The CMIP was the implementation component of the Municipal Infrastructure 
Investment Framework – a government policy that pledged a basic level of services to all 
households in South Africa within the next 10 years. The CMIP was to operate through 
an application-based system that was open to all municipalities. Apart from the basic 
service target, CMIP also set out to link the delivery of infrastructure with housing, to 
improve service delivery generally and to ensure its long-term sustainability. The CMIP 
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also undertook to integrate urban and rural services and to strengthen municipalities. The 
CMIP initially defined the infrastructure it would fund as (ibid): 
i)   Connector: (for example, water pipes that link reservoirs) 
ii)  Internal bulk: (roads or other infrastructure maintained by the municipality) 
iii)  Service infrastructure (public lighting, solid waste sites, storm-water systems, etc.) 
The CMIP was organized into three categories of provision that were based on the 
existing assessment of the state of municipal infrastructure and the type of interventions 
that were required to improve it. Each category or ‘window’ had its own criteria: 
 
Table 10. The Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme’s categories of 
provision 
Funding Category 1 Funding Criteria 
Providing new or upgrading 
existing internal bulk and 
connector infrastructure 
Local need and demand 
Priority with respect to national and provisional development 
strategies 
Cost effectiveness 
Efficiency and speed of implementation 
Service charge payment performance 
Affordability of service levels 
Previous delivery performance (for repeat funding) 
Service charge payment performance 
Capacity to manage project 
Financial sustainability 
No double-funding 
Funding Category 2 Funding Criteria 
Restoration of collapsed 
service infrastructure 
Current state of repair 
Local need and demand 
Cost effectiveness 
Efficiency and speed of implementation 
Service charge payment performance 
Capacity to manage project 
Service charge payment performance 
Financial sustainability 
Funding Category 3 Funding Criteria 
Special cases, based on 
merit 
Technically deserving of special treatment 
Local need and demand 
Cost effectiveness 
Service charge payment 
Financial sustainability 
Source: Idasa, 1997, p.24–5 
 
By 2003/04 the CMIP was being replaced by the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG). 
The MIG will eventually replace all existing grants for municipal infrastructure 
development including (ibid): 
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• CMIP 
• Local Economic Development Fund 
• Water Services project 
• Community-based Public Works Programme 
• Municipal Sports and Recreation programme 
• National Electrification Programme to local government 
• Urban Transport Fund 
The consolidation process is expected to continue into the period 2005/06. In his 2003 
address to the national assembly on the tabling of the Medium Term Budget Policy 
Statement and the Adjustments Appropriation Bill, Finance Minster Trevor Manual 
announced that local government would receive the largest percentage increase of all 
spheres of government due to its ‘vital role in delivering basic services to poor 
communities’ and that a ‘stepped up’ infrastructure delivery programme would be 
available through the MIG. Total national transfers to local government would rise from 
R12 billion in 2003/04 to R17.1 billion in 2006/07. The increased allocation to local 
government (the 2004 Medium Term Expenditure Framework set aside R16.6 billion for 
infrastructure grants) was to accelerate the roll out of free basic electricity, water, refuse 
removal and sanitation to poor households, to strengthen infrastructure delivery and to 
consolidate local government financial management and policy reforms to comply with 
the Municipal Finance Management Bill (GSA, 2003b, p.78). 
The National Treasury allocates funds to the CMIP / MIG in the form of ‘conditional 
grants’ subject to the Division of Revenue Act (DoRA). The Act, (Section 11.1 (a)) 
stipulates that funds may only be transferred ‘In terms of a policy framework approved by 
the Minister’ and requires stringent accounting and reporting regarding the use of such 
funds. The Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2001 shows a doubling of expenditure on 
infrastructure between 2000/01 and 2003/04. The programme has been able to spend an 
annually increasing budget in all but one financial year and has successfully satisfied the 
stringent obligations of DoRA in terms of financial accountability and reporting (ibid). 
In general, local government – constantly under transformation pressure and with an 
array of new forms, expanded boundaries and nationally prescribed systems – has 
proved to be a poor vehicle for delivering fiscal allocations intended for development and 
infrastructure provision: 
Given the challenges of rising personnel costs, water and electricity losses, 
inefficiency in service delivery and outstanding service payments, it is critical 
that municipalities take appropriate measures to address these issues. 
Changes and shifts in powers and functions, increased service delivery 
responsibilities, general economic development, population growth and 
urbanization, infrastructure disparities and income inequality all contribute to 
the tough challenges facing the local government sphere (ibid, p.85). 
While the Division of Revenue Act (DoRA) has expedited the flow of funding to local 
government, provincial stakeholders argue that it has also undermined the influence of 
provincial governments over allocations of funding. Provincial government officials claim 
to be unable to over-rule resolutions taken by local councils or influence the appointment 
of capable service providers. Provinces claim that this inhibits their legal responsibility for 
oversight of large infrastructure projects and thus weakens the monitoring and evaluation 
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function expected of this sphere of government. There is little evidence, however, that 
provinces such as the Eastern Cape have the capacity to effectively monitor such 
projects. The Department of Housing, Local Government and Traditional Affairs, for 
example, currently has one qualified engineer to check on the quality of all housing and 
infrastructure projects (personal communication with Madyaka (Department of Housing, 
Local Government and Traditional Affairs – Eastern Cape), March 8, 2006). 
Most of the criticisms levelled at the CMIP programme relate to institutional failing and 
the capacity of officialdom and are not necessarily a reflection on the programme itself. 
Whereas CMIP emphasizes the delivery of physical infrastructure it cannot retain long-
term responsibility for the services and benefits that arise from this infrastructure – this is 
clearly the responsibility of the municipality. Municipal incapacity, poor planning and 
misguided budget prioritization has often resulted in under-used and poorly maintained / 
vandalized infrastructure, and as a consequence, inferior services (my own observations, 
partly confirmed by McIntosh Xaba & Associates, 2003). The CMIP has also been 
accused of failing to articulate a coherent contribution to local economic development 
beyond the creation of employment during construction. Further it is argued that CMIP 
makes no systematic attempt to ensure that infrastructure contributes to an enabling 
environment for local economic development. It is debatable, however, whether it was 
feasible to assign these ambitious development objectives to CMIP rather than 
recognizing that the programme was merely one of a set of pre-conditions to effective 
local level economic strategy. 
McIntosh Xaba & Associates’ evaluation of CMIP projects in Kwa Zulu-Natal, Eastern 
Cape and Limpopo suggests a tightly co-ordinated system of programme management 
and financial accountability with engineers and project managers central to the delivery 
process. Municipal stakeholders are reported to view CMIP primarily as an infrastructure 
programme and regard the potential local economic development objectives of CMIP – 
such as building human capital, pulling in private investment and creating a conducive 
environment for industry – as incidental to the programme (McIntosh Xaba & Associates, 
2003). There can be little doubt, however, that CMIP has created some of the most 
tangible benefits for poor service users including increased mobility, access to short-term 
employment in the construction of infrastructure, less time spent in the collection of 
firewood and water, access to better quality of water and reduced incidences of water-
borne illnesses (ibid). 
The Eastern Cape had the highest allocation of CMIP funding for the 2002/03 financial 
year. According to the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) 
November 2002 Report, the Eastern Cape was allocated R444.1 million, which is 
equivalent to 24 per cent of all national allocations. The largest share of the Eastern 
Cape 2002/03 provincial infrastructure allocation is directed to the OR Tambo District 
(27.95 per cent), which gets a total of R124 million. The Chris Hani District has the 
second-largest allocation of R71.66 million (16.15 per cent). Alfred Nzo and Amatole 
districts are allocated R48.22 million (10.87 per cent) and R46.57 million (10.50 per cent), 
respectively. The fifth and sixth-largest share of the infrastructure grant is directed to the 
Nelson Mandela Metropole, at R39.75 million (8.96 per cent) and Ukhahlamba District, at 
R38.92 million (8.77 per cent). Buffalo City is allocated R30.62 million (6.90 per cent) and 
the remaining infrastructure grant funding is allocated to the Cacadu District, at R16.93 
million (3.82 per cent) (GSA, 2004a, p.4). In the Eastern Cape, CMIP projects have on 
the whole been water supply, solid waste disposal site replacements, bulk sanitation 
services, storm-water upgrading and access roads. 
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It is very difficult to quantify the extent to which CMIP / MIG development impact has 
been compromised by clearly identified acts of corruption. Most of the anti-corruption 
agencies interviewed in the course of this study have pointed out that the most serious 
instances of irregularity leading to compromised delivery of service infrastructure arises 
from the manner in which large infrastructure projects are contracted out to service 
providers. However none of the informants was able to provide specific examples and 
quantify the amounts involved or the impact on basic service delivery. The most common 
criticism is one of lack of transparency or nepotism in the tender process. This problem, 
however, assumes a new dimension when it arises (as many of the informants 
suggested) precisely because of, rather than despite, government policy. The cited policy 
was local economic development (LED) and black economic empowerment (BEE). 
These policy frameworks dictate that black-owned companies and emerging contractors 
are the preferred service providers. Few potential bidders on CMIP projects would ignore 
these imperatives; indeed they would be out of business quite quickly. Nonetheless, the 
express intention of promoting small and medium-sized enterprises has rarely been 
achieved. Emerging contractors have invariably been unable to meet the terms of large 
government contracts and have been appointed in irregular ways, with the result that 
project failure is the rule rather than the exception (Auditor General 2003b). Attempts to 
overcome this by forming partnerships with established businesses or joint ventures have 
often replicated the existing divisions of labour and reward, with so-called small, medium-
sized and microenterprises (SMMEs) taking up the role of labour contractors. 
Alternatively the emerging contractor acts as the facilitator between communities and the 
main contractor, with little on-site transfer of skills (McIntosh Xaba & Associates, 2003, 
p.8–9). 
There are problems, usually problems in the private sector, meeting equity 
objectives on the one hand, or black economic empowerment not having the 
experience and capacity to carry out projects successfully. Where they do, 
often there are problems and transparency (many contracts and tenders are 
not open to public inspection). Within this range of activities there is also the 
problem of corruption (for example, backhanders, nepotism in both private 
and public sector, favouritism, etc.…) (Hemson et al., 2004, p.52). 
In some instances infrastructure projects appear to have been developed for political or 
symbolic reasons without any reasonable assurance of functional value to beneficiaries. 
In general this is not defined as corruption but there are instances where the project is 
clearly for the short-term benefit of local political careers. Where functional service 
provision was demonstrably unlikely, and where it is likely that the project’s political 
sponsors were aware of these pitfalls, some of the criteria seem to be present which 
would meet a broad definition of corruption. The following project is not a watertight 
example of this eventuality, but it raises key questions about how public funds can be 
fruitlessly expended without any obvious suggestion of graft: 
 
Box 3. Case Study: Middledrift waste disposal 
This project, drawn from the 2003 evaluation by McIntosh Xaba & Associates (assisted 
by, amongst others, Mbumba Development Services), demonstrates ostensibly the 
problem of costly CMIP infrastructure being under-used, poorly maintained and 
vandalized. The Middledrift Waste Disposal site in the Eastern Cape was part of the 
highly acclaimed Middledrift development process that was awarded ‘best practice 
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status’ in a review undertaken by Stanford University. Solid waste disposal was 
deemed necessary to service the increasing number of residential sites (it was 
estimated that the project would serve over 1,480 households). Previously, plastic and 
other solid waste had been strewn throughout the area causing disease, the spread of 
vermin, unsightly pollution and stock losses when cattle ingested the plastic. The 
waste disposal site was built at a cost of R542,000 (excluding official’s time) and 
consisted of: 
• a drainage facility; 
• an incinerator; 
• a sorting site; 
• an office block; 
• toilets; and 
• a guarded checkpoint. 
Currently all of these facilities, except the actual hole into which waste is tipped, are 
neglected or unusable and some have been vandalized. The incinerator has never 
been used. The considerable investment has in fact yielded nothing more than the hole 
into which rubbish is deposited. The hole addresses the primary need of waste 
disposal, but could have been provided at a fraction of the cost. 
McIntosh Xaba & Associates suggested also that the direct and indirect costs 
(including environmental impacts and official personnel’s time) entailed in this type of 
service provision were frequently underestimated or ignored in decisions about the 
scale and nature of infrastructure to be constructed. The analysis suggests a tendency 
for municipalities to adopt conventional services solutions that rely on high levels of 
professional input. In retrospect the circumstances of this community and the available 
skills required a more modest approach. But what if the problem was less about 
naivety and more about conjuring vote-winning demonstrations of local leaderships 
‘commitment to development’? What if the council behind this debacle had done the 
same thing in a number of other infrastructure projects and had in all probability 
factored the likely collapse of the infrastructure against the political capital that accrued 
when this project was presented to the community? 
 
There is a broad band of problems that exist in a grey area where incapacity merges with 
more questionable behaviour by officialdom. The effects of municipal incapacity on the 
CMIP programme have already been described. In summary these relate to ill-advised 
appointment of contractors and inability to enforce contracts, but these shortfalls can be 
very difficult to distinguish from partiality in appointments and deliberate non-enforcement 
of contracts. It also carries over beyond the construction phase into the inability to 
correctly diagnose technical problems once infrastructure is installed and generally weak 
operation and maintenance procedures. The view of many corruption investigators who 
provided insight into this study is that ill-advised appointments make systems failure 
inevitable and that this should not be treated as a benign ‘weakness’ – but rather as a 
form of corruption. The Auditor General has echoed this sentiment in reports over the 
past decade. Nonetheless it is more than likely that significantly more resources are lost 
to weak municipal management and operational incapacity than to corruption per se, and 
that this problem is pronounced amongst those municipalities, especially those that are 
unable to undertake their own capital investment. Weak municipalities cannot 
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communicate and transact with communities in an effective manner, therefore the 
infrastructure that is provided by CMIP cannot recoup costs. This initiates a cycle in 
which infrastructure is poorly maintained, services break down and services payments 
diminish (McIntosh Xaba & Associates, 2003, p.12). The imputed ‘autonomy’ of local 
government has contributed to the deepening of this crisis, as CMIP staff at provincial 
and national level have been reluctant to interfere in the affairs of local government. 
Some remedy to this crisis of local capacity has been achieved through innovative 
approaches to capacity building and technical support such as the Municipal Mentoring 
Project and, most recently, Project Consolidate. 
5.6.2 Housing delivery 
In August 2003 the Portfolio Committee on Housing from the national parliament held a 
series of Imbizos (events where politicians and officials interact with the public and hear 
concerns – the events are frequently quite orchestrated as public relations exercises) in 
the Eastern Cape. The aim of the exercise was to assess housing and infrastructure 
provision, check the adherence of contractors to building standards and general quality, 
establish the progress of the People’s Housing Process (PHP) programme, check 
consistency with integrated development plans and assess the involvement of emerging 
contractors (including women). The findings selected below are not intended to be 
balanced or representative but simply to focus in on problems related to infrastructure 
(GSA, 2003c). 
Umzimkhulu Municipality 
• In some instances, like the Raloti project where 102 houses were built to replace 
shelters lost to veld fires, the PHP process had combined with a building contractor to 
provide units of 40m2 with ‘VIP’ toilets at a cost of R14,750. Although infrastructure 
such as running water and taps was still needed, the beneficiaries seemed to be 
reasonably satisfied with the outcome and the remaining subsidy would cover the 
outstanding infrastructure. 
• In the Riverside project 502 houses were scheduled and 300 had been built by ‘local 
builders’. It was found that the interior walls in the houses of the first phase were not 
affordable. Material had been lost to theft and some partial structures were 
vandalized, with the result that the project had to employ security guards. Poor 
quality materials had resulted in rotten doors and houses lacked steps that made 
access for the elderly difficult. 
• In the Umzimkhulu Town Extension 6 project the budget of R8,000 per house (40m2) 
had proven inadequate despite the use of local builders and a ‘building coordinator’. 
Doors and windows had been built without lintels and walls had cracked. 
Umzimvubu Municipality 
• Tyoksville project: 700 subsidies had been approved but only 102 units were 
completed at the time of the visit. The PHP model is used and the building teams are 
made up of the beneficiaries but the project manager was based in East London. The 
project had cash-flow problems and materials (locally procured) were not supplied on 
time ‘The community seemed to be in a state of despair as many houses are 
incomplete’ (GSA, 2003c). The delegation from the Portfolio Committee also 
identified four other projects in the municipality where a total of 2,232 houses were to 
have been built – none of the construction targets had been met. In subsequent 
discussions, the local community attributed the problem to the government’s inability 
  
54
to resolve land claims over the prospective developments. It was also noted that civil 
servants had been involved in the illegal invasion of land (ibid, p.3). 
Buffalo City Municipality 
• Duncan Village Hostel B: the original single-sex hostel was built in 1960 and 
damaged by fire during 1985 resistance activity. After a number of false starts the 
project was upgraded in 1995 as municipal renting stock for 302 family units and 96 
single occupations, with a plan to form a housing association. Various agencies 
including the local and district municipality contributed to the R8 million upgrade. 
Many of the units were illegally occupied at the time of the visit and families had 
‘absconded’ and illegally rented out their units. Illegal electrical connections had been 
made and the upgrade suffered from poor quality (no lintels, walls cracking, leaks, no 
steps, etc.). 
• Haven Hills South Housing Development: Developed by an NGO (van der Leij 
Habitat Foundation) as a demonstration project for ‘integrated and sustainable urban 
living environment’ with high-density options. It included 132 project-linked low-cost 
units, 354 rental apartments and 70 credit-linked plot and plan dwellings. The project 
began in September 2002 and an R28 million tender was awarded to Grinaker-LTA 
construction, a large national firm. It was reported that the project was progressing 
well and all units would be completed and occupied by mid-August 2003. 
The above examples illustrate the typical problems and successes that emerge from 
housing provision in terms of the PHP model and more conventional housing 
approaches. The problems of poor construction, project disruption (community conflict, 
theft and vandalism) are common to both conventional and PHP approaches. In the 
Haven Hills project, success was provisionally achieved through much higher unit costs 
and hands-on expertise. These resources are scarce outside of an urban context. In 
general, though, the policy imperative to use emerging contractors or beneficiary-owned 
and beneficiary-driven project approaches, while laudable in its developmental motives, 
in fact introduces an increased likelihood of poor construction and community conflict. 
Such an environment proves to be corruption-friendly since cost cutting, project failure 
and beneficiary discontent can be blamed on a wider set of factors and the actual service 
provider can shirk accountability. 
5.6.3 Operational considerations 
Acquiring service infrastructure is only the first step to using it effectively. Infrastructure 
may be developed effectively but its use may be ‘corrupted’ by discriminatory laws or 
conventions, as happened under apartheid. In the ‘new’ South Africa, local government is 
legally obliged to provide services in a manner that is consistent with nine distinct 
principles set out in the Local Government White Paper (GSA, 1998b, p.93): 
Accessibility: Stresses non-discriminatory (race, gender, sexual orientation) access to 
services, at least at minimum level. Historical unevenness in service provision is to be 
addressed by building new infrastructure and rehabilitating/upgrading that which already 
exists. The mechanism for rolling this out is capital investment in bulk and connector 
infrastructure via infrastructure grants, at this stage through the Consolidated Municipal 
Infrastructure Programme (CMIP). Municipalities are also urged to consider the ‘ease of 
use’ of this infrastructure, particularly for the disabled (ibid). The question of ‘eligibility’ is 
thus firmly established – all citizens are eligible for municipal services irrespective of their 
social and economic circumstances. Much debate has centred on this principle and the 
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extent to which it has been carried through to implementation programmes and municipal 
logistics (see for example Bond, 2000). 
Affordability: The White Paper (GSA, 1998b) notes the importance of considering the 
affordability of the actual service – even though the service infrastructure may be in 
place. It urges: 
• Tariff levels that consider both the economics of providing the service and the 
potential of the poor to access the services, i.e. financial sustainability has to be 
offset against the needs of the poor and their possible contribution to service costs 
(ibid). 
• Service levels have to reflect local affordability patterns but not in such a way as to 
perpetuate the existing spatial (and racial) inequality between ‘low, middle- or high-
income users…’ (ibid). 
• Cross-subsidization is envisaged within particular service types and across services 
(for example, income from electricity can legitimately be used to subsidize water 
provision) (author’s own example). Higher income users may thus subsidize lower 
income users and commercial users may subsidize residential users (GSA, 1998b). 
Quality of services: Quality relates to attributes like relevance to purpose, whether the 
service is delivered on time, convenience to users, safety, continuity (minimal 
breakdown) and responsiveness to service users. 
Accountability: The stress here is on the municipality retaining ultimate responsibility for 
service provision. Perhaps recognizing the overarching international movement to 
privatization and ‘outsourcing’, the White Paper emphasizes that council remains 
responsible for delivering appropriate services of the required standard. 
Services and development: Integrated development is called for, with consideration of the 
social and economic impacts of the services provided. Importantly ‘sustainability’ is 
defined as encompassing resource usage, including financial viability and development 
that is both environmentally sound and socially just. 
Value for money: This attribute compares cost inputs with the quality and value of the 
service outputs and the aim is ‘the best possible use of public resources to ensure 
universal access to affordable and sustainable services’. It might be argued that this is 
the most important measure to apply in any assessment of the current service delivery 
patterns, i.e. useful appraisal is less about the reach and scale of service delivery (where 
the challenges and achievements are fairly well documented) and more about whether 
the significant resources allocated to services are optimally deployed. 
Impact on local commerce and industry: When considering cross-subsidization between 
commercial and residential service users and generally when considering tariff levels, 
municipalities are urged to consider the impact of rates and service charges on 
commerce and industry in order not to compromise the ‘job-creating and competitive 
nature’ of such enterprises. 
Service provision strategies must therefore be measured against the above principles (in 
addition to the technical indicators used by the engineering sector) in order to establish to 
what degree they meet a broader set of policy expectations. Different generations of 
indigent policy have tried in varying degrees to meet these principles. Indigent service 
policy has included measures for cross-subsidization by more affluent households, but 
has generally proved to be inadequate or has simply been neglected by municipalities 
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due to political expediency or incompetence. By way of illustration, unpaid consumer debt 
for municipal services, was estimated at R22 billion in 2002 and had risen to R28 billion 
by 2004 (Idasa, 2003 and 2005). 
Where infrastructure services to poor households fail it is generally a result of one or 
more of the following reasons: 
• The municipality’s own strategic assessments are flawed, i.e. planning has failed to 
identify where services are needed and has not prioritized accordingly (generally, 
since the introduction of Integrated Development Planning in 1998/99, poor 
neighbourhoods are adequately factored into planning). 
• The municipality has prioritized immediate operating issues over longer-term 
infrastructure investment – capital budgets are often inadequate and do not allow for 
the necessary extension of infrastructure. This remains highly prevalent, despite 
frequent pleas from the National Treasury and other authorities. It is often 
exacerbated by lack of maintenance budgeting for existing infrastructure. For the 
2004/05 financial year, the National Treasury expressed concern that 43 per cent of 
municipal budgets go to personnel costs (excluding expenditure on bulk services), 
with persistently high packages for senior managers and executives (Business Day, 7 
September, 2004). (This issue is explored in a later case study on Qaukeni 
municipality.) 
• The municipality cannot service its capital budget because it cannot generate its own 
revenue surpluses and because it is unable to compile credible proposals to the 
Municipal Infrastructure Investment Fund (MIIF). According to the National Treasury 
report for 2004/05, about R45 billion is directed to infrastructure projects over a five-
year period. 
• The necessary capital funds are drawn down by the municipality from national 
government, but the funds are not deployed as intended. This invariably relates to 
inept project preparation or inept / corrupt tender and procurement procedures, 
resulting in the appointment of consultants who are incapable of doing the work. 
Recently appeals to public oversight bodies like the National Prosecuting Authority, 
the Public Protector, or one of the investigating agencies have resulted in many 
tenders being suspended. 
Clearly from the above there will be many instances where irregular or corrupt practises 
are difficult to separate from financial and managerial incapacity. A study by the National 
Treasury of financial and project management capacity and potential competency to 
implement the Municipal Finance Management Act found that of South Africa’s 284 
municipalities, about 18 per cent have high capacity, about 38 per cent have medium 
capacity and 44 per cent have low capacity (Business Day, 5 August 2004). In 2003 the 
National Treasury observed that the main personnel issues at local government level 
were (National Treasury, 2003): 
• high total personnel costs; 
• cost of merging a number of municipalities each with different pay systems; 
• structure of employee benefits; 
• skills level of staff; and 
• personnel implications of creating municipal entities dealing with utilities such as 
water and electricity. 
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[The] Key challenge is to attract quality people while moderating total 
personnel costs (ibid). 
This implies that the impact of corruption on municipal service provision may be distinct 
from other spheres of government because the current systems of local government, 
even in their legitimate form and operating within the law, are profligate. 
At the minimum, in order to improve service delivery and expand services to 
communities where services do not exist or are underdeveloped, local 
governments will have to free up resources to provide for basic services and 
increase capital expenditure (ibid, p.197). 
Increased costs attached to the provision of services are not necessarily related to 
expanded capacities or an increased scope for service provision. 
However, in the main, the amalgamation of smaller municipalities into larger 
ones and the resultant pressure to equalise salaries have driven up total 
personnel costs. Also, generous employee benefits such as leave payouts; 
retirement provisions and medical aid subsidies have increased costs too 
(ibid, p.198). 
This may have resulted in local government becoming the preferred level of government 
for employees who wish to earn comparatively well without being exposed to high levels 
of expectation regarding performance. 
Municipal employees generally earn higher than their counterparts in national 
and provincial departments…in the top 18 municipalities, salaries and wages 
and allowances amount to 30 per cent of total expenditure. The average 
annual employee salary cost across these municipalities is about R107,000 
(ibid). 
The combined salary bill for the top 18 municipalities in the 2002/03 year was R13.9 
billion (ibid). In a study of six municipalities in 2006 the National Treasury found that 
between 1997/1998 and 2002/03 these municipalities were paying between 41 per cent 
and 186 per cent more in nominal terms to each employee in a period where the 
consumer price index increased by just 40.5 per cent (ibid, p.199). The beneficiaries of 
these patterns are not municipal workers and frontline staff but a relatively small group of 
managers. In a further study of six municipalities it was found that managers constitute 
13.5 per cent of staff on average but consume 28.4 per cent of staff costs. Amatole 
District municipality in the Eastern Cape, for example, has a relatively high proportion of 
managers (36.3 per cent of total staff), but a more worrying factor is that this group 
consumes 61.8 per cent of staff costs (ibid, p.200). 
Nor is there any indication that this expenditure is directed to service priorities. In five of 
the country’s metropolitan municipalities and Buffalo City: 
The number of employees in the major service sectors (electricity, water, 
sewerage and sanitation and refuse collection) is quite low, suggesting that 
these services are not very labour intensive. On average these services 
account for about 30 per cent of staff (ibid, p.201). 
The above situation, especially when considered in relation to the indifferent level of 
performance of local government and the need for constant assistance and financial 
support from other spheres of government, suggests an entrenched form of fraud. 
Indeed, there is clearly a view that this broad pattern of generous benefits and 
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remuneration combined with general incapacity and poor service provision is itself a new 
form of institutional corruption. This perspective is clearly illustrated in some of the 
interviews with corruption investigators that formed part of this survey. 
Beyond legal parameters, politicians and senior civil servants are expected to be alert to 
the strategic and administrative challenges that the actual rollout of vast housing, water, 
sanitation and electrification programmes present. Under the banner of Batho Pele 
(people first) government has bound its officials to a set of across-the-board performance 
and ethical benchmarks which in theory give citizens strong rights in respect of service 
and clearly directed and properly monitored state expenditure. Without such an 
assurance, government risks growing alienation from its primary support base – the 
urban and rural poor. Much policy debate within the country focuses on the difficult 
question of appropriate cost recovery mechanisms for infrastructural services, essentially 
deciding upon the question of where the issue of willingness to pay for services intersects 
with the ability to pay. 
Investigations by the National Treasury in the 2003/04 financial year, suggested that of 
the 27 million people who received free basic services at a cost of R6.3 billion, only about 
12 million or 44 per cent are actually poor (Cities Network, 2004). While the cost of 
running municipalities continued to grow in 2004, there was little correlation with the 
percentage of communities who accessed municipal services. At a seminar presentation 
in East London in 2003 Andre Olivier of Organisation Development Africa estimated that 
at metro and secondary city level access to full municipal services ranges from about 50 
per cent of all citizens (Polokwane) to just fewer than 90 per cent (Sol Plaatje). Buffalo 
City, in the Eastern Cape, provides less than 70 per cent of its citizens with basic water, 
sanitation and electricity. Olivier also noted a general trend towards the ‘squeezing’ of 
infrastructure and operational / expenditure due to the escalation of salary expenditure 
and interest and redemption charges. Paul Whelan of Idasa’s budget information service 
has shown a strong real growth in Equitable Share transfers to local government from 
2002 to 2005/06 thus increasing local government’s scope for discretionary spending. 
Local revenue generation strategies, on the other hand, seem to have been de-
prioritized, with no significant improvement in credit control and debt collection and 
expensive but ineffective customer-care facilities / call centres. 
5.6.4 Service delivery support – Eastern Cape 
Service delivery support for local government is generally based on the assumption that 
municipalities lack the capacity to provide services in an effective manner and not on the 
possibility that municipal authorities may wilfully misappropriate resources earmarked for 
service provision. Collaboration between the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) and the 
Department of Housing and Local Government and Traditional Affairs in the Eastern 
Cape since 2004 and the explicit acknowledgement that corruption exists as a priority 
issue in at least 13 municipalities (see interview with Madyaka) is a significant break with 
the general ‘hands-off’ approach that provincial and national government usually take on 
the matter. It is useful to outline some of the history and current developments regarding 
support to local government in the province where this study is centred. 
Since 1995 the Eastern Cape local government sector has had the support of several 
national and provincial support programmes including the Presidential Project Team, 
Project Liquidity, the Municipal Support Programme and the Municipal Mentoring 
Programme. In addition there has been various initiatives from within the provincial 
Department of Housing Local Government and Traditional Affairs and the district-based 
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Planning Implementation and Management Services (PIMS) driven by national 
government. Not all of the above have directly targeted service delivery for intervention 
but in all cases the anticipated benefits have included service delivery objectives. In most 
instances the interventions have not had ‘corruption’ included in their brief. 
It is therefore noteworthy that currently the most significant support programme, Project 
Consolidate, does include ‘corruption’. Project Consolidate emanates from a review of 
the last decade of service delivery that revealed service delivery backlogs in most 
municipalities including a lack of access to electricity, clean drinking water and sanitation 
(Seti, 2005). Project Consolidate involves two linked strategies (ibid): 
• hands-on support to build the capacity of municipalities to fulfil their developmental 
mandate; and 
• refinement of policy, fiscal and institutional matters. 
The hands-on support programme is focused on the following elements: 
• public empowerment, participation and community development; 
• capacity building, systems, human resource development and improved 
organisational culture; 
• integrated human settlement development; 
• free basic services which target poor households, appropriate billing systems and the 
reduction of municipal debt; 
• local economic development, job creation, public works programmes and municipal 
infrastructure; 
• an anti-corruption campaign; 
• special interventions in rural and urban development nodes, and in municipalities 
where provincial and national government has had to intervene according to 
provisions of section 139 of the Constitution; and 
• performance monitoring, evaluation and communication. 
The refinement of policy and frameworks focuses on: 
• intergovernmental relations; 
• financial viability of different categories of municipalities and revenue generation; 
• intergovernmental fiscal relations; and 
• long-term economic growth path (all information drawn from Project Consolidate 
booklet). 
Project Consolidate received a Cabinet endorsement in May 2004 and is to be 
implemented by teams of experts in each province, co-ordinated by a national unit in the 
Department of Provincial and Local Government. In the Eastern Cape Project 
Consolidate is run by civil engineer Hamish Scott (a private consultant), overseen by 
officials within provincial government (Seti, 2005). The table below lists the municipalities 
targeted by Project Consolidate. 
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Table 11. Municipalities targeted by Project Consolidate. 
Project Consolidate: Eastern Cape 
Alfred Nzo District Municipality 
Umsombovu Local Municipality  
Amatole District Municipality 
Buffalo City Local Municipality 
Mbashe Local Municipality 
Mnquma Local Municipality 
Ukhahlamba District Municipality 
Elundini Local Municipality 
Chris Hani District Municipality  
Emalahleni Local Municipality 
Engcobo Local Municipality 
Intsika Local Municipality 
Sakhisizwe Local Municipalities 
Qaukeni Local Municipality 
O R Tambo District Municipality 
King Sabata Dalindyebo Local Municipality 
Mbizana Local Municipality 
Mhlontlo Local Municipality 
Ntabankulu Local Municipality  
Nyandeni Local Municipality 
Port St Johns Local Municipality 
Alfred Nzo District Municipality 
Umzimkhulu Local Municipality  
Umzimvubu Local Municipality  
Source: Ministry for Provincial and Local Government, Press Statement, 29 October, 2004 
 
According to Hamish Scott, the project will deploy a facilitation team in the Eastern Cape 
who will assess particular projects and programmes in the target municipalities. Where 
blockages are encountered, the teams will assist the municipality to resolve the problem. 
Project Consolidate will not take over the function as has happened in more serious 
interventions; ‘The projects remain with the people / agencies who initiated them’ (ibid). 
Nor does Project Consolidate bring additional funding to the problem – it works within 
existing municipal budgets and has only two years (until 2007) to achieve its objectives. 
These circumstances may mean that the project focuses on short-term solutions rather 
than longer term capacity-building goals. Given its extensive list of priorities and 
emphasis on ‘working with municipalities’, Project Consolidate is unlikely to devote much 
time or effort to problems of corruption and its ‘campaign’ against corruption is likely to be 
geared towards making politically correct public statements on the issue. 
Interventions like Project Consolidate have to be viewed against macro patterns of local 
government behaviour that suggest a neglect of municipal service infrastructure. 
Nationally 83.2 per cent of the overall local government budget is for operating 
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expenditure and only about 16.8 per cent for capital projects (Local Government 
Transformer, December 2005–January 2006). The salaries and allowances paid to 
councillors and officials are R10 billion more than the money spent on municipal services 
(ibid). At national and provincial level the priorities for capital spending seem to be sound, 
i.e. water and sanitation followed by roads and storm-water drainage, then housing and 
finally electricity. The delivery of these capital projects, however, remains an on-going 
problem despite the steadily increasing CMIP/MIG allocations and the fact that the 
Eastern Cape has received a massive 24 per cent of CMIP/MIG allocations in past 
financial years. There appears to be no long-term mechanism in place to ensure that the 
corrupt awarding of infrastructure projects is stopped, that successful bidders have the 
skills and equipment to do the job and that every aspect concerning sustainability, 
including appropriate technology and cost / maintenance inputs required of the 
community, are carefully considered prior to construction. 
The much-lauded concept of municipal autonomy in South Africa is currently, and in 
practical terms, more about shielding corruption and incompetence than providing the 
constitutional space for local leaders and communities to make informed choices about 
policy and service options. 
 
5.7 The Case of Qaukeni Municipality 
5.7.1 Brief profile 
Qaukeni is one of seven local municipalities in the OR Tambo District Municipality in the 
Eastern Cape. The other are: King Sabata Dalindyebo, Nyandeni, Port St John’s, 
Mhlontlo, Ntabankulu and Mbizana. The district municipality covers an area of 2,575km2 
and was established in 2000 with the amalgamation of the Flagstaff and Lusikisiki 
municipalities and their respective rural councils (ibid, p.10). 
Population: The estimated population of the municipality is 269,000 with a projected 
negative growth rate of -0.5 per cent due to the high instance of HIV/Aids (ISRDP, 2003). 
Within the district 93.3 per cent of the population reside in rural areas, thus there are 
32,894 traditional dwellings in Qaukeni, compared to only 11,672 formal dwellings and 
282 informal dwellings (shacks) (ibid). The average household in the district contain 5.3 
people. About 55 per cent of the population is female and 45 per cent male due to 
migrant labour patterns in the area – many households are therefore headed by women. 
 
Table 12.  Age distribution 
Age group Percentage (%) 
0–14 (youth dependency) 44 
15–64 (potentially economically active) 49 
65+ (age dependency) 7 
Source: Municipal Demarcation Board 
Housing and services: There is an estimated housing backlog of 33,502 units – mostly for 
rural areas (ibid). About 93 per cent of households have no formal sanitation services, 
while the water supply to 78 per cent of the population either does not meet the minimum 
standard outlined in South African policy or is entirely absent. The Integrated Sustainable 
Rural Development Programme (ISRDP) 2003 lists the following ‘challenges’ in respect 
to housing: 
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• lack of institutional capacity at municipal and provincial level; 
• access to land; 
• limitations and inflexibility of subsidy packages; and 
• lack of management and finance skills amongst contractors. 
Economic: At the district level 71.5 per cent of the potentially economically active 
population is unemployed and 88 per cent of households live below the poverty line. 
According to the Qaukeni IDP, approximately 34 per cent of the employed population are 
unskilled/elementary workers; 20 per cent are professional workers, of which 1 per cent 
are located in the craft/trade industry, plant machinery sector, 6 per cent in the service 
sector, 10 per cent in the technical sector and 6 per cent are clerical. Given the fact that 
the area lacks economic infrastructure, there is a surprisingly low rate of employment in 
the informal sector: 
The informal sector employs about 13,548, whilst the formal sector creates 
about 63,974 jobs. The informal sector therefore employs about 18 per cent 
of the labour force (Qaukeni Local Municipality, 2002). 
Education: In Qaukeni 48,364 people who are of school-going age have no education 
(ibid). About 0.9 per cent of the population have a tertiary education, 16 per cent have a 
secondary education and about 29 per cent have a primary education (ibid). 
The literacy rate within the O.R. Tambo [District] is about 45–50 per cent but 
Qaukeni has a 40 per cent literacy rate, one of the poorest in the district (ibid). 
Health: Qaukeni has a high infant mortality rate – about 88 deaths per 1000 live births. 
The table below indicates the incidence of HIV/Aids and its increase over recent years: 
 
Table 13. Incidence of HIV/Aids and its increase 
Year % per population 
1997 10.7 
1998 16.0 
1999 17.5 
2000 22.1 
Source: Demarcation Board 
 
In addition to the problems of unemployment and infrastructure / housing backlogs 
already outlined, Qaukeni also faces food insecurity, a stagnant or decaying local 
economy, poor health facilities and widespread environmental degradation. The 
government sector is the largest contributor to Gross Geographical Product and Mthatha 
is the only significant economic node, but it is comprised mostly of a wholesale and retail 
sector that have ‘very little growth potential and have little to offer towards needed 
employment opportunities’ according to the ISRDP. Agriculture is predominantly 
subsistence, and more viable agriculture is undermined by lack of infrastructure as well 
as little training or financial support for local aspirant farmers. Regional state-driven 
development strategies have recently begun to look to tourism, mari-culture and 
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agroforestry to improve the local economy. The area, like most of the Transkei region, is 
plagued by high levels of crime that impact negatively on tourism potential (ibid, p.18). 
5.7.2 Infrastructure Services (Qaukeni, 2002)  
Table 14. Water provision in Qaukeni 
Water in 
dwelling 
On 
site 
Public 
tap 
Tanker Borehole Natural Other/ 
unspecified 
Total 
721 
(2%) 
1,20
9 
(3%) 
4,492 
(10%) 
178 
(0.4%) 
948 
(2%) 
36,579 
(82%) 
158 
(0.8%) 
44,185 
 
Table 15. Telephone provision in Qaukeni 
Dwelling Neighbour Public 
phone 
Other 
nearby 
Not 
nearby 
No 
access 
Unspecified Total 
431 
(1%) 
134 
(0.34%) 
5,040 
(11%) 
858 
(2%) 
2,019 
(5%) 
35,651
(81%) 
52 
(0.1%) 
44,185 
 
Table 16. Sanitation provision in Qaukeni 
Flush Pit latrine Bucket latrine None Unspecified Total 
882 
(2%) 
23,395 
(53%) 
415 
(0.9%) 
19,188 
(43%) 
305 
(0.7%) 
44,185 
 
Table 17. Energy provision in Qaukeni 
Electricity 
from local 
authority 
Electricity 
(other 
supplier) 
Gas Paraffin Candles Other 
source 
Unspecified Total 
1,100 
(2%) 
183 
(0.4%) 
150 
(0.3%) 
6,235 
(14%) 
36,165 
(82%) 
1 
0% 
203 
(0.8%) 
44,185 
 
The above data suggests that the municipality is only able to meet people’s service 
needs in very limited ways, and there remains a high degree of reliance on natural 
resources or service agencies outside of the municipality (for example Telkom for 
telecommunications and Eskom for electricity). 
As a former homeland area (or Bantustan), Qaukeni faced a particularly difficult set of 
problems around land tenure and general access to land as the following ‘issue’ list from 
the IDP illustrates: 
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Table 18. Qaukeni ‘issue’ list 
Lack of 
access to 
land, 
security 
and 
tenure 
 
To provide tenure rights to 
approximately 10 per cent of 
people without security and 
tenure rights by 2004, focusing 
on women. 
Develop and implement a reform programme. 
Provide safety and security to farmers. 
 
Land 
invasion 
and 
mismana
gement 
 
To reduce land invasion by 50 
per cent by 2003. 
To institute, develop and monitor 
a broad plan by year 2003. 
Enforce land-use planning regulation and punish 
offenders seriously with heavy fines. 
Develop and implement an efficient land-use 
management plan. 
Educate the populace on the effects of land 
invasion and provision of services, especially in 
informal settlements. 
 
Source: Qaukeni IDP Report 2002, p.31 
 
The IDP document notes that there were insufficient skills amongst staff to effectively 
address these problems. However the strategy that followed, i.e. to appoint ‘fresh’ staff, 
possibly even school leavers, and have them trained to the point where they became 
effective, was naïve and had rarely if ever worked in the previous seven years of 
transforming municipal government. 
Priority Project: Starting in 2002 the Qaukeni IDP indicates that the municipality planned 
to facilitate the provision of 500 low-cost houses and 100 middle-income houses per 
annum over the next five years at a total cost of R53 million (funds were to come from the 
Department of Housing) (ibid, p.36). It planned to ensure that 23 pre-schools were built 
by 2004 at a cost of R632,500. The municipality also planned to create plantations of 
trees, build a clothing factory, set up community gardens, spend nearly R72 million on 
access roads, provide new taxi and bus ranks, and set up three tourism information 
centres. Clearly the IDP suggests that the municipality had a clear idea of the 
development challenges it faced as indicated in the following project budgets (ibid, p.36–
85): 
• Water supply mainly to rural villages: six projects of total value R20.7 million 
(various bulk water feasibility studies were also to be undertaken) 
• Sanitation mainly to rural villages to acceptable RDP standard (an on-site 
ventilated pit latrine): eight projects of total value R33.9 million 
• Clinics: R31 million 
• Electrification: R22 million 
• Nutrition: R11 million 
• Maternal / child health: R7.5 million 
The municipality, through its IDP, also planned to spend significant amounts on training 
staff, developing administrative systems, improving co-ordination and instituting gender 
equity (ibid, p.37–50). The priority projects identified above suggest that the municipality 
had recognized the seriousness of the service backlogs it faced and had begun to cost 
the rectification of these problems. Various national funding sources, such as the 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG), would have allowed it to implement these projects 
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to a limited degree – since it had no prospect of funding its own capital projects, it should 
have been obvious to council that the optimum use of national infrastructure grants was 
essential. 
 
Table 19. Comparison of operating and capital budgets: Qaukeni (R million) 
 
2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
Operating 26.4 31.3 33.7 35.8 
Capital 21.3 125.7 100 65.2 
Source: Qaukeni IDP Report, p.105–7 
 
The IDP document thus projects a massive increase in capital spending over this four-
year period, whereas the National Treasury showed that budgeted operational 
expenditure for municipalities typically tended to be four to five times that of capital 
expenditure across the rest of the country. In terms of these IDP projections Qaukeni 
therefore reflected, at least on paper, a much better set of spending priorities than most 
other municipalities across the country. 
Capital investments in municipal infrastructure are essential if municipalities 
are to fulfill their development mandate. It has taken time for capital 
expenditure to feature as a significant part of municipalities’ funding priorities, 
largely as a series of amalgamations, insufficient capacity and a shortage of 
financing options (National Treasury, 2003, p.25). 
The above figures from the IDP document may, however, be misleading. The National 
Treasury’s data for 2004/05 shows that Qaukeni budgeted about R28.1 million for capital 
projects and that just over 7 per cent of this would be contributed by own revenue, while 
93 per cent came from grants and subsidies (National Treasury 2005, Table A1). This is 
just 43 per cent of the projected expenditure shown in the IDP for the same period and 
only 68 per cent of the operational budget for the same period. In this respect Qaukeni 
resembled the national pattern already described. In light of this the motivation for the 
inflated capital budget figures in the IDP must be questioned. Was this simply a ruse to 
over-sell the municipality’s development intentions, along with making a large operational 
budget seem reasonable? 
While the deployment of the capital budget showed at least an in-principle commitment to 
development, the projected operating expenditure was more problematic. In 2001/02 
more than 49 per cent of the budget was to be spent on wages and salaries and only 
slightly less than 2 per cent on maintenance and repairs (ibid, p.107). Thus the 
considerable capital projects that Qaukeni planned, plus the existing infrastructure in the 
area, would be unlikely to be properly maintained or repaired. In 2002/03 for example, 
the municipality had planned to spend more than R125 million on capital projects but only 
slightly more than R500,000 on maintenance and repairs. This pattern would continue to 
2004/05 when salaries and wages would constitute about 45.7 per cent of operating 
costs and repairs and maintenance just 1.8 per cent (ibid). Subsequent figures from the 
National Treasury show that Qaukeni did considerably worse than this, and budgeted 
expenditure on salaries, wages and allowances in fact rose to 54 per cent by 2004/05 
(National Treasury, 2005, Table B1). This problem exists as a general feature of local 
government in South Africa: 
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The main personnel issues at local government level are high total personnel 
costs, the cost of merging a number of municipalities, each with different pay 
systems, the structure of employee benefits, the skill level of staff… At the 
minimum, in order to improve service delivery and expand services to 
communities where services do not exist or are underdeveloped, local 
governments will have to free up resources to provide for basic services and 
increase capital expenditure (National Treasury, 2003, p.96–7). 
In a study for the National Treasury of five municipalities covering the 2002/03 financial 
year, the municipalities were paying each municipal employee on average between 41 
per cent and 186 per cent more in nominal terms in 2002/03 than they were in 1997/98. 
Given a consumer price index rise of 40.5 percent, it was concluded that most 
municipalities gave significant real increases over this period, and it was further noted 
that ‘the steepest rise was in 2001/02, the first year of the new municipal boundaries’ 
(ibid). 
In this respect the Qaukeni IDP narrative is rather disingenuous, in that it offered an ‘in-
principle commitment’ to keep ‘salary, wages and allowance as close to 35 per cent6 of 
the budget as possible’ and to ‘Increase repairs and maintenance to at least 10 per cent’ 
(ibid), whereas its actual budget plans specified nothing of the sort. Apart from a fairly 
high staff complement, the other explanation for high staff expenditure would be the 
actual packages paid. In this regard it is worth noting that Qaukeni was one of nine 
municipalities in the Eastern Cape that failed to report its senior manager remuneration 
packages to the National Treasury and thus contravened the law (National Treasury, 
2005, Table C1). A press report in January 2003 indicates that the salary of the Qaukeni 
municipal manager was R386,945 (Daily Dispatch, 27 January, 2003). (The average 
budgeted municipal manager yearly salary was R436,8757 in 2003/04 for the four local 
municipalities within the OR Tambo District Municipality that did report to the National 
Treasury.) Despite having arguably the worst performing municipalities, the Eastern 
Cape had the second-highest number of senior managers and spent the second-highest 
amount (R66,207,746) on their remuneration of all provinces in 2003/04 (ibid, Table 
C10). In 2003 the Intergovernmental Fiscal Review expressed concern about the rapid 
increase in personnel expenditure and pointed out that the remuneration of municipal 
employees, particularly managers, tended to be higher than similar grades in national 
and provincial government. Smaller municipalities like Qaukeni tended to pay managers 
at a level comparable to an assistant or deputy director in the public service (National 
Treasury, 2003, p.201). Managerial-level salaries were unregulated and not in any way 
related to the municipality’s financial position or what it was paying its non-managerial 
staff. In January 2003 South African Municipal Workers Union official Dale Forbes noted 
that: 
These salaries are draining municipalities’ service delivery…and the salaries 
are unjustifiable compared with those of other municipal employees (Daily 
Dispatch, 27 January, 2003). 
In 2002/03 Qaukeni would employ 127 staff, giving it a staff to population ratio of 1:2,202 
people – this was fairly average by standards in the region. Adjoining municipalities had 
similar ratios, viz. Port St Johns had 1:2,513 and Mbashe had 1:3,290 (Municipal 
Demarcation Board, 2003, p.55–6). In terms of operating budget the average expenditure 
by household was R1,002 per annum, compared to R1,456 in a reasonably well-
performing municipality like Amahlati. How did this institutional capacity translate into 
service delivery? By 2003 Qaukeni had the fifth lowest percentage (15 per cent) of 
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households serviced with RDP-level water (piped water within 200m of dwelling), but 
within this group of municipalities it had the largest operating budget (R44,264,843) (ibid). 
The municipality that shared this untenable position (also 15 per cent of households 
serviced with RDP water) was nearby Nyandeni,8 with a budget of R27,623,290. It is 
important to note that the provincial average of households serviced by RDP sanitation 
was just over 67 per cent, whereas Qaukeni stood at 56 per cent (ibid). Furthermore 
Qaukeni had the lowest percentage of households serviced with basic electricity (3 per 
cent) along with Ntabankulu municipality. 
The picture thus emerges of a municipality that issued plans to spend increasing 
amounts on much-needed infrastructure projects, provided that all of these projects were 
funded by national government, whilst reducing maintenance as a percentage of overall 
operating expenditure and steadily increasing an already inflated item for salaries and 
allowances. Some might regard this entire scenario as a systematized form of corruption. 
If the reports of various anti-corruption agencies are to be believed, Qaukeni was 
regarded as one of the most corrupt municipalities in this period, and the figures above 
suggest that it was also one of the worst performing in terms of providing basic 
infrastructure services. Whether there is a causal link between these two factors could 
only be determined through access to informants and financial records. 
The Qaukeni IDP suggests a high degree of dependency on national transfers, however 
the IDP narrative does not appear to be overly concerned by this factor: 
It should be borne in mind that the listed programmes or actions are not all 
funded by Qaukeni Local Municipality but by various Sectors or Governments 
Departments, all with different programmes for individual projects (Quakeni, 
2002, p.107). 
In fact by 2004/05 Qaukeni was budgeting for 90.3 per cent of its revenue to come from 
subsidies and grants and was reflecting no anticipated revenue from electricity, water or 
sanitation services. The only own revenue it did reflect was R571,000 from property 
rates, R484,000 from refuse services and R3,549,000 from ‘other’ (National Treasury, 
2005, Table B1). This reflects that the budgeted income set out in the IDP below was 
significantly incorrect, i.e. budgeted rates income in 2004/05 was just 18.8 per cent of 
that projected in the 2002 IDP, however budgeted revenue from refuse in 2004/05 was 
nearly four times that projected in the IDP. On the whole, this picture of dependency is 
significantly different to the vision outlined in the 2002 IDP (Qaukeni, 2002, p.104): 
The key to successful implementation of the Municipality’s Integrated 
Development Plan and strategies is their efficient management of scarce 
financial resources or limited income. The Municipality has several possible 
sources of income: 
• Service fees: Charging residents for water, refuse collection, sewerage and 
other services that they use 
• Rents: Charging rents for buildings, land or facilities owned by municipalities 
• Fines and licenses 
• Interest on investments 
• Rates: Levying assessment rates and land value 
• Grants: From national, provincial and regional (district municipality) government 
for capital projects and agency functions 
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The financial situation in 2004/05 suggests that apart from refuse collection, few of the 
local revenue sources were realized and the municipality looked almost entirely to grants 
to finance its activities. This also contrasts strongly with the budget scenarios outlined in 
the IDP. 
 
Table 20. Estimated income (budget) 
Budget (Rands) 
Item 
2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 
Water 315,000 330,750 347,290 364,655 
Sanitation 190,000 199,500 209,475 219,950 
Refuse 115,000 120,750 126,790 133,130 
Rates 796,000 2,750,000 2,887,500 3,031,875 
Other 361,000 379,050 398,002 417,903 
TOTAL 1,777,000 3,780,050 3,969,057 4,167,513 
 
Table 21. Estimated grant transfers 
Budget (R’000) 
Item 
2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 
Equitable share 33,724 30,352 27,316 24,585 
Free basic services 9,069 8,162 7,346 6,611 
Governance 2,413 0 0 0 
Transitional 127 100   
Total 45,333 38,614 34,662 31,196 
Source: Qaukeni 2002, p.107 
 
Thus budgeted own income in 2001/02 would be just under 3.8 per cent of total income, 
with the balance coming from national transfers. In 2002/03 it would rise to slightly less 
than 10 per cent of total income and this pattern would not change significantly by 
2004/05. In fact in the revised National Treasury budget for 2005, total grant income for 
Qaukeni stands at R43,041,000. While it is within South African fiscal policy that 
municipalities should be supported by central government to meet development and 
basic service needs, the effect on governance practice of de-linking public expenditure 
from local revenue contribution may not have been fully understood. Clearly the 
councillors and officials were not spending the money of local residents or businesses 
but that of various remote government departments who may have been less concerned 
or less capable of monitoring the outcome of such expenditure. 
One of the interesting projects outlined, which appears to have identified and addressed 
potential for corruption, was a project called the ‘Promotion of Uniformity Accountability 
and Responsibility to Promote Free Corruption in the Public Service’ (the IDP document 
appears to have made a slight mistake with the project title). Unfortunately the situation 
analysis component of the Qaukeni IDP gives no indication of the underlying conditions 
or problems that motivated this project. The objective of the project was ‘To inculcate a 
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sense of responsibility, accountability and commitment towards the utilization of state 
property’. The project was targeted at the administration and the major activities were the 
‘Training of officers and integration of registry services in terms of Government standard 
norms, treasury Directives and Transport Regulations’ (ibid, p.51). An amount of 
R203,295 was to be obtained from the Department of Arts and Culture to be spent in the 
2002/03 financial year. This was a very unusual item to appear in a municipal IDP and 
some credit is due to the planners / municipal contributors for even registering that there 
was a shortfall in accountability / corruption-free public service within Qaukeni.9 The 
proposed solution, namely training and a budget provision, is typical of the IDP policy 
framework and its limitations in addressing such problems through technical / project-
based provisions. It is also worth noting that a similar problem amongst councillors is not 
identified or provided for – subsequent developments proved that a major part of the 
corruption problem arose from within council. 
5.7.3 Service expectations: Policy 
The Municipal Demarcation Board’s (MDB) assessment of municipal powers and 
functions in May 2003 confirmed that OR Tambo (ORT) District Municipality was one of 
two districts where communities have least access to basic services (Municipal 
Demarcation Board, 2003, p.4). The Board voiced particular concern about the lack of 
infrastructure to render a potable water service and noted efforts since 1995 to build 
institutional and financial capacity and to create the technical capability for water and 
sanitation services as a priority (ibid, p.8–9). The official service expectation of Qaukeni 
must be understood; the municipality was not responsible for providing electricity – only 
two other local municipalities within the district had this capability – nor did it render a 
fire-fighting service (ibid, p.10). In terms of macro-policy, municipal health functions 
rested with the district. Some local municipalities provided primary health services, but 
Qaukeni was not one of them. Qaukeni was judged to be capable of taking responsibility 
for local roads and was performing this function plus the associated task of storm-water 
management (ibid, p.22). 
Street trading is an authorized local authority function and Qaukeni had 11 staff allocated 
to this function (the second-highest in the province) – similar-sized municipalities tended 
to have far fewer staff assigned to this function (ibid, p.30) Qaukeni also had the second-
highest staff allocation (70) to refuse services in the province – only a metro municipality 
had a higher allocation (101).10 By contrast, Qaukeni was only able to partially perform its 
potable water supply responsibilities and had only 10 staff assigned to this function (ibid, 
p.64). Thus two functions, namely street trading and refuse services, accounted for more 
than 63 per cent of Qaukeni’s staff. Qaukeni, like most local municipalities, had made 
budget provision in 2002/03 for promoting local tourism, a function that was shared with 
the district. The MDB found that while municipalities in the ORT district tended to perform 
less than 50 per cent of the core functions (planning fire-fighting, roads, refuse, storm-
water, cemeteries and traffic), they did tend to make provision for those services they had 
taken on in their budget and to allocate staff (ibid, p.45). 
5.7.4 Political conflict and corruption in Qaukeni 
Qaukeni came to prominence as an SIU pilot investigation in November 2004, when the 
SIU and the provincial Department of Housing, Local Government and Traditional Affairs 
(DHLG&TA) reported the outcome of an initial investigation in Qaukeni and how this 
would shape the further launch of a three-year ‘probe’ into other municipalities (Daily 
Dispatch, 11 November, 2004). The SIU initial investigations found that (ibid): 
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• an amount of R732,398 had been ‘overpaid’ to six mayoral committee members on 
the Qaukeni council; 
• there had been unsubstantiated expenditure in the among of R33 million; 
• R40,968 had been overpaid on municipal contracts; 
• procurement fraud had occurred: front companies were awarded contracts that they 
were unable to fulfil and tendering companies had direct links with officials and 
councillors; and 
• development projects had been subject to ineffective financial and management 
controls. 
Measures by the SIU at this stage included the setting aside of contracts worth R33 
million due to improper procurement procedures, the recovery of an amount of 
R1,068,563 and the issuing of summonses against the ‘mayoral committee’ councillors 
who had been overpaid for the recovery of the full amount (ibid). (The provincial 
government had already suspended the council and it was later to be dissolved.) 
5.7.5 Crisis timeline 
• September 2002: DHLG&TA declines to intervene after conflict breaks out between 
mayor Ntsubane and speaker Ngozi (both ANC members) (Daily Dispatch, 24 
September, 2004). 
• January 2003: Qaukeni meets with MEC Nkwinti but refuses to meet with OR Tambo 
District Municipality Mayor Capa – ANC chief whip in Qaukeni Qhuba claims Capa 
had caused the factionalism in Qaukeni. 
• May 2003: Violence, including the drawing of knives and a single gunshot, disrupts 
the first council meeting of 2003 (The Herald, 1 May, 2003). 
• May 2003: DHLG&TA gives Qaukeni 14 days to respond to damning AG report which 
had resulted in a no-confidence vote against Ntsubane and Ngozi by rival mayor 
Laleni in 2003. Laleni’s bid was foiled by the Mthatha high court but Laleni refused to 
relinquish office to Ntsubane and Ngozi. 
• December 2003: Eastern Cape Provincial government intervenes in Qaukeni in terms 
of section 139(1)(b) of the Constitution – council is suspended and Administrator R. 
Sogo is appointed to restore peace, stability and service delivery. (GSA, 2004b). A 
strategic support team comprised of strategic, political and operational agencies is 
tasked to review the IDP, redesign the municipal organogram, implement an 
information technology system and improve the financial management. 
• March 2004: Attempt on life of Administrator Sogo in drive-by shooting on the R61 
near Fort Donald, allegedly by suspended Municipal Manager Stanley Kango. 
• June 2004: The Select Committee on Local Government and Administration (National 
Council of provinces) makes an oversight visit to Qaukeni to verify the report to the 
NCOP by the Eastern Cape MEC – recommends that intervention continue, stronger 
community involvement in intervention, disciplinary actions be sustained and the law 
should take its course against those who committed embezzlement – see Section 
5.7.6. 
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5.7.6 Findings of Select Committee on Local Government & Administration 
The report of the Select Committee (SC) on 28 June 2004 illustrates how government, in 
terms of the oversight and support obligations of the National Council of Provinces, 
analysed problems within Qaukeni. This report also provides some insight into the form 
of corruption at work. 
Political instability: The SC formally ascribes this to ‘the unclear demarcation between 
governance and political processes’, and the general tone of its analysis suggests that 
those in political office used this power to infiltrate administrative procedures for their own 
material advantage and to subvert basic governance procedures (ibid, p.2). The SC 
report does not comment on the fact that most of the protagonists were from the same 
party or that some of the conflict appears to stem from internal rifts within the ANC. Nor 
does the SC note that the key person at district level, Executive Mayor Capa, who was 
part of the strategic support team, was alleged to be party to these rifts, thus making 
resolution more difficult (ibid). The political fate of the Qaukeni mayor and the councillors 
who received unauthorized payments of R732,398 is also not clear, apart from the fact 
that the council on which they served was ultimately dissolved. While they were sued for 
the recovery of the funds, there is no indication that they were disqualified from future 
public office or definitively sidelined by the ANC. 
Institutional weakness / lack of policy: It is alleged that councillors ‘exploited loopholes 
and the absence of policies in the municipality’ (ibid). This covered a wide range of 
abuses such as councillors sitting on tender committees and thus using their influence to 
award contracts to family and acquaintances. This practice appears to have been 
‘shielded’ by failing to institute procedures to check that tender contracts were completed 
to specification, i.e. poor performance or lack of delivery could not be revealed. The 
report highlights the consequences of the lack of control procedures rather than the issue 
of why elected local leadership did not follow the basic principles of fair and transparent 
practice – laws and regulations notwithstanding. 
The SC report clearly suggests that councillors abused their political office to appoint 
staff members to the municipality either out of nepotism or to strengthen their own 
position in conflicts with other councillors – the conflict between mayor and the speaker is 
cited (ibid, p.4). Appointments were not made in accordance with an organogram nor with 
the constitutional obligations of the municipality. Further, the National Treasury principles 
of keeping the salary line item within 30 per cent of the total budget was ignored. Labour 
unions reported the unfair treatment of staff members and ‘huge costs’ had been incurred 
through irregular dismissals and subsequent reinstatement. The strategic support team 
was now faced with the prospect of ensuring that staff members were assigned job 
descriptions that were consistent with the functions of the municipality. The SC report 
notes that new human resource policies were drafted, job description reviews had begun 
and regular communication with staff was urged (ibid). Apart from those staff members 
who could be legally dismissed for direct involvement in corruption or severe mal-
administration, the municipality was ‘stuck’ with the current incumbents no matter what 
their level of qualification or competency (due to the provisions of the South African 
Labour Relations Act). The prospects for a short-term turnaround in the effectiveness of 
the administration were therefore limited. 
The misuse of operating grants – the Equitable Share, for example – also constitutes a 
policy failure, however the curious assertion in the SC report is that this was used for 
‘capital works’ rather than the provision of basic services. This is something of a reversal 
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in the pattern of grant abuse, i.e. the possibility of funds going to capital projects rather 
than (often wasteful) operating costs. Unless the capital projects in question lacked 
legitimacy or were in some way fraudulent, there is a possibility that this may have been 
a genuine mistake (ibid). The absence of a free basic services policy is noted and would 
explain the very poor service delivery levels and lack of scale previously outlined in this 
report, however the existence of such policies does not constitute a guarantee that free 
basic services will be effectively provided. 
Service delivery: The fact that the OR Tambo District Municipality ‘expressed satisfaction 
with the present levels of service delivery in Qaukeni’ must be cause for concern and 
suggests that either this supposed oversight / supporting body was poorly informed or 
else chose to be complicit in trying to conceal the very poor service performance already 
outlined. Statements like ‘Large areas are now being serviced and there appears to be 
real opportunities for job creation in communities’ appear to have emanated from the 
district municipality in an effort to represent the Qaukeni situation in a more positive light. 
These inputs seem to be more political in nature than a clear quantification and analysis 
of prevailing development patterns. For example, the poor level of basic water provision 
is blamed on the limited (R30 million) allocation from the Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry, but there is the vague assurance from OR Tambo that ‘the municipality has 
undertaken not to compromise service delivery in spite of the lack of funding’ (ibid, p.3). 
The general sense therefore is that the district and the local municipality shared political 
interests and were bound into certain political dynamics. This shared political interest 
apparently prevented the district municipality from acting as a completely independent 
overseer of service standards and clean governance. 
The provincial intervention around reviewing and improving the IDP appears also to have 
been given too much significance – the 2002 IDP, as the previous section of this report 
has shown, tended to function as an instrument for council to make gestures to 
development rather then as a guiding blueprint for the activities and priorities of council. It 
is hard to imagine how a review process would resolve this problem. The process did, 
however, include a review of project commitments to check on their viability, and this may 
have brought some realism to the project ambitions in the IDP. It is suggested in the SC 
report, for example, that the gap between the budget and the IDP was resolved, and that 
the officials became more directly responsible for the budget (ibid, p.3). 
Finance: The problem of ‘severe financial mismanagement’ is traced to the lack of 
professional skills within the CFO and the suggestion that this individual acted in a 
manner that might be regarded as ‘criminal’ (ibid). The CFO was to face a disciplinary 
hearing in relation to four charges. Despite the overall seriousness of the alleged 
behaviour of the CFO and the fact that he was suspended, there was no clear indication 
that this person faced arrest. While it is alleged that the terms of the Municipal Finance 
Management Act were not complied with, the new acting municipal manager in fact 
confirmed that the municipality as a whole was ‘not ready to comply with the 
requirements of the Municipal Finance Management Act’. It would therefore seem that 
there was considerable overlap between basic incapacity and overtly corrupt behaviour. 
The failure of the municipality to recover the VAT owed to it is an example of where mal-
administration rather than fraud or theft led to financial losses (ibid, p.2). While the 
consequences of these are much the same, the remedy by law and by reason has to be 
distinctly different. 
Another cost factor that is worth noting is that of the actual remedial intervention once the 
corruption and mal-administration had been revealed. In Qaukeni this included the time 
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and resources of the SIU, the provincial Department of Housing Local Government and 
Traditional Affairs and political leadership of the OR Tambo District Municipality. 
Furthermore an acting municipal manager had to be appointed after the incumbent had 
been suspended (on full pay) and the intervention was headed by an administrator, 
Sodo, who also had to be paid as a professional person. Subsequent to the attempted 
shooting of the administrator on 24 March 2004, security had to be provided for the 
administrator and the acting Municipal Manager (ibid, p.1–4). 
5.7.7 Conclusions about Qaukeni 
It is unnecessary to provide detailed analysis of the Qaukeni case as considerable 
discussion has been provided as part of the preceding descriptive material. In general 
access to detailed information on the motivation and form of corruption proved more 
difficult than anticipated despite the high publicity accorded to this case. Having reviewed 
the case, however, it is clear that even with access to financial records and willing 
informants it would have been impossible to clearly define a causal link between ‘pure’ 
corruption and the state of infrastructure service to the poor. There are two basic reasons 
for this: 
a) Corruption was invariably mixed in with problems of incapacity or negligent practice 
and the distinction became very blurred in some instances. 
b) Not all corrupt practices would necessarily have resulted in weakened service 
delivery – for example an acquaintance of the municipal manager who secured a 
contract in exchange for a kick-back might coincidently have been competent to 
provide the goods/ services and their streamlined appointment may have even had 
benefits for the end users. 
What can be asserted is that the protracted period (2002/04) of corruption and related 
conflict in Qaukeni undoubtedly had a negative impact on the manner in which scarce 
public resources were deployed, both in terms of the day-to-day service functions of the 
municipality but also in terms of its larger capital projects. Had these factors not existed, 
Qaukeni would still have been a very poorly resourced and under-skilled municipality. It is 
reasonable, however, to assume that the proper appointment of staff, the contracting of 
competent service providers and contractors and oversight and managerial functions that 
were not tainted by vested interest, would have vastly improved basic services like water 
and sanitation and expanded their impact on human settlements. Since municipalities like 
Qaukeni are highly dependent on contractors for running and maintaining basic services, 
the corruption of the proper tendering and procurement procedures would generally have 
had particularly serious consequences. 
An equally important factor is the entrenched nature of the problems experienced in 
Qaukeni for the South African local government system as a whole. The IDP document 
and the overall budgetary data that was discussed bring this out strongly. In 2002, for 
example, it appears that the planning process was manipulated to present a specific 
picture of the municipality that was more or less in keeping with the policy prescriptions 
for developmental and democratic local government – the misrepresentation of the 
balance between operational and capital costs and the ‘fudging’ of high salary costs are 
particularly important. The gap between the development principles outlined in the IDP 
and the hard reality of budgeted expenditure, for example, the low provision for 
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maintenance and repairs, is a further example of development subverted. The tendency 
to invest heavily in the municipal institution / bureaucracy, be it in terms of office 
equipment, training, etc., without concomitant service benefits, further illustrates a form of 
systemic corruption. Technocratic interventions that focus on systems, procedures, 
administrative compliance, etc. frequently sidestep or even exacerbate these problems – 
in fact where a vast body of existing evidence suggests that the intervention will produce 
no tangible benefit, its on-going invocation may be seen as a form of corruption, 
particularly if it consistently provides work to a particular industry or sector. The heavily 
dependent state of Qaukeni on national transfers may also have contributed to the 
propensity for corruption, as the large amounts outlined in infrastructure projects may 
have tended to take on an abstract meaning. Often promised investments were used to 
advance political objectives and to placate poor neighbourhoods. Project expenditure 
would be controlled from afar and become less subject to local controls or indeed 
affordability concerns. What became increasingly blurred in this scenario was the actual 
service obligations and competency of the local Qaukeni municipality. This was 
exacerbated by the general confusion around powers and functions and the complexity in 
policy that for instance distinguished between Water Services Authorities and Water 
Services Providers. The possibility that Qaukeni exploited this confusion to build a greedy 
local bureaucracy with vast responsibilities on paper but very little tangible output is 
strong, but not necessarily unique to this municipality. 
5.7.8 Access to information 
In the course of interviews and literature searches Qaukeni municipality emerged as one 
of the most significant examples of the collapse of orderly local governance and 
accountable administration. Qaukeni seems to illustrate how corruption takes root most 
easily where a host of other political and social issues are present, principally political 
conflict and generally low levels of administrative and governance skills. Apart from the 
fact that Qaukeni is located in one of the poorest regions of the country, this municipality 
was also selected as it had attracted a high level of attention from anti-corruption 
agencies including the Auditor General, the SIU and the Joint Anti-Corruption Task Team 
(JACT), and the case had been referred to the highest levels of government, including 
parliament and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). It was evident that the 
provincial government had put considerable effort and resources into trying to resolve the 
Qaukeni case. It was therefore anticipated that Qaukeni would meet certain research 
criteria, i.e. it would likely present: 
• well-documented outlines of the issues and events; 
• an increased likelihood that relevant reports would appear in the public domain; 
• a high level of professional analysis of the problem and its likely causes / remedies; 
• impact in terms of policy thinking, i.e. the lessons would be unpacked and referred to 
the relevant policy / law makers; and 
• the respective anti-corruption agencies involved would be keen to publicize their work 
and illustrate in more detail how they had achieved the successes claimed in their 
own publications. 
As it turned out the Qaukeni case study met very few of these expectations, and after the 
initial literature search the entire exercise became a protracted case of begging 
information from officials from government and the various anti-corruption agencies with 
very little success. Written and verbal requests were made to parliament and various 
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monitoring agencies that work with parliament, to the Eastern Cape Department of 
Housing Local Government and Traditional Affairs and to the Auditor General. Verbal 
requests were also made to the Special Investigating Unit. No documentation or 
interviews resulted from these requests, despite the fact that some officials were clearly 
anxious to provide the requested information and seemed to recognize the value of the 
research. Reasons varied from a clear lack of understanding about why detailed 
information on corruption should be placed in the public domain to the concern that it was 
not up to the agency in question to make the information public, i.e. many were 
concerned that they would breach departmental protocols or jeopardize on-going legal 
action by releasing the information. There was clearly some validity in the latter, as 
several informants, including the SIU, alleged that some of the criminal cases arising 
from the investigation had yet to be completed. The Auditor General’s office initially 
seemed willing to provide the ‘regulatory report’ for Qaukeni but later refused, noting: 
After our telephone conversation I first tried to establish if the reports that 
have been issued by the Office have been tabled by the Council of Qaukeni. I 
realized that they have not yet been tabled and as such are not yet Public 
documents. I would be in a position to provide you with copies if they had 
been tabled to the Council. I would not know why they have not yet been 
tabled. 
It must be noted that this response was from an official who was more helpful than most 
in trying to provide access. Nonetheless this implied that a municipality was able to 
withhold AG reports from public scrutiny by simply failing to table them in council. In 
terms of Section 21(3) of the Public Audit Act No. 25 of 2004: 
Audit reports must be tabled in the relevant legislature in accordance with any 
applicable legislation or otherwise within a reasonable time. If an audit report 
is not tabled in a legislature within one month after its first sitting after the 
report has been submitted by the Auditor-General, the Auditor-General must 
promptly publish the report. 
Furthermore, Section 27 (2) of the Municipal Finance Management Act No. 56 of 2003 
says that: 
The mayor of a municipality must, within seven months after the end of a 
financial year, table in the municipal council the annual report of the 
municipality and of any municipal entity under the municipality’s sole or 
shared control. 
And in Section 27 (4):  
 The Auditor-General may submit the financial statements and audit report — 
(a) of a municipality directly to the municipal council, the National Treasury, 
the relevant provincial treasury, the MEC responsible for local government in 
the province and any prescribed organ of state, if the mayor fails to comply 
with subsection (2). 
Section 130(1) further requires that: 
The meetings of a municipal council at which an annual report is to be 
discussed or at which decisions concerning an annual report are to be taken, 
must be open to the public and any organs of state, and a reasonable time 
must be allowed — 
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(a) for the discussion of any written submissions received from the local 
community or organs of state on the annual report; and 
(b) for members of the local community or any organs of state to address the 
council. 
(2) Representatives of the Auditor-General are entitled to attend, and to 
speak at, any council meeting referred to in subsection (1). 
The collective interpretation of these provisions must be that a municipality may not delay 
the tabling of the AG’s report and thus effectively prevent it from becoming a public 
document. The fact that such denial of access to information seems to be the case in the 
Qaukeni example, calls into question the utility of the legislation outlined and the 
effectiveness of the various antic-corruption agencies in enforcing public accountability. 
Further, the fact that it is clearly not in the interests of these agencies to shield the 
municipality from public scrutiny also suggests that they are perhaps over-sensitive to the 
constitutional status of local government (see, for example, previous descriptions of 
Mayor Capa’s attacks upon the authority of the AG ) as an autonomous sphere. In 
addition, for whatever reasons, they fear some form of political repercussions if they were 
to adopt a confrontational stance to municipalities who fail to comply with the 
accountability provisions in legislation. 
In cases like Qaukeni it seems that there is an acceptance by government that people 
involved in corruption should be prosecuted and jailed, thus the obvious and simple 
principles of accountability are well served. What is less clearly accepted is the need to 
look deep into prevailing municipal political culture and norms to understand why such 
outrageous abuses of public office could have even been considered by those called 
upon to serve a local government system widely renowned for its strong democratic and 
developmental principles. Here it is important to refer back to the seven key interviews 
conducted in the course of this study, especially the comments on the general 
governance environment, the precedent set by political leadership, and the various 
assertions about the link between corruption and culture. When these views are set 
against the backdrop of fiscal policy for providing municipal infrastructure and services, in 
particular its non-discretionary character, then we can begin to understand some of the 
possibilities for corruption to occur, if not the specific reasons. Sam Sole’s observations 
are also worth recalling: 
Formal accountability may be extensive on paper, but may be rendered weak 
by lack of enforcement, or be bypassed by strong informal codes of secrecy 
and solidarity, and a certain social approval or cachet being attached to 
‘beating the system’ (Sole, 2005, p.87). 
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6. Concluding remarks 
6.1 How corrupt is South Africa? 
As previously noted, the study of corruption has to be related to broader social and 
economic aspects of South African society in order to fully understand its significance for 
policy-making and political discourse. Unlike some developing countries, South African 
fiscal policy does recognize the importance of focusing state expenditure on poor service 
needs. According to the Minister of Finance’s Budget Speech 2003/04, since 1994 public 
spending on health education, welfare, housing and other social services has increased 
from 52.9 per cent of non-interest expenditure to 58.3  per cent (2003/04). The question 
is what percentage of this actually reaches the poor and how much is lost to corruption. 
This is an important research challenge and one that this paper makes no claim to have 
made any impact on. Key to such an exercise would be defining corruption with specific 
reference to infrastructure services, and then developing systems for collecting quantified 
data on the various funding and investment mechanisms geared towards providing such 
infrastructure and frequency of corruption within such projects, as well as the monetary 
value. Thus a useful corruption barometer could measure the: 
• number of infrastructure projects where construction or maintenance has been 
disrupted by irregular financial management procedure or where such irregularity is 
alleged; 
• monetary value of the misappropriated finance; 
• service deficit for the intended beneficiaries: service deficit = intended service level 
and scale (as framed by the Integrated Development Plan or other planning 
instrument) minus the actual service level and scale experienced by the intended 
beneficiaries (may require on-site inspection); and 
• ‘severity’ of the corruption (rather than incapacity / incompetence) as indicated by 
Auditor General reports or the reports of anti-corruption agencies, internal disciplinary 
actions by the municipality / other sphere of government and criminal or civil actions 
arising from the case. 
Currently there is some information on the actual financial inputs to infrastructure projects 
and some on the outputs (delivery of projects, etc.). In addition there are examples of 
particularly blatant corrupt practice that have become the focus of investigations and 
court cases. The media is the primary instrument for ensuring that these cases become 
public knowledge, but the reporting is of varying standard and usually covers the key 
development issues poorly and often fails to provide any form of continuity. The majority 
of these cases only receive media attention when high-profile arrests are made or when 
the alleged perpetrators are formally charged in court. Internal disciplinary actions by 
municipalities, individual public complaints, whistle-blowing, investigations begun but not 
completed and investigations of a forensic nature that remain confidential constitute a 
huge body of evidence that never enters the public domain. 
As in most other countries, corruption in South Africa is a highly charged political issue 
with much disagreement regarding the relative scale of corruption in the country as a 
whole, particularly between the government of the day and its political detractors. These 
tensions are neither unusual nor undesirable in a democracy, however it does begin to 
pose a problem when corruption is indiscriminately used as a political cudgel to beat 
government or where government becomes so politically sensitized that it resorts to 
automatic denial strategies or the deliberate withholding / manipulation of information. 
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What is of concern is the growing tendency to disregard corruption as an impediment to 
good governance and in particular local good governance. Thus while government 
rightfully claims huge strides in strengthening local participatory democracy and more 
equitable services strategies, it is often blind to very significant gaps in the way that 
municipalities account to the local public, financially and in the general use of public 
assets. South Africa needs to be reminded about the fundamental significance of 
corruption outside the realm of politics, thus the warning of Judge Arthur Chaskalson 
(2000) is repeated: 
Corruption and mal-administration are inconsistent with the rule of law and 
the fundamental values of our Constitution. They undermine the constitutional 
commitment to human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms. They are the antithesis of the 
open, accountable, democratic government required by the Constitution. If 
allowed to go unchecked and unpunished they will pose a serious threat to 
our democratic state. 
It is important to acknowledge the government’s efforts to combat corruption in the civil 
service. The programmes of the Public Service Commission and its co-operation with the 
National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF) suggest that government is prepared to divert 
resources to combating corruption and to include representatives of private sector and 
civil society in this endeavour. This commitment to curb corruption within the civil service 
becomes much more ambivalent where high-ranking politicians and members of 
parliament are involved. The same clear principles of clean government do not seem to 
have been clearly applied in the ‘arms deal’ case, the differentiated strategies for dealing 
with MPs who defrauded parliament with false travel claims (known as ‘Travelgate’), or 
even the highly questionable use of state resources by some provincial premiers. The 
ruling party and many senior politicians’ statements on the trial of Deputy President 
Jacob Zuma for corruption also suggest a greater concern for political unity within the 
former liberation cadres and ‘populism’ than clean governance.11 
Census-type surveys like Markinor and Afro-barometer exist as very useful tools for 
tracking trends in corruption and the public’s perceptions thereof. In general, though, 
these are, like most census-type surveys, perception based. To strengthen their veracity 
such surveys have typically tried to avoid recording ‘collectively understood realities’ on 
the basis that this is a form of hearsay or ‘urban legend’. The emphasis on the 
respondent’s first-hand experience of corruption, for example, being personally asked for 
a bribe, is very limiting for the following reasons. First, it focuses on outright fraud or graft 
involving minor amounts – a form of corruption that this report suggests is relatively 
insignificant. Secondly, it ignores that information that the citizen may have taken the 
trouble to garner from media, friends or acquaintances, which helps to explain the impact 
of corruption ‘higher up’ on their own lives. Finally there is also the problem that a corrupt 
interaction with government is only likely to be reported if the respondent ‘came away 
clean’. Where the respondent felt legally compromised by the interaction, the matter is 
unlikely to be reported. Where these surveys offer considerable value is in confirming 
other evidence that particular sectors of the state, namely the South African Police 
Services, the Department of Home Affairs and local government, have particularly 
serious problems of corruption. 
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6.2 How useful are South Africa’s anti-corruption programmes? 
Virtually all South Africa’s anti-corruption agencies haven proven their worth at some 
level and would appear to have a role in future endeavours against corruption. There is 
undoubtedly some scope for more rationalized terms of reference but the wholesale 
closure of certain agencies or merger into other agencies needs to be treated with great 
caution. Pressure from government for rationalization probably poses the greatest threat 
to public faith in these agencies and it is not entirely clear that such proposals are 
motivated entirely by pragmatic considerations of efficiency and effectiveness. In general 
the different agencies should remain free to deploy their respective capabilities in an 
independent manner, free of political and bureaucratic influence. One of the greatest 
concerns is the state’s general tendency to argue for absorption of the more effective SIU 
and Scorpions into the less effective and arguably more corrupt SAPS. At the same time 
the SIU, Asset Forfeiture Unit and Scorpions need to be sensitive to not abusing their 
elite position for institutional prestige (although their so-called ‘untouchable status’ is 
undoubtedly of operational and political value). These agencies need to continue their 
already strong work for greater co-ordination between themselves, the police and the 
prosecuting authorities. Of greatest urgency is the current antipathy between the SAPS 
and the Scorpions. 
 
Box 4. Local partnerships 
In terms of the specific focus of this report, there is a need for these agencies plus the 
internal auditors and inspectorates that exist within government to develop much-
improved consultation and reporting mechanisms with communities that become 
victims of corruption. This could become a very rewarding focus for partnerships with 
CBOs and NGOs who could play a facilitator role. Analysis of resolved cases must be 
taken into community forums to reinforce sound notions of citizenship and to give 
concrete expression to the idea of accountability. Such activities must provide answers 
to communities in terms of how their access to services was diminished, who was 
responsible and what remedy has been put in place. Furthermore these engagements 
between the official ‘watchdogs’ and civil society must provide the lessons for framing 
pro-active community monitoring measures to prevent the recurrence of corruption. 
 
In the case of higher level anti-corruption partnerships like the ACF and NAC in the 
Eastern Cape which bring government and civil society together, there is a vast body of 
experience which suggests that these are important but difficult to sustain and that their 
function easily degenerates into symbolism and public relations (for details on how these 
partnership forums work see Section 4.10). These forums are prone to naivety about 
‘who is in authority’ and the acceptable parameters for corruption investigations. These 
forums often generate a form of short-term ‘political capital’ for government that 
dissipates immediately the forum collapses or dissolves into conflict. Where these forums 
are highly penetrated by political forces from government or party they invariably have 
little to do with clean governance and may ultimately jeopardize the credibility of the 
participating CSOs. 
A promising development outlined in this report is the expansion of a sector of NGOs 
clearly dedicated to good governance and in some instances anti-corruption objectives. 
This includes not just dedicated institutions like ODAC and the resilient PSAM, but the 
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emergence of stronger governance projects within established NGOs and their organized 
collaboration towards improved local governance – the Good Governance Learning 
Network being the most prominent and recent example. 
6.2.1 Local government corruption 
Corruption in South African local government is systemic and rooted in policy and 
systems rather than in arbitrary acts of fraud and graft. This type of corruption is most 
serious in diverting state resources away from pro-poor development objectives. Tackling 
corruption is difficult due to the merging of corruption with vast problems of incapacity 
and systemic weakness. Often it becomes difficult to distinguish incapacity from 
deliberate fraud or negligent disregard for proper procedure. The corrupt therefore have 
the opportunity to shield or excuse corruption by claiming incapacity. 
The Auditor General is clearly a key watchdog body for protecting the public interest with 
respect to proper management of public funds. In relation to local government, the AG 
appears to have been largely thwarted by large-scale and severe lack of compliance with 
basic municipal auditing requirements. The least accountable and most problem-ridden 
municipalities simply do not respond to the AG’s injunctions, either because they cannot 
or because they refuse. The AG’s impotence may be partially solved by stronger legal 
provisions and greater enforcement, but this will require political will from national 
government and the Treasury and to date that will has been lacking. Clearly an 
alternative strategy is for the AG to enter into much closer consultation and engagement 
with local civil society in pressuring for greater accountability from local authorities. 
Similarly key legislative provisions like stronger audit committees can only become 
effective if they are known to local civil society and used to their full potential. Clearly 
such pressure will only be effective where the municipality has the capacity to resolve the 
broad range of administrative and financial shortfalls. Many of these shortfalls relate to 
technical and professional capacities and will not be resolved by increased local public 
pressure, however it is equally clear that municipalities may not embark on the necessary 
technical solutions with any conviction unless there is such pressure from civil society. 
Furthermore, in the discussion of the infrastructure funding programmes (CMIP and 
MIG), it is apparent that serious problems arise in terms of administrative and financial 
culture, i.e. a propensity for institutional and bureaucratic extravagance and waste while 
infrastructure and service delivery receives the bare minimum of attention and often 
seems to be driven by short-term political imperatives (rolling out projects that enhance 
council’s status). Qaukeni provides an extreme example of this form of systemic 
breakdown, where irregular practice led to service disruption and widespread conflict that 
eventually became a form of localized anarchy. While legal and criminal actions have 
flowed from government and SIU interventions and many administrative support 
interventions have been invoked, the role of local civil society has been minimal and it is 
doubtful that local people are aware of the full details of how the council collapsed due to 
corruption and mal-administration. Unless these issues are unpacked, the high-rolling will 
continue and community-level institutions will have little opportunity to begin changing 
perceptions of the state and of what it means to be a good citizen or a respected local 
leader. 
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7. Endnotes 
1. It is presumed that this is an error and is meant to read ‘quantification’. 
2. One traffic official was found to have made an illegal income of about R75,000 per 
month over a five-month period by issuing fake licences. A driving school station in 
Mpumalanga was found to have forged 1,240 foreign licence conversions. 
3. Sole presents a very strong case to show that Scopa’s credibility was severely 
damaged by government in the ‘arms deal case’, when it responded favourably to an 
Auditor General’s recommendation for a full forensic audit of a complex deal involving 
contracts of billions of Rands, foreign loans and ‘offset investments’. Scopa (including 
leading ANC MPs) approved a multi-agency probe but was criticized by the 
Executive, who intervened and ultimately forced the resignation of the Chair plus the 
senior ANC MP on Scopa. The subsequent probe cleared government of wrongdoing 
despite persistent evidence of irregularity. The report was regarded as much 
compromised by its contradictory findings and by the removal of the SIU and two key 
members of the AG team. 
4. It should be noted that the author of this report is also a part-time staff member of 
Afesis-corplan and therefore has a direct interest in the programme described. 
5. Author’s own observation having interacted with both the ECNGOC and the PSAM. 
6. It is unclear where this figure is derived from as the National Treasury guideline for 
salaries and allowances as a component of operating costs is 30 per cent. 
7. By way of comparison: At this time the highest salary for a medical specialist in the 
public sector was R225,385 (although it was generally acknowledged that this was 
too low). 
8. Nyandeni was also subject to serious corruption allegations in this period and 
became the focus of anti-corruption interventions. 
9. The ‘analysis’ section of the IDP is relatively brief and for obvious reasons does not 
deal with institutional problems that might indicate corruption or breakdowns in 
governance – this was a general failing of the IDP approach and was probably 
inevitable given that council held final authority over the approval of the IDP 
document. 
10. Since the MDB’s figures on staff allocation per line function exceed the total 
municipal staff complement it must be assumed that these staff were not exclusively 
assigned to the function, i.e. refuse staff would also perform cleansing functions for 
example. 
11. For example: ANC General Secretary Kgalema Motlanthe asserted at the August 
2006 start of Zuma’s trial for corruption that ‘The ANC is united …All members of the 
ANC support Zuma in his hour of trials and tribulations…People feel he was treated 
unfairly…’ (Daily Dispatch, 1 August, 2006). 
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 A1.1
Appendix 1.  
Case Study: Pension Fraud in the Eastern Cape 
 A1.2
A1.1. Introduction 
The Department of Social Development estimates that between R1.5 to R1.8 billion in 
social grants is being paid out illegally every month to fraudulent beneficiaries across 
South Africa (SIU, no date). Head of the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) in South Africa, 
Willie Hofmeyr estimates that this translates into 600,000, beneficiaries, or 6 per cent of 
the total registered beneficiaries who need to be removed from the social system (ibid). 
To date the SIU claims that it has contributed to the removal of more than 130,000 
fraudulent cases from the social grants register, thus saving the state R4.5 billion (ibid). 
Whereas most defrauders of the system are members of the public, the SIU claims to 
have identified 43,000 public servants who were drawing both social grants and salaries 
from the public service. The unit accomplished this by comparing the social pensions 
database against the public service salaries database (ibid). The SIU also claims that 
their investigations have had an indirect ‘knock-on effect’, with a further 80,000 people 
having stopped collecting R167.4 million in fraudulent social grants and 36,000 people 
(whose grants had a value of R115.3 million) asking to be taken off the register (ibid). 
Presumably then, many of the yet unidentified defrauders of the system are also civil 
servants. The annual value of the irregular and unlawful pensions drawn by public 
servants was about R50 million, according to Hofmeyr, but when combined with the 
discontinued collections and requests for de-registration, the total is R333 million. Of this, 
about R7.3 million had been recovered as of March 2006 (ibid). 
 A1.3
A1.2. The Eastern Cape 
In July 2004, the Department of Social Development in the Eastern Cape released a 
report that indicated that a total of 1,476 public servants had defrauded the Eastern Cape 
Social Development Department of about R10 million in social grants over the preceding 
two years (Daily Dispatch, 26 July 2004). At the time of the report (July 2004) the Daily 
Dispatch reported that the department was investigating 593 public servants who 
allegedly defrauded the government of R6.2 million in social grants (ibid). By November 
2005 the department’s spokesperson Gcobani Maswana informed the media that 2,421 
government officials, including police, had illegally collected social pensions totalling 
R26.5 million (Daily Dispatch, 11 November 2005). The department provided a profile of 
the illegal recipients: one official from Premier Nosimo Balindlela’s office, 338 police 
officers, 1,129 officials from the education department, 671 from health, 79 from social 
development, 75 from public works, 49 from agriculture, 25 from correctional services, 12 
from economic affairs and tourism, 25 from housing, six from transport, six from finance, 
and five from sports, art and culture. 
The impact of this type of fraud on the poor is very direct, as the grants targeted for theft 
are the main instruments for alleviating the most severe forms of economic 
marginalization in South Africa. Old-age pensions, child-support grants and disability 
grants are the pillars of the welfare system in South Africa. Because of the many 
dependents in most poor households and the support networks within the extended 
family, these grants support poor households in general rather than just the targeted 
beneficiaries. Understandably, therefore, government has set out to highlight the 
selfishness inherent in this fraud and its role in worsening poverty. Departmental 
spokesperson at the time, Gcobani Maswana, noted of the fraudsters ‘They are illegally 
benefiting from the child support grant, old age, care dependency and disability grants’ 
(ibid). SIU spokesperson and legal representative Naomi Shivali Goodley echoed this 
view, ‘Many of the problems that led to the fraud and thefts were as a result of basic 
human greed – greed that has hurt the poorest of the poor’ (Daily Dispatch, 25 January 
2001). It appears, however, that the instances of fraud arise from different circumstances 
and with different motives. Some officials were genuinely unemployed when they first 
started drawing the social grants, but failed to cancel the grants when they took up 
employment in government. Others had set out directly to defraud government by 
drawing grants to which they were never entitled.  
The authorities made provision for those who were willing to repay the amounts, however 
those who failed to make arrangements to pay the fraudulently drawn social grants were 
arrested. Government appears to have initially treated the problem as one of a systems 
flaw and allowed considerable space for the officials involved to repay the outstanding 
amounts and avoid prosecution. ‘The department encouraged officials about to start 
negotiating repayments to contact the department’s Inspectorate Unit charged with 
tracking fraud and corruption’ (Daily Dispatch, 26 July 2004). There is little direct 
evidence at this stage to indicate whether this facilitated a more effective form of 
recovery of state funds – possibly allowing as yet unidentified perpetrators to come 
forward without fear of punishment – or whether it simply sent a message of tolerance 
towards those who defraud government. By November 2005 the department had 
recovered only R417,000 (approximately 1.6 per cent) from the officials, who have been 
made aware of their illegal actions (Daily Dispatch, 11 November 2005). 
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A1.2.1 State of the administration 
It appears that the general state of administration at the Department of Social 
Development district offices may have contributed to opportunities to commit fraud. By 
way of example, an inspection of the Butterworth district was undertaken by four 
members of Internal Control on 10 and 11 September 2002 (Department of Social 
Development, 2002). The unit made the following findings and recommendations: 
• Personnel files: Appointment letters and duty sheets were not filed – for two staff 
members there were no files at all. 
• The telephone register was not up to date and no personnel calls had been recorded. 
• Beneficiary vouchers were not properly filed, but were instead stored in brown 
envelopes in no chronological order and did not include ‘stubs’. 
• Leave forms were not available for inspection. 
• For two vehicles there was no proper control, tires were missing / not fitted, and 
logbooks had not been properly completed. 
• In outlying offices there was a shortage of trained officials to run the computerized 
system (Socpen) that allows beneficiary payments to be checked. 
• At one sub-district office the computer was not connected to a power source, the 
paymaster arrived for work at 13.00, cheques were left unguarded in a van eight 
registrations for disability grants were incomplete and lacked medical records or any 
form of identity for the beneficiary, and new applications were being handled by an 
untrained ‘volunteer’. 
• Two sub-offices lacked any form of supervision and ‘everyone does as they please 
and do not work according to procedures’. 
• In many instances no registers were kept or existing registers were deemed 
inadequate. The team recommended that standardized registers be developed; 
‘…seeing that lack of registers or inadequate registers means no control over state 
monies’. 
 
A1.2.2 Examples of fraud notification 
The Department of Welfare had a register of 123 fraud cases maintained by its internal 
Inspectorate. Seventeen randomly selected extracts from the period 1999–2002 reveal in 
a superficial way how the initial indications of fraud are detected / recorded. 
 
Table A1.1. Initial indications of fraud 
Place Date Possible indication of fraud 
Queenstown 17/11/2001 Possible theft of cheques after death of beneficiary 
Sterkspruit 17/11/2001 Beneficiary claims they never received their grant (this is a 
very common complaint at all offices) 
Zwelitshwa 19/11/2001 Beneficiary claims no grant received for October 
Uitenhage 19/11/2001 Beneficiary never applied for grant for her children. The file 
was processed without her knowledge. 
Bizana 19/11/2001 Possible fraudulent identity document 
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Elliot 23/11/2001 Possible pension fraud with Post Office vouchers – value 
R20,000 
King William’s town 12/12/2001 Beneficiary claiming pension while suspected of working and 
owning several businesses 
Willowvale 12/12/2001 Beneficiary cashed cheque at shop and received R1,100 in 
cash rather than R1,780 as on cheque 
Bisho 18/12/2001 R32,630 suspected to be missing after disability grant was 
drawn whilst beneficiary was in jail 
Grahamstown 27/12/2001 Cash voucher from Post Office contains apparent knuckle 
print – fraud suspected 
Bisho 28/12/2001 Twelve cheques that were not correctly endorsed presented 
at bank 
Mdantsane November 
2000 
Ten officials dismissed after being found guilty of voucher 
theft / fraud in the amount of about R3.8 million (this incident 
was the basis for this case study) 
Mdantsane 1999 One official dismissed after being found guilty of theft of 
vouchers to the value of R130,140 
Elliodale 1999 Three officials involved in voucher fraud / theft in the amount 
of R612,663 
Lady Frere 1999 Three officials – theft / fraud of cheques to the value of over 
R500,000 
Idutywa 1999 Three officials – theft / fraud of cheques to the value of over 
R900,000 
Bisho  1999 Seven officials steal cheques to the value of R2.5 million 
from government office 
 
A scan of the incidence of fraud cases across the various offices reveals that the most 
cases (21) were reported from the Zwelitsha office; a large urban area near King 
William’s Town, and Bisho, formerly administered as part of the Ciskei homeland. Due to 
its proximity to the abovementioned towns, Zwelitsha functions as part of the 
administrative centre of the province. The next highest number of cases (15) emanate 
from Umtata – the former capital of the Transkei and still the administrative centre for the 
region informally referred to as ‘the former Transkei’. Umtata is well known for its 
ineffective and corrupt bureaucracy. Bisho, the former capital of the Ciskei and the 
current capital of the Eastern Cape Province, reported nine cases and Mdantsane, a 
township near East London previously administrated as part of the Ciskei, reported seven 
cases. Without knowing the relative workloads on these offices it is impossible to identify 
statistical patterns of significance, however it is safe to assume that these offices would 
handle some of the largest numbers of beneficiary payments as they all serve large 
urban areas with the greatest population concentrations in the province – this in itself 
explains why reported fraud would be high. However Port Elizabeth and East London are 
the largest urban centres in the province and Queenstown is the fourth largest city, and 
these areas reported one, three and four cases respectively, thus the relative ‘load’ in 
beneficiary payments is not the sole determinant of incidence of corruption. Apart from 
high beneficiary payment levels, Zwelithsha, Umtata, Mdantsane and Bisho all had a 
history of former homeland bureaucracies, cumbersome, inefficient and in many cases 
disillusioned by their reluctant absorption into the new provincial government. This in 
itself may explain why corruption was more of a factor than in the other busy welfare 
offices. 
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A1.3. The case study 
The case under examination here dates back to 2000. It was not possible to study a 
more recent case, as it is impossible to gain access to departmental records or legal 
documents where any aspect of the case is not completely finalized. The case came to 
public attention in February 2001 when ten officials – namely Buso, Kwatsha, Dulaze, 
Makasi, Dukashe, Bulwana, Nogqala, Payi, Mbashe and Maxama – were sentenced to a 
total of 109 years imprisonment for fraud and theft in the approximate value of 
R3,800,000 (see Table A1). The court also made a compensation order directing the 
accused to compensate the department. It was not until November 2001 that all of the 
officials had been dismissed from the Department of Health and Welfare where they had 
worked in the pensions section. Buso, Dulaze and Mbashe were paymasters, while the 
others (except Payi, who was a driver) were clerks responsible for drawing or ‘pulling’ the 
vouchers and checking beneficiary identities. The accused were linked to the fraudulent 
vouchers via fingerprints. The vouchers should have had fingerprints of the legitimate 
pensioner recipients; instead the vouchers bore the fingerprints of the accused. The 
judge found that the accused had acted with common cause. This case of corruption led 
to the formation of a special investigative team (SIU, SAPS criminal record centre, 
departmental officials and advocates appointed by the state attorney). The department 
has also allocated R128 million to enable the SIU to employ 200 investigators to continue 
probing into the social grant fraud (SIU, no date). 
 
Table A1.2. Mdantsane township, November, 2000: Cash voucher theft / fraud (all 
employees were dismissed)  
Name Amount Sentence (years) 
Nombulelo Buso 688,9500 13 
Bulelwa Dulaze 9,360 5 
Xoliswa Maxama 311,500 12 
Msuthukazi Kwatsha 1,027,180 13 
Khaya Makasi 30,000 8 
Nadile Dukashe 266,520 12 
Noluthando Bulwana 485,880 12 
Nobesuthu Nogqala 485,880 10 
Mfuneko Payi 106,360 12 
Nomafengo Mbashe 376,500 12 
 
A1.3.1 Detection 
In this case the detection arises from technological scrutiny of pension cash vouchers by 
a fingerprint expert, Franswa Stassen, formerly of the South African Police Services and 
now the head of the internal inspectorate in the Department of Social Development. 
Stassen would typically be called upon to investigate after an official from the department 
reported a case of suspected fraud at one of the pension pay points. Stassen explains 
his role thus: ‘I was asked to check the pension cash vouchers from a fingerprint expert’s 
point of view and I found several ‘runs’ of fingerprints, which were made by one and the 
same person or persons. These ‘runs’ were found to range from small to large amounts 
of pension cash vouchers’ (Stassen, 2000–01) no date). In other words, the fairly simple 
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task of looking for an unusual prevalence of the same fingerprint is used to detect the 
fraud. Stassen notes that the perpetrators of the fraud would also use toe prints or the 
fingers of latex gloves in an attempt to ‘fool’ the system (Stassen, 2006). 
For example, in a separate case in September 2000 Stassen examined the fingerprints of 
one Dorcas Mafongosi and found that various prints, including eight different fingers, had 
appeared on 4,191 pay vouchers with a total monetary value of R4,201,767. All the 
vouchers had emanated from District 101 Mdantsane in the period 1994 to 1996 
(Stassen, no date). In another instance Stassen was able to reveal that the official had 
used a toe print to subvert the system. ‘I compared the abovementioned set of toe prints 
with prints that appears on forty-nine (49) vouchers emanating from the district 106, 
Zwelitsha. I found that forty-nine (49) of the vouchers is corresponding with the left big 
toe of Nonceba Cynthia Andries. I thus found that the toe prints that appear on the 
abovementioned vouchers to be made by one and the same person namely Nonceba 
Cynthia Andries. The total value of the forty-nine (49) vouchers is R38,220’ (ibid). 
What would motivate these officials to put their well-paid jobs (civil servants are generally 
regarded as well paid in South Africa) at risk and engage in such bizarre behaviour as 
fraudulently attaching their toe prints to social grant vouchers targeted at the poor? What 
attitudes and values operate within the Eastern Cape civil service and what do the 
subjects of this study think about corruption? Before turning to obvious answers to these 
questions, i.e. the views of those involved in corruption, it is useful to look at some of the 
useful but rare studies that have been undertaken about corruption in the Eastern Cape 
civil service. 
 
A1.3.2 An insider’s view of corruption 
In 2001 the Public Service Accountability Monitor (PSAM), an NGO based at Rhodes 
University, set out to study how provincial officials perceived and experienced corruption. 
Their aim was to acquire benchmark information to measure (over the longer term) the 
effectiveness of various anti-corruption measures in the Eastern Cape. They also set out 
to track changes in government official’s perceptions and experiences of corruption (Allan 
et al., 2002). The PSAM surveyed 169 officials. 
Understanding 
The PSAM found that Bisho officials did not fully understand the concept of corruption. 
Some 89 per cent thought that the active demanding of bribes or the theft of public 
resources was wrong. However, about 50 per cent of those surveyed felt that the 
acceptance of gifts in return for performing public services should not be punished: ‘48 
per cent of respondents thought it was either ‘not wrong’ or ‘wrong but understandable’ to 
accept ‘gifts’ from citizens for performing services’ (ibid, p.1). The PSAM observed that 
this may have resulted in the under-reporting of exposure to corruption. 
Rationalization 
The PSAM identified possible rationalizations for corruption in its survey and based some 
of its questions on the generally used ‘excuses’ for corrupt practice. This revealed that 22 
per cent of respondents endorsed the view that ‘government officials are so poorly paid 
they have no choice but to ask people for extra payments’. Furthermore 23 per cent felt 
that ‘extra payments and favours make government work more effectively’ and 21 per 
cent of respondents felt that ‘there are many more important things to worry about than 
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whether public officials are making a little extra money on the side’. The PSAM 
expressed special concern that 42 per cent of respondents felt that ‘the coming of 
democracy’ had ‘increased the number of acts of corruption in our government and 
society’ (ibid). The PSAM noted: 
‘This last finding should be of particular concern given that 75 percent of the 
survey respondents were employed in the public service prior to 1990 and 
were thereby competent to make a comparison between the current 
democratic administration and the previous apartheid and Bantustan 
administrations’ (ibid). 
The PSAM recommendations in respect of the understanding and significance of 
corruption included training for civil servants in the ‘definition, identification and adverse 
social impact of corruption’. In particular civil servants need to be aware of the risk that 
gifts exchanged for official services may ‘lock’ an official into escalating impropriety and 
illegality, and thus place them under increasing influence of the corruptor. 
The PSAM also thought it important to dispel the impression that corruption is a 
‘victimless’ crime: ‘… when public resources are abused it is the entire society, and 
specifically its most vulnerable members, that suffer as a result. Social infrastructure 
such as roads, schools and hospitals are not built. As a result investment and job 
creation are adversely effected. Less money is available for poverty alleviation and 
welfare grants’.  
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Appendix 2:  
Corruption in Service Delivery: Synthesis of Respondent Views 
 A2.2
This report presents the consolidated and summarized views of the respondents to the 
questions posed in seven interviews conducted in late 2005 and early 2006. The report is 
an annex to the main report ‘I won’t sell my brother’: Corruption in Infrastructure 
Delivery: South African Case Study. 
The main purpose of this study is to present an overview of predominant views about 
what causes corruption; how it is best combated; why accountability fails and how is 
should be strengthened; and the overall impact of corruption and anti-corruption 
measures on public services to the poor. The views outlined here are from a limited 
number of informants (seven), but most are directly engaged with anti-corruption work on 
behalf of the key agencies – thus considerable importance may be attached to their 
opinions. 
Within each sub-heading the overall views of the respondents have firstly been 
summarized and some examples outlined. Particularly useful insights are then explored 
through quotes and specific arguments. In some cases the author has drawn upon the 
larger context of the interaction with the informant, for example background information 
and informal discussion, to elaborate on the specific answer to a question. The 
concluding remarks are a summary of the main issues with some additional analysis. 
 A2.3
A2.1. Profile of the respondents 
Five of the respondents were officials whose primary responsibility was to combat or 
investigate corruption in government. One respondent was an independent consultant 
mainly working to improve the financial accountability practices amongst municipalities. 
One official was a senior manager in the civil service who had opted to speak out against 
irregular practice and as a result became subject to departmental disciplinary action and 
finally suspension. Individual job descriptions are as follows: 
 
1. Senior manager in provincial government department – currently suspended 
(anonymous interview granted) 
2. Special advisor (GTZ sponsored) appointed by National Treasury to assist Provincial 
Treasury to train municipal finance staff in the Municipal Finance Management Act 
3. Senior Special Investigator in the Directorate of Special Operations (Scorpions) 
4. Two senior managers in the Eastern Cape provincial Department of Housing, Local 
Government and Traditional Affairs (DHLG&TA) with responsibility to improve the 
financial management and reporting obligations of local government 
5. Head of the Inspectorate in the Social Development Department (provincial 
government) 
6. National Head of Operations of the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) 
7. General Manager Internal Audit in Buffalo City municipality 
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A2.2. General experiences 
All respondents were involved in either reporting, detecting or investigating corruption or 
in helping to improve financial management in government. The one exception, the 
provincial manager, may be regarded as a ‘whistle-blower’ without formal responsibilities 
related to corruption in his normal course of duties. All regarded corruption as a serious 
issue for the South African state, and all generally endorsed the Treasury advisor’s view 
that the importance of corruption arises from the fact that it ‘hits the people low down’ – 
that is, the poor. 
Most respondents had a fairly hands-on experience of corruption and investigations and 
were able to speak at a level deeper than policy and principle. This constituted a 
significant benefit over the type of interview that typically results from talking to very 
senior officials or politicians. The Scorpions investigator, for example, had many years of 
experience of working as a policeman and had also worked for the Heath Special 
Investigations Unit. As a member of the Scorpions he had been part of corruption 
investigations in four provincial government departments and was very concerned by the 
range of corruption that existed and the fact that it reached to the members of the 
executive committee at provincial level (the political heads of the various provincial line 
departments). 
The suspended provincial manager who had experienced pressure from his political 
bosses to implement actions that seemed irregular or questionable shared this view. He 
alluded to an institutional culture of unquestioning obedience and fear of repercussions 
should the directives of political heads not be followed. Few of his colleagues at work 
were prepared to confront the power of their political ‘bosses’. The respondent alluded to 
circumstantial evidence of irregular practice for example, payment for some service 
providers were prioritized over others. 
The managers in the Department of Housing, Local Government and Traditional Affairs 
(DHLG&TA) were anxious to point out that their role was to support local government in 
improving financial management. They did not regard themselves as ‘investigators’ but 
were able to focus on corruption in municipal councils (as their jobs would dictate) and 
suggested two main causes: first, inadequate legislation, and secondly, inexperienced or 
economically vulnerable councillors being tempted into irregular manipulation of the 
tendering / procurement process. 
The Head of the SIU generally talked about much the same problem, noting that 
corruption and incapacity/poor practice often inter-link to create a complex problem that 
meets the wider definition of ‘corruption’ but not the narrow definition of ‘fraud’ or ‘graft’. 
Those respondents who focused on local government tended to concur that the main 
problem arises in political office rather than the administration. Apart from the 
Inspectorate in the Social Development Department (concerned specifically with social 
grant fraud), there appeared to be a consensus that the general abuse of authority and 
high political office to direct decisions towards questionable outcomes carries more 
severe consequences to the operation of accountable governance than the more simple 
acts of fraud or theft. 
One reason for this is that abuse of power and manipulation of the political process for 
private gain is usually defended and re-interpreted by the perpetrators. Corruption that is 
‘justified’ in this way can entrench itself in the system and even lead to a complete 
redefinition of norms and values. Blatant acts of fraud and theft simply have to be 
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exposed and punished and are rarely defended as a form of political culture or overtly 
cast as an alternative system of norms and values. 
The views of these respondents suggest a problem of oversight and integrity of political 
leadership. Those who were in a position to influence institutional culture and provide a 
particular style of leadership appeared to be directly responsible for engaging in or 
condoning corrupt activities. Clearly this sets an example and creates institutional norms 
for those officials further down the chain of command. It was also evident that officially 
sanctioned anti-corruption initiatives may not receive the support they need in these 
circumstances. While endorsed in official government policy and publicly championed, 
anti-corruption initiatives that are ‘too successful’ or implicate persons in high office can 
have negative consequences for those responsible for the initiative. The interviewer 
gained a strong sense that the investigators’ own circumstances and careers might be 
jeopardized by those in high political office who feel threatened by anti-corruption 
programmes. 
 
Adv. Visagie explained how the SIU conducts its relationship with the government 
departments under investigation – or what they call ‘partners’. The call for the 
investigation comes from the ‘partner’ or at least is portrayed as such. In other words 
the government body under investigation gets credit for ‘sorting itself out’ (author’s 
phrase) rather than the SIU. The SIU has adopted this approach from experience. 
Previously it adopted a high-profile approach and took much of the credit for 
successful investigations, however this caused tensions with government and its 
position became politically insecure. In Adv. Visagie’s words, ‘…high profile did not 
work politically’. The SIU is now headed by Willie Hofmeyer, who has a legal 
background and a strong link to the ruling ANC party; Hofmeyer is well connected but 
reputed to be fiercely independent. 
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A2.3. Human resources and service delivery 
Most respondents viewed the impact of corruption on service delivery as severe, in that it 
hampered effectiveness and efficiency in service delivery. The most significant corrupt 
actions that resulted in impaired service delivery were irregular appointments of staff, 
irregular appointment of service providers and general subversion of the tendering and 
procurement process. The Scorpions investigator said that large projects, often 
infrastructure-related, are affected by this form of corruption because senior government 
officials and politicians are involved – he had recently been involved in four such 
investigations. 
The respondents from the DHLG&TA shared this view but related it specifically to local 
government. The scale of the problem is linked to the large financial grants that 
municipalities access, including the Equitable Share (for operating costs) and MIG 
infrastructure investment grants (Municipal Infrastructure Grant). These officials felt that 
previously disadvantaged councillors are too inexperienced to oversee the deployment of 
these large public finance allocations and, because of their own recent economic 
vulnerability, find themselves drawn into corrupt actions around tendering and 
procurement. 
For example, some councillors from a poor background have to make 
decisions on huge sums of money for procurement; the first question they ask 
themselves is ‘what can I get out of this?’ 
The respondents noted that these councillors manipulate the process to their own benefit 
and often lack the experience and education to foresee that their actions will be detected. 
The example provided was failure to disclose their interest in a company getting a 
municipal tender or giving the tender to a company that has no capacity to complete the 
brief, invariably because some form of undisclosed link exists to that company. Unlike 
other respondents, the officials from the DHLG&TA did not take the view that this was an 
inevitable risk arising from government’s Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy. 
BEE principles are well spelt out and they are not designed to bring the 
country to its knees. For example you do not award a R20 million contract to 
someone who does not have an office or is not credit worthy. 
The SIU respondent suggested that the problem lay not in the BEE policy per se but its 
interpretation and non-compliance with supply chain management legislation. This is a 
new legal requirement and few municipalities are compliant with its provisions. For 
example, they do not abide by the provision that procurement procedures for contracts 
above R500,000 should only attach a limited percentage value to considerations such as 
affirmative action and equity. The implication is that there is blanket use of BEE principles 
and a simplistic favouring of emerging (black) contractors at the expense of other criteria. 
‘Local authorities do not understand the process, particularly in rural areas, and do not 
use it correctly.’ 
The DHLG&TA managers also pointed out that the problem is not limited to ‘outside 
contracting’ and also applies to the appointment of staff in some situations: 
All appointments are affected by politics, they don’t consider qualifications. 
For example teachers are appointed as section 571 managers or even 
municipal managers and they don’t have the necessary qualifications – this is 
due to party influence. This makes them vulnerable – they cannot stand up to 
the councillors. This problem is made worse at the local level where 
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communities put pressure on the municipality to appoint local people – people 
say ‘my child has a BA and is unemployed, why should s/he not have this 
job.’ 
The SIU respondent described the same problem – that is, a mix of contracting 
irregularity, ill-advised appointments and general incapacity – all of which creates fertile 
ground for corruption. This helps to explain a well-recognized trend in municipal human 
resource shortfalls, – that is, the consistent appointment of unqualified and poorly 
equipped officials to the administration. Of particular interest is the view (also reflected 
strongly in the interview with the suspended provincial official) that while nepotism or 
ignorance may influence such appointments, the councillors may also be seeking to 
protect their own vulnerability by appointing persons who will not be able to challenge the 
lack of integrity or capacity within council. Clearly poorly educated staff, who owe their 
positions to the favour of particular councillors, will be less likely to expose or challenge 
irregular or ill-advised decisions by council. The other important insight from the above 
quote is the reality that the local skills pool for small rural municipalities is very small, but 
there is also a legitimate expectation that local people be prioritized for any jobs that do 
become available. Thus the consensus between community and municipality that local 
economic circumstances dictate that all public sector appointments should go to local 
people can result in a significantly under-skilled administration. This blurring of nepotism 
and community expectations illustrates how ‘corruption’ may be very complex and often 
indiscernible from other less malevolent social issues. 
The problem of senior officials and politicians seeking to build an administration that they 
can manipulate and tie into relationships of dependency / personal loyalty or outright 
patronage is also a factor in the Eastern Cape provincial government, according to views 
of the suspended provincial manager. This respondent suggested that the problem took 
various forms, ranging from the intention to create capacity shortfalls, to appointments 
based on tokenism and nepotism rather than merit. Where officials lack skills they are 
easily dictated to and manipulated; ‘they owe their jobs to the leader’. The respondent 
suggested that these strategies are planned, – that is, adverts, job descriptions and/or 
person specifications are designed to lead to the appointment of a ‘lackey’. As a result 
the department operates with a lack of human and physical resources that obviously 
impacts on its service provision. 
This respondent suggested that the high number of suspensions of senior officials is 
linked to this problem. Those who oppose the (corrupt) system get suspended but not 
fired, – that is, they continue to earn salaries but they are ‘taken out of the picture’ and 
thus cannot stand in the way of those who benefit. The ‘acting’ replacement is invariably 
a less qualified person, less able to confront wrongdoing by seniors but also often a 
further waste of resources due to their weak capabilities and the fact that a second salary 
or allowance has to be paid to the ‘acting’ employee. 
The forms of irregularity identified by this respondent included inappropriate grade 
‘jumps’ for some staff due to the boss’s influence. Much of this comes from the political 
level and senior managers are forced to comply with the political head’s directives – they 
are in effect intimidated. This leads to paralysis in addressing wrongdoing. ‘When I 
approached my superior with these concerns, the response was “what can I do?” The 
respondent was faced with the choice of “toeing the line”, which implied sanctioning 
irregular practice or refusing to implement wrongful directives and placing his own job in 
jeopardy. He tried to find a compromise that would not make him complicit in wrongdoing 
but would also avoid an outright challenge to his superiors. ‘When I tackled these issues I 
 A2.8
avoided insubordination but I placed my concerns on record’, (that is, that he was being 
compelled to undertake actions that seemed irregular). 
In the subsequent court action (which is on-going) his choice appears to have been 
understood by the court. ‘The judge has thus far ruled in my favour – he has recognized 
that I made my discomfit[ure] known’. Politicians are happy to have a senior manager 
(who objects to their practices) suspended because the politicians have a limited five-
year term – if the person is reinstated after their term, they are not affected. According to 
the respondent the political heads are not concerned with the waste of state resources 
that arises from having someone suspended and having another manager appointed 
(and paid) in an acting capacity. 
The Buffalo City Audit General Manager was the only respondent who actually worked in 
a municipality and described a slightly different and perhaps more positive scenario. 
Contracting and procurement problems arose not simply from fraud but from a range of 
issues linked to ineligible contractors being assigned contracts. Sometimes it is simply 
that the contractor cannot sustain their operation in business terms or is not competent, 
and this impacts the service or goods provided. There were a number of reasons why the 
system was not always able to identify and eliminate these contractors from the 
procurement process – weak management capacity but also irregularity. There are 
however more blatant instances where the contractors claim for incomplete work. Black 
contractors on housing projects often have this problem and are prone to systems failure, 
according to the respondent. The auditor was hopeful that the new laws and regulations 
would reduce the problem. For example the Preferential Procurement Facilitation Act and 
the BEE Act plus the Supply Chain Management Regulations (SCMR) are all geared to 
resolving these shortfalls. The Construction Industry Development Board Act, for 
example, allows for the certification of contractors according to the size of the contract.2 
The auditor was of the view that there was a need for new BEE contractor management 
systems. 
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A2.4. Comparing corruption across different spheres of 
government 
Respondents generally made it clear that they did not have sufficient comparative 
experience of different spheres of government to say categorically that one in particular 
suffered from forms of corruption that had most impact on services to the poor. The 
respondent from the Department of Social Development regarded corruption in national 
government as most important since this was where the largest defrauding of social 
grants occurred. He noted, however, that a significant number of municipal staff had 
been implicated in defrauding the social grant system. 
Those who worked at local government level, however, generally thought that corruption 
at this level was most serious in terms of service implications. Reasons included 
‘because it has most influence over grassroots services’ and ‘because local government 
is the “face of delivery”.’ The SIU respondent, who was in a position to compare different 
spheres of government, answered: 
Local government, because it is at the coalface of delivery and this is where it 
generally breaks down. This is where the poorest of the poor are most 
affected. 
Only one respondent, the provincial treasury advisor, ventured a brief opinion on why 
corruption within rural / small local government level might be seen to have taken root 
more than at other spheres. He suggested that national government is less concerned 
about corruption in the small municipalities because financially they are not significant. 
The respondent appeared to be worried by this view, noting that groups of councillors 
and employers who are corrupt can have a very negative effect where service delivery is 
already marginal. In other words small municipalities may control limited budgets but the 
services that flow from these budgets are basic and minimum level, thus misallocation of 
resources has a critical impact on poor service consumers. 
Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘Would you 
agree with the view that a significant degree of corruption (in so far as it effects local 
service delivery) occurs at municipal level?’ Two respondents said that they did not know 
and one did not respond to the question. Four agreed with the statement and two of 
these offered examples or evidence on which their response was based. 
The Scorpions investigator outlined an example of an investigation that he regarded as 
an illustration of how easily municipalities are ‘ripped off’. 
…a recent example was a municipal tender for road signs. It appears that the 
company that got the tender (a BEE firm) paid municipal staff to steal the old 
signs so they would have to be replaced. They then used the old boards 
(refurbished by their sign writers) to replace the missing signs that were 
reported. The alleged scam was exposed by a rival contractor who hired a 
private investigator to film the signs being stolen. 
SIU Head of Investigations Advocate Visagie made the following point about the forms of 
corruption that occur at municipal level and how significant these are: 
…frontline staff corruption – that is, R50 bribes for preferential service – is 
overrated (although we don’t know the full extent of this because it does not 
leave a paper trail). Housing projects is where difficulties arise socially – 
because if they are not successful, there is an immediate reaction from the 
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community. Contracts are awarded to people who lack capital / security for 
example, a contract to build a school. You need large scale on projects like 
these to make money – the larger established contractors are only able to do 
so (make money) because they can work at scale. The smaller contractors 
get into financial difficulty and begin to compromise quality or they go to the 
administrators for more money / advance payments. Sometimes the 
administrators grant this because they want to get the job finished (but these 
payments are irregular), sometimes the job is completed, sometimes it is not 
and the builder walks away with the money from an incomplete project. 
Occasionally the contractor enters into the project with no intention of 
delivering and runs away with the money or provides very poor building 
quality from the outset. 
It is not only emerging contractors who rip the public off, but it is emerging 
contractors who lack start-up capital and who get caught up in the need for 
up-front payments. You can track these problems back to the officials but 
bribery may not be so evident. Kickbacks are often difficult to trace. In about 
15 cases of this type of wrongdoing, four are municipal councillors. The 
councillors were linked directly or through family to the contractors. They 
misrepresented themselves in this situation and did not disclose their interest. 
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A2.5. Types of services effected by corruption 
Five of the seven respondents felt that all types of services were equally prone to 
corruption. One (the provincial manager / whistle-blower) explicitly said that it was 
contracting arrangements and those involved in contracting that determined the likelihood 
of corruption, rather than the nature of the service. Only the DHLG& TA managers were 
able to elaborate on this issue and on how lack of capacity for oversight encourages 
corruption: 
All municipal services where infrastructure is lacking – that is, water and 
sanitation, drainage, roads and other amenities (but not much in terms of 
refuse removal) – are prone to corruption. Housing is one of the worst 
affected. Most public funding goes to basic municipal services – infrastructure 
and local economic development (LED) are the primary expenditure items. 
People see government that cannot monitor and manage these projects and 
they try to take advantage of this incapacity. For example the Municipal 
Infrastructure Grant for the Eastern Cape is R1 billion, but our department has 
one engineer to monitor the whole project, that is, check business plans, 
structures, etc. This is where people take the gap – tenders often deliver poor 
quality, especially in housing. The same applies within local economic 
development – there are no top-line staff. The department has severe 
capacity shortfalls. 
The SIU respondent confirmed that the contracting arrangement determines the 
likelihood of corruption and that the size of the contract has a bearing, albeit an 
ambiguous one, on whether corruption will occur: 
All types of projects are targeted for corruption: housing, roads, water, etc. - 
there is no particular pattern. The size of the contract may have a bearing. 
The larger contracts give security and are more attractive but are subject to 
more rigorous process and are therefore more difficult to subvert. The smaller 
projects are easier to corrupt but the returns are not as high. 
Only the municipal auditor spoke of the actual operation of the service as an issue worth 
consideration in terms of corruption potential. His view related specifically to Buffalo City 
Municipality and the potential for corruption within the two main ‘trading services’, that is, 
water and electricity: 
Water and electricity – electricity especially because electricity services are 
the trading services with big budgets and the most potential for good returns 
(from corrupt practices). Environmental services presents less opportunity. 
Refuse management is mostly outsourced – this carries some risk. The 
frontline functions associated with electricity and water, that is, meter reading, 
are checked, but there is still the risk and exposure to opportunity. 
An interesting perspective that was not articulated by other respondents was the 
explanation of the DHLG&TA managers of why services directed to the poor were 
particularly vulnerable to corruption. The managers suggested that culture might account 
for the acceptance of inferior service and questionable governance practice by poor and 
predominantly black communities. 
It is a cultural thing – black people do not complain, for example in a bank 
they will stand in a queue for a long time before questioning the service. 
Therefore in relation to basic services, people are patient, there is no push 
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from the community – delays and poor service are seen as normal for 
government. Councillors and officials factor this in when planning corruption. 
There is also a lack of accountability because poor communities do not know 
their rights – they lack education in this respect. People do not understand 
that public funds belong to them – they see the money as government’s, not 
theirs. This is made worse by the heavy reliance on national transfers – 
people are not concerned about money that comes from outside. 
These concise and unusually frank responses came from managers who are themselves 
‘black’ and in all likelihood have experienced poverty in their past. On closer 
consideration it is apparent that the statement ‘It is a cultural thing – black people do not 
complain…’ is not an explanation in itself but a shorthand way of identifying a section of 
the community with a history of poverty and oppression under apartheid. What might be 
interpreted from this is that this historical experience of the state and local authority not 
acting in an even-handed way is what frames the expectations and accepted norms of 
black citizens, rather than their race or culture. The acceptance of corruption is then 
perpetuated (after the demise of the apartheid state) by on-going educational deprivation 
and the lack of terms of reference on which to assess the morality of certain 
administrative norms. The advent of democratic government brought with it a more 
socially responsible programme of services expenditure driven by national government 
on behalf of poor citizens. This, however, inadvertently reinforced a consciousness of 
dependency, that is, ‘it’s not our money – why should we be concerned about how it is 
spent?’ 
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A2.6. Is corruption most significant in terms of capital or 
operational expenditure? 
Most respondents had already addressed this issue in previous answers and the general 
consensus was that larger capital projects posed the greatest temptation for corruption. 
The Treasury advisor emphasized the importance of the opportunity to deal with service 
providers as an important condition in framing the basis for a corrupt relationship. At least 
three respondents acknowledged that while corruption did occur at the operational level, 
it was not as significant in financial terms and was less likely to negatively impact 
services to the poor. The SIU respondent adopted a slight different position, suggesting 
that corruption of operational spending offered less rewards but was also difficult to 
detect. ‘The capital projects present the biggest temptation for large-scale corruption but 
the safeguards are stronger. The operational level is easier to corrupt and wrongdoing is 
harder to track – often no paper trail.’ The municipal auditor chose to emphasize the 
prioritization of expenditure on political objectives rather than developmental objectives 
as a cause for concern. 
The problem is the incorrect prioritization of projects – there is a strong bias to 
the political and a weak commitment to the developmental. For example the 
council was reluctant to spend on a risk assessment… (eventually the officials 
put together a risk management programme for R75,000) but is prepared to 
spend millions on publicity – (the respondent produced a sheaf of glossy 
Buffalo City Municipality calendars by way of illustration). 
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A2.7. The effectiveness of South Africa’s stringent tendering 
and procurement laws and other municipal policies, such as 
the provision for independent audit committees 
This emerged as a key issue for understanding corruption, given the previous views of 
the respondents that suggested that the subversion of tendering and procurement lay at 
the centre of the most important instances of corruption. All respondents seemed to think 
that the current laws and policies are partially effective or work in certain circumstances 
(with a particular calibre of political leadership and administrators). Two respondents, the 
municipal auditor and the SIU head of investigations, felt that the laws and policy were 
too new to make a final evaluation. The other respondents cited a range of reasons why 
the provisions are only partially effective. 
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A2.8. Contradiction with Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) Policy 
The provincial manager who had been suspended due to whistle-blowing cited a direct 
contradiction between fair and transparent tendering practice and BEE principles that 
create opportunities for corruption: 
It works for certain public servants but the rule can be manipulated and there are 
gaps. The BEE framework presents many loopholes and is prone to the practice 
of ‘fronting’ (black individuals are rewarded for representing essentially white-
owned companies, thus misleading the BEE criteria for the awarding of 
contracts). Senior officials often have a vested interest and know what outcome 
they want before the tendering process starts. There is a basic contradiction 
between BEE and fundamental tendering principles. 
The inspector from the Department of Social Development felt that the effectiveness of 
the provisions was constrained by the difficulty in screening the companies responsible 
for the provision of the service – and it was often difficult to distinguish between poor 
judgement and intended subversion of the process: 
Yes, they are effective, but the problem is vetting the companies – they are 
appointing people who cannot do the work. In some cases this is done out of 
misjudgement, in other cases they know that the company can’t do the work 
but don’t care, that is, it’s a corrupt relationship – it’s a 50/50 situation (50per 
cent misjudgement / 50per cent corruption). 
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A2.9. Depends on the relative skill and determination of the 
‘corruptors’ 
The Treasury advisor noted the importance of making such provisions workable. But he 
also pointed out the reality of well-prepared private sector players who are determined to 
subvert the process and easily find willing partners amongst councillors, officials and 
community members: 
It’s got to be effective – we have no choice. At the moment it may stop the 
opportunists and ‘chancers’ but not the well-organized corruptors – these are 
both councillors and officials and ringleaders from the community. The private 
sector usually drives these endeavours – they take the initiative to offer a 
bribe / kickback. A councillor approaching community members for bribes, 
etc. takes more of a risk. 
The same view was expressed by the Scorpions investigator, who also suggested that 
compliance was left to local discretion and the whim of officialdom and that the 
involvement of non-governmental agencies had done little to avoid irregularity: 
The laws are okay but officials who manage the process make too many 
decisions – there is too much discretion. Oversight is lacking. If you can pay-
off three or four officials you can still beat the laws. For example the 
Education Department uses the Independent Development Trust for 
procurement and yet still this Nkalo3 got a contract for the supply of furniture, 
even while he was under investigation for prior irregularity. The prosecutors 
were contacted beforehand to check whether Nkalo would be pursued, that is, 
they (the Education Department) knew of his situation and were checking to 
see what would happen to him. He should never have been eligible for short 
listing – they are violating their own guidelines. The IDT simply claimed 
ignorance. 
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A2.10. The general governance environment 
The managers from the DHLG&TA suggested a more serious situation where a number 
of factors related to the general governance environment in municipalities would render 
tendering and procurement policy ineffective. In the first instance the managers noted 
that certain key provisions like audit committees assumed the existence of certain 
capacities in local civil society which were not found in the smaller municipalities: 
The problem is compliance. Very few municipalities, for example, have audit 
committees. These could make a big difference. The allowance paid to audit 
committee members is insufficient to attract anyone with professional skills – 
in smaller local authorities there is no local capacity to ensure that the public 
members nominated to the audit committee can independently oversee the 
contracts / transactions of the municipality. 
The managers also seemed to look to a general shift in the political culture of 
municipalities that would be a pre-condition to the effective use of the legal provisions for 
transparency and accountability: 
After these elections (March 2006) there was the hope that we would see a 
new generation of less selfish councillors, that the new councillors would be 
more effective. These new policies (for transparency) came in the mid-term of 
the previous councillors so they were not properly enforced. 
Furthermore the managers looked to provincial government to support the emergence of 
a new governance culture in municipalities and the ability to better comply with the 
accountability provisions. Despite the fact that they were employees of the provincial 
government, they expressed doubts about its capacity to support a shift in municipal 
governance culture and offer the necessary oversight. 
The new generation of councillors are expected to do better but the question 
is ‘does province have the necessary capacity to support these 
municipalities?’ Municipalities are not, for example, tabling the Auditor 
General reports (also not providing the AG with up-to-date financial 
statements to facilitate the audit), yet the MEC for local government has never 
reported this to the legislature, as he is required to do. The reason for this is 
that the MEC does not get proper reports from his department – we do not 
have the resources to compile those reports. Municipalities do not invite the 
AG to meetings where the AG’s report is tabled – they do not invite us either. 
Once again the importance of political will, rather than administrative procedure, was 
emphasized as a key obstacle to effective use of the provisions for accountability, for 
example in the case if audits: 
Councillors do not understand the value of audits – it reflects on the credibility 
and credit-worthiness of the municipality and therefore their ability to raise 
loans. Municipalities are hiding the details of their financial situation. In some 
cases financial statements are done but there are huge backlogs. The past 
history of audit problems holds up any progress on this matter. The AG 
refuses to audit where the financials are not up to date – we need to find 
some sort of cut-off date to solve this problem. 
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A2.11. New laws will ‘plug’ the gap 
The most optimistic view was expressed by the SIU respondent who seemed to feel that 
there was a good prospect that the new legislation, in particular the Municipal Finance 
Management Act, would overcome ‘loopholes’ that had previously allowed tendering and 
procurement to be subverted: 
The new laws are solid, for example the Municipal Finance Management Act 
that is still being implemented, the framework of legislation is sound. 
Compliance is the problem. It’s too early to judge the effectiveness of this new 
legislative framework. All municipalities will now have to have a ‘supply chain 
management policy’; at least this will leave a paper trail (if corruption is not 
prevented) – there has been a change in mindset from the old days of the 
tender boards. It looks good – time will tell. 
The Buffalo City municipal auditor endorsed the same view and suggested that the focus 
should be on intervention from other spheres of government or outside agencies where 
the municipality fails to comply with the legislation: 
It is too early to say. It has only recently become law and where it is being 
done, it seems to have an impact. For example where tender committees 
operate according to the new laws, you are unlikely to have fraud. BCM were 
forerunners in this respect. The issue is one of enforcement – what happens if 
the municipality simply fails to comply? There should be takeover procedures 
by other spheres of government – limited and specific interventions to ensure, 
for example, that tendering is properly handled. 
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A2.12. Public accountability 
Effective checks and balances against corruption require not just legal and technical 
compliance with tendering and procurement provisions, but the inclusion of the local 
public in the monitoring and oversight of governance. All respondents indicated serious 
concern about the effectiveness of these provisions. Reasons cited included deliberate 
strategies to mislead the public by producing fallacious reports (cited by three 
respondents). Others felt that the consequences of non-compliance needed to be 
demonstrated; that is, sanctions needed to be enforced through precedent-setting 
punitive actions. The most optimistic views related to improving reporting instruments and 
adjusting current practice to make it more participatory. Key comments are grouped 
according to overall emphasis: 
 
A2.12.1 Deliberate strategy to mislead: 
• Most of the information that is provided in these reports is misleading and there is no 
action on underperformance because the boss is also guilty. It was different in the 
other province where I worked – here in the Eastern Cape politicians are involved in 
administration. There is a culture of obstructing proper audits and investigations, 
complaints are dismissed as unfounded and anti-corruption agencies are criticized or 
marginalized. Corruption is seldom an individual affair – there is always a network. 
The most junior people take responsibility when it is exposed – this is pre-arranged. 
These networks reach very high up to the provincial MEC, provincial police 
commissioner and the Premier’s office. When the corruption was partly exposed via 
the press (journalist Eddie Botha) and the PSAM (Colm Allan) there was some 
attempt to hold a high-level investigation, but the MEC blocked it at the provincial 
level and charged the investigating officers – in this case it is all rooted in cliques. 
• The performance results are exaggerated in these reports – delivery is overblown. 
Only the Auditor General picks up on the real issues. The reports concentrate on the 
loopholes (in explaining lack of performance) and blame suppliers. 
 
A2.12.2 Sanctions need to be invoked: 
• Punitive action needs to be taken – for example, the municipal manager needs to be 
jailed when found guilty as an example to others. Sanctions need to be applied 
properly. At the moment people are learning what they can get away with – we need 
cases of precedent to change this message. 
• There should also be more stringent sentencing of those convicted of fraud. For 
investigators it is often difficult to prove that money is changing hands (kickbacks for 
example), but usually it is exposed. The prosecution is okay but the sentencing is the 
problem, for example, two to three years for stealing millions of Rand! There should 
be prescribed sentences. 
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A2.12.3  Improved reporting instruments and performance monitoring 
procedures: 
• IDP reviews are important as another tool, but not all involve the public. The reports 
on these reviews come into the department in dribs and drabs. The municipalities 
wait until the last day to complete these reviews – there is little time to engage 
outsiders in the process, as they are required to do. Twenty-two of the 45 local 
governments have submitted their IDPs and often the link to the Provincial Growth 
and Development Plan is very weak. Also there is little linkage with the performance 
management system because the municipalities lack the tools to do performance 
management, in fact municipalities are reluctant to do performance management 
because they know it will expose problems in personnel performance (DHLG&TA 
managers). 
 
A2.12.4 The Buffalo City internal auditor: 
• If it is done correctly IDP review is useful and should ensure budget alignment. 
Performance assessment must look to properly defined targets – only then can the 
public tell [if the municipality is performing]. Currently the performance management 
instruments do not have clearly defined targets, therefore it is impossible to say what 
is being achieved. 
One very important insight is that the work of key institutions for promoting public 
accountability, such as the Auditor General (AG), can be completely nullified by simple 
administrative laxity. In the case of the AG, the capacity to present the public with an 
opinion on the state of municipal finances and financial management is severely impaired 
by the late or non-provision of financial statements by municipalities.4 
Many municipalities don’t produce financial reports for a number of years; 
therefore they have not been audited. The AG needs to have these to do his 
work – without this it is not useful (SIU Head of Investigations). 
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A2.13. Are poor citizens able to make use of public 
accountability safeguards? 
In retrospect this question may have been posed in a somewhat limiting way, in that it 
asked whether the poor were able to make use of the safeguards and not whether the 
system of safeguards served the interests of the poor. Every respondent indicated that 
the poor were unable to make use of such safeguards. The reasons included: 
• Even when their services are negatively impacted by corruption, the poor are 
manipulated by politicians and do not perceive the source of their problems; ‘… they 
are simply deprived of the service and are uninformed – they are the main targets for 
the politicians’ manipulation, that is, to get their support. They are gullible and 
invariably remain loyal to the politicians’. 
• To challenge corruption requires resources that the poor do not have. The community 
structures accessed by the poor, for example ward committees and leadership 
structures, are effective only in registering opinion and not in changing governance 
practice; ‘…only money can make things happen. The poor can’t take up cases and 
push things further. Ward committees and local leaders are useful only to register 
opinion – they cannot force action’. 
• The watchdog bodies that are effective for example, the PSAM and the Public 
Services Commission do not require partnership with poor communities for their 
success and are not geared to reporting at this level. 
• The accountability systems described can only be effectively used by a more 
sophisticated form of civil society; ‘Not in rural areas. These safeguards require a 
more organized form of (civil) society usually found in urban areas – I’m not aware of 
poor people being able to use the safeguards’ (personal communication, SIU 
respondent). 
While the respondents did not think that accountability systems were geared towards the 
direct use by poor constituencies, there was a strong sense that such systems functioned 
to protect the interests of poor service consumers and that such protection was unlikely 
to be replaced from the political realm or by other systems for civil representation that 
could be accessed by the poor. What seemed implicit in most of the replies was that 
better access and understanding of such systems by the poor required the intervention of 
a separate set of non-government, non-business support agencies. Some respondents 
clearly felt that programmes to promote accountability would become more effective if the 
gap between the agencies acting against corruption and the poor constituencies (who are 
invariably the victims of corruption) were bridged. 
 
A2.13.1 Who is most likely to be involved in corruption: elected 
councillors, senior staff or frontline staff? 
There was a considerable range of responses to this question but the majority of 
respondents who addressed themselves to local government indicated that the most 
serious problem lay with senior councillors and officials. The Scorpions respondent 
suggested that this related to the specific social profile and economic circumstances of 
South Africa’s councillors, ‘After taking office they start to “wheel and deal” and it 
becomes easier as they go along. They may be driven by need but also there is an 
extended family that also has “needs”…’ The SIU respondent provided an insightful 
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comment on the incidence of councillor involvement in corruption and the particular policy 
model for local government in South Africa, suggesting that the increasing tendency to 
look upon public office in municipalities as ‘a job’, had expanded the propensity for 
corruption. 
Councillors – their involvement is disappointingly high. In rural municipalities 
part-time councillors regard their post as a job despite the fact that they are 
only paid an allowance. In Qaukeni, for example, there were 50 ‘full-time’5 
councillors (the implication here was that fulltime ‘employment’ without 
commensurate payment creates the need for a second income). 
One respondent indicated an equal spread across all the groups but this comment was 
based on experience of provincial government rather than local municipalities. The 
official from the Social Development Department also outlined a different pattern of 
involvement in corruption, mainly involving junior staff, and suggested that perceptions of 
high-level corruption may be fuelled by the way that anti-corruption agencies target their 
investigations. 
Corruption mainly involves frontline staff – some of these people (in the Social 
Development Department) have much experience but are poorly 
remunerated. I’d say it’s about 98per cent frontline staff and 2per cent 
councillors. With senior staff it’s more about exercising bad judgement. 
The anti-corruption agencies prefer to go after the ‘big names’ (senior staff or 
politically senior) because it brings prestige and recognition. But in our 
department the problem is not at that level – maybe in other departments but 
not Social Development…the staff are scared of the inspectorate, I don’t 
know why but they are. 
 
A2.13.2 Are poor communities aware of the level of corruption that 
occurs and the impact on their lives? 
All but one of the respondents felt that poor communities are not aware of the extent of 
corruption but do experience the effects when services fail or are poorly provided. There 
was an overall sense that the poor could not distinguish between different levels of 
corruption or identify the reasons why they suffered inferior services, ‘…they don’t 
understand the level of corruption or the amounts involved – to a poor person there is no 
difference between R2,000 and R200,000’ (Provincial Treasury Advisor). Some 
respondents also suggested that even when poor people experienced the negative 
results of corruption in local services, they were resigned to it or regarded it as normal. 
Poor households will engage with corruption in services when they are directly affected, 
for example, when they are provided with an inferior state-subsidized house or when 
‘mobilized’. 
…they become aware of the lack of service delivery and may even see the 
abuse of assets but it takes time and energy to assess these problems. For 
example, they will see a contractor undertaking an electricity upgrade but the 
supply fails shortly thereafter (the Mdantsane upgrade was mentioned as an 
example). 
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A2.13.3 How do poor communities respond to the corruption that they 
become aware of? 
Most respondents felt that poor communities do not respond in any clearly discernible 
way to the corruption that they become aware of – unless specific individuals or 
households are directly affected. Where the effects of corruption are experienced and 
suspicion arises, the matter is generally taken to the municipality either as a complaint or 
a protest. Virtually all respondents who mentioned this, however, thought it was unlikely 
to result in effective action. 
There are not many avenues for them to respond – they can try via the ward 
committees to communicate with council but they do not have a very useful 
voice unless the councillor in question is very effective (implied that this was 
the exception) – there is a ‘gatvol factor’ (fed up) – poor communities have 
real grievances (BCM internal auditor). 
A distinctly unusual view was that responses to corruption were shaped by ambivalent 
attitudes or norms within poor communities themselves where self-interest was the 
dominant factor: 
Poor communities only report the non-facilitation of services; they don’t know 
why these services are not delivered. Often they report to the ward councillor 
who may in fact be part of the problem of non-delivery. Bribery is not 
regarded as unusual – it is part of the process. The motivating factor is self-
interest; they also want to get preferential treatment. 
 
A2.13.4 If there is a relatively low rate of corruption reporting by poor 
communities, why is this the case? 
Note: the interviewer provided a series of prompts. This deliberately ‘leading’ approach 
was adopted to present the respondent with a range of possibilities they could either 
endorse or dismiss (similar to multiple choice). The prompts were: 
• fear of repercussions; 
• ambivalence towards the authority of the state/courts; 
• influence of networks of patronage; 
• ‘they also have something to hide’; 
• a general culture that corruption is okay; and 
• distrust of the police or anti-corruption agencies. 
A broad spectrum of opinion emerged as to why there is a low level of corruption 
reporting by poor communities. One respondent said that most of the concerns listed 
above constituted a general reason why corruption was not reported. Some respondents 
referred to their responses in the previous question. Some imparted a sense that 
corruption was culturally acceptable in certain settings or regarded as a necessary and 
minor ‘evil’ to get things done. The SIU respondent noted that corruption could be 
regarded as a necessary part of both traditional and modern transactional norms: 
There is a low level of reporting – it has to do with the ‘corruptor – corruptee’ 
relationship, a case of quid pro quo. It has to do with the culture of business 
and tradition – there is a lack of faith. 
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One or two respondents appeared to suggest that the poor shared a common culture that 
made corruption more acceptable. Clearly this does not imply that all poor people are 
pre-disposed to being corrupt and some were quick to add statements like, ‘I do not 
believe that poor people generally endorse corruption’. However it is obvious that 
economically vulnerable households can less afford to stand on matters of principle or 
challenge the actions of those who are more powerful (and corrupt). Poor people may 
therefore be more disposed to ‘adopting’ a culture of accepting corrupt practices. Most 
respondents seemed to suggest that the poor ‘learn the ropes’ of social networks that are 
not of their making and beyond their control. 
The DHLG&TA managers explained the importance of prior experience and the 
awareness poor service consumers have of being spatially and administratively 
marginalized and therefore unable to influence the way governance and administration 
are conducted. Under these circumstances it is both futile and dangerous to challenge 
the powerful and the corrupt: 
Poor communities experience situations where corruption is reported but it 
takes too long to reach any form of conclusion. People are often distant from 
the local authority / leadership. Ward committees sometimes cover 20 villages 
– some communities do not know the local councillor. They see the well-
educated doing it (corruption) and they are helpless – court processes are 
drawn out and investigations lacking. 
The inspector in the Social Development Department underlined this view, that is, that 
vulnerability and fear, combined with a sense of inevitability, function to reduce the 
likelihood that corruption will be reported. 
 Most important is fear of reprisals. The poor eventually realize that they have 
to pay (kickbacks and bribes) but they do not initiate this. 
Fear of reprisal or negative consequences initiated by those in power was strongly 
emphasized by the provincial manager who had acted as a whistle-blower. While his 
comments related to the possibility of reporting corruption by fellow civil servants, he 
made it clear that citizens and the poor in particular would also confront such dilemmas, 
that is, the dilemma of whether to trust the people they are reporting the corruption to. 
Reprisals are also relevant as is fear of not getting support from those in 
power. They do not trust the forums for reporting corruption – such a forum is 
needed. There is a lack of confidence to report corruption – fact to face 
interaction is needed, not a ‘hotline’ – it is not trusted. 
 
A2.13.5 What is the primary motivation for public servants / officials to 
become involved in corruption? 
Again prompts were used to guide responses – these were: 
• low salaries; 
• occasional financial crisis; 
• need; 
• unusual opportunity; 
• general culture of the bureaucracy; and 
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• unlikely to be exposed. 
There was complete consensus from respondents that public servants become involved 
in corruption due to greed more than any other motivating factor. In some instances this 
was combined with occasional financial crisis and opportunity. There was an equally 
strong consensus that low salaries and need are not contributing factors. 
South African public service salaries were regarded by all as more than adequate. The 
pattern of high-level personnel being involved in corruption was cited as proof that salary 
scales have little bearing – in fact the higher paid officials and politicians seemed most 
prone to engaging in the really high-value cases of corruption. Lower level petty graft was 
regarded as financially insignificant. 
Greed – the level of people involved earn salaries in excess of R500,000 per 
annum, at a lower level it is mostly small pilfering. There is a difference 
between planning to rip the public off in a big way and taking a small item out 
of opportunity (Provincial Treasury advisor). 
More than one respondent mentioned the possibility that officials were unable to cope 
with the cumulative pressures of a market-based society and tended to get caught up in 
extravagance and status-seeking purchases. This was probably the predominant 
explanation for ‘greed’ and explained why well-paid officials find themselves in financial 
crisis. 
It is not salaries. Values are wrong – it is about greed. People seek status 
symbols and get into debt – then they look for external forms of income. It is 
also about lack of controls and opportunity. In a financial crisis, people will 
take an opportunity, they recognize that they can subvert the process. 
The same DHLG&TA manager went on to note that local government presents special 
opportunities in this regard due to its autonomy from other spheres of government and 
the fact that this weakens any form of oversight. 
Local government provides the opportunity to do this – local autonomy means 
lack of oversight – ‘there is too much autonomy’. 
In contrast the inspector in the Department of Social Development stressed that 
departmental culture and lack of oversight were not contributing factors and that systems 
for checking acted as an effective deterrent. 
I can only answer for the Social Development Department [where the problem 
is] financial crisis brought about by peer pressure / irresponsible spending 
and unusual opportunity. It’s not the culture of the department or disregard for 
the controls – people do fear getting caught. 
The SIU respondent felt that the main explanation was that the pressures of a market-
based society combined with weak administrative systems and poor checks and 
balances in the public sector that presented opportunities for abuse. 
Greed – they are not underpaid. It is also a matter of opportunism – the low 
capacity is evident and the person ‘takes the gap’. Also about systemic 
weakness where the policy is not in place, but where it is there is still the 
compliance problem. 
Political context also has a bearing on corruption, and in the minds of some civil servants 
the new democratic South African state is not entirely free of its apartheid past. State 
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authority is somehow synonymous with apartheid authority and is rejected at some level 
– especially where policing and criminal investigation is concerned. Whether these 
perceptions are authentic or simply an excuse to reject authority of any form and 
question the rule of law is obviously a moot point. Some respondents see within this the 
reversion to traditional authority when the interests of the individual are not served by the 
new democratic state.6 
In the old (apartheid) order there was not less corruption but it was discrete, now it is 
in the open. People buy into corruption rather than reporting it. The attitude is ‘I won’t 
sell my brother’. The state is still seen as the ‘Boers’, even by those who are part of 
it.7 ‘You must remember that under tribal culture people don’t recognize those who 
are elected.’ (Scorpions respondent) 
 
A2.13.6 To what extent are the public, and especially the poor, pre-
disposed to offering a bribe in order to secure services? 
Responses to this were mixed. Three respondents indicated that they could not comment 
or did not regard this as a significant element of corruption. Four said that such a 
disposition does exist but two of these said that it was not initiated by citizens and largely 
resulted from coercion by those in authority – again the overall impression was that it was 
not a significant factor. The Provincial Treasury advisor ascribed this ‘low-level’ behaviour 
to a breakdown in moral values and suggested that it might be cause for some concern. 
The SIU investigator suggested it was a familiar convention in South African society but 
evidence of its operation came mostly from urban legend. The Scorpions investigator 
again ascribed it to ‘culture’ and implied that it was fairly prevalent and well entrenched in 
certain segments of the population. 
There is a culture of ‘pop-up’, that is, a tradition of presenting a gift when 
interacting with authority. The driver’s licence scam8 is an example. 
On reflection is appears that this might be an important point as the convention of ‘pop-
up’ is fairly familiar and widespread amongst poor people who interact with the state. It 
frequently refers to a blurred form of payment that can include both legitimate and often 
minor bureaucratic fees charged by the state for processing certain transactions but it 
can equally refer to irregular payments to state officials to ensure that the citizen’s 
transaction is not hopelessly delayed or otherwise neglected. The defining feature of the 
‘pop-up’ is that it is usually minor in monetary terms and it is not a complex transaction – 
usually involving only one other person. It is also not limited to transactions with the 
state.9 
 
A2.13.7 Are whistle-blowers sufficiently protected? 
The overall impression created by the collective responses was that it is very difficult to 
protect ‘whistle-blowers’ even when the will to do so exists (and that is not always the 
case). Only two respondents felt that whistle-blowers were adequately protected and this 
related to particular institutional environments, namely the Social Development 
Department and Buffalo City Municipality. In the case of the Social Development 
Department it was clear that the protection relied upon the fact that the informants were 
generally junior people in a large institution – such strategies would be unlikely to work in 
smaller institutions like municipalities or where the whistle-blower is from a small group of 
senior managers. 
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In the department they are definitely protected, we have one contact only and 
then we leave them alone (to avoid exposure). 
The Buffalo City internal auditor did not fully explain his confidence in the system for 
protecting whistle-blowers but noted the difficulty in acting on such information. 
They are protected at the municipality. Investigations are undertaken but 
these can be expensive if they are detailed – frequently we are looking into 
more than fraud. The deterrent value is more important. BCM has no hotline – 
I am against this mechanism because we would not be able to respond 
effectively to the calls – that is, make follow-ups and report outcomes – our 
control environment is inadequate. 
The remaining four respondents noted that protection for whistle-blowers could never be 
adequate. The provincial manager who had personal experience of acting as a whistle-
blower highlighted the strong likelihood that persons undertaking to reveal corruption 
were certain to become the target for both victimization and strategies to discredit or 
marginalize their revelations: 
They are not well protected. Confidence in the protective measures is lacking 
and as a result people keep quiet. In the same issue that my case involves, 
two people were previously suspended, one for about 15 months and another 
since October 2003 (about 28 months prior to the date of the interview [Feb. 
2005]) These lengthy suspensions are typical strategies to remove those who 
blow the whistle but nothing is done to challenge this, despite the fact that it is 
a well-known situation – the Auditor General reports consistently highlight this 
problem but nothing happens. The Public Service Accountability Monitor 
(PSAM)10 gets little support from government for its work, they are attacked 
on racial grounds (the director is white) and are generally ‘slagged off’. 
One of the strongest disincentives to whistle-blowing is probably simply that undertaking 
such action will almost certainly make one’s working life more difficult, and in the Eastern 
Cape government departments are already fairly stressful working environments. 
Protection may well come from informal networks and alliances rather than the official 
system for protecting whistle-blowers. 
…there are probably not enough guarantees to ensure protection. In reality 
civil servants do not respond to authority, you need alliances and co-
operation. You need to make somebody’s life easier – remember as a public 
servant you will ‘prioritize that which keeps you out of the shit’. 
By comparison, those in power who are corrupt have an array of informal strategies that 
they can use against people who expose or threaten to expose their wrongdoing. 
Anonymity appears to be the safest guarantee but in cases of serious exposure resulting 
from information that is privileged, it is fairly easy for the ‘exposed’ to work out who the 
‘exposer’ was. Once disciplinary action begins it is also easy to work out who is 
implicated and who is not, and whistle-blowers will be among the latter. As one 
DHLG&TA manager noted, ‘You can’t be anonymous to infinity’. The most 
comprehensive outline of problems associated with whistle-blowing came from the 
Scorpions investigator: 
It is very difficult to protect them. To be useful they have to have inside 
information. Sometimes they are the only people not receiving ‘dirty money’ 
so its easy to work out who blew the whistle. When this happens (that is, full 
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investigation and sanctions) its is easy to identify the whistle-blower because 
‘he is the last man standing’. But sometimes even before it reaches this 
stage, they are ‘worked out’, that is, the system is manipulated to ensure that 
they are sidelined or compromised. New people coming into a corrupt 
institution often ‘pick up the same culture’. 
An example is the Premier (Eastern Cape Premier Nosimo Balindlela). She 
came in (to office) trying to fight corruption but then found herself under 
political pressure. Another example is Shanks Maharaj, who dug his heels in 
against irregular practice by his superiors, and as a result was suspended on 
‘trumped-up charges’. 
Whistle-blowers are usually identified, even if not formally – it becomes 
evident who the ‘culprit’ is and ‘they work him out’. Informally the whistle-
blower is marginalized. People are easily drawn into corruption – it may be a 
small incident but once they are drawn in they are compromised (there is no 
going back). The more powerful exploit this to protect themselves. (Scorpions 
respondent) 
The last point is important, that is, corrupt officials lure in other officials who could expose 
them and compromise them with small irregular ‘favours’, thus nullifying their potential to 
reveal corrupt practice. It appears to be widely deployed and it might be an important 
component of the induction programme for new civil servants to alert them to this 
strategy and assist them to remain uncompromised. 
It might reasonably be assumed that high-profile cases of exposure offer some protection 
to the whistle-blower in that it is more difficult for the exposed to take retributive action 
against the whistle-blower once the case is in the public domain. This apparently is a 
false assumption – whistle-blowers have sometimes held media briefings in conjunction 
with anti-corruption agencies, only to find that disciplinary action, suspension, or even 
dismissal is the result when they return to their workplace. The media, while happy to 
cover the initial exposure, seldom bother to follow-up the case and publicize what 
ultimately became of the whistle-blower. 
A lot is done but they (whistle-blowers) can never be protected 100per cent 
and often end up being the victims. The greatest victimization occurs when 
the exposure occurs ‘up-front’, that is, it is overt. 
 
A2.13.8 Are the anti-corruption agencies effective in exposing, 
investigating and prosecuting corruption? 
It is important to recall that three of the seven respondents actually worked for the anti-
corruption agencies under discussion and the remainder had close working relations with 
the agencies. Overall, however, it appeared that most respondents made a conscious 
effort to be objective in their assessment. 
Most respondents were aware that the different agencies (Scorpions, SIU, SAPS 
Organised Crime Unit, SAPS Commercial Unit, Asset Forfeiture Unit and JACT) all had 
different briefs and roles, and that it would be unfair to compare each agency according 
to a standardized set of criteria. The SIU respondent was particularly keen to point out 
this division of tasks, how these fitted together into an overall corruption prevention 
strategy and the difficulty in comparing the various programmes. 
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Comparisons are unfair because they operate differently and with different 
resources (highlighted differences in size). The key is good co-ordination 
between the different agencies. There is a lot more co-ordination now than in 
the past, although not between the SAPS and Scorpions – they are still in a 
conflictual relationship. Since Hofmeyer headed up the SIU, co-ordination is a 
top strategic objective. We have different roles – the SIU for example gets 
information from the AG on cases of criminal conduct, after investigating we 
involve the Scorpions and the SAPS (for arrests – we do not arrest) and the 
National Prosecutor (including Asset Forfeiture Unit) – each has a role to 
play. Collectively we try to be a ‘one-stop shop’. The most successful 
example of this internationally is the Hong Kong Independent Commission 
Against Corruption – a real one-stop service. 
Most respondents nonetheless regarded effectiveness in investigations and prosecution 
as important, as well as independence, powers, experience, accessibility and co-
ordination – these were reasonable criteria whereby the different agencies might be 
assessed. 
The least favourable comments were reserved for the SAPS units, although the 
provincial manager victimized for exposing corruption reported having received good 
support from the Organised Crime Unit and the SIU respondent was particularly careful 
not to criticize the SAPS. JACT as a provincial co-ordinating body involving different 
agencies received favourable comment, but has subsequently been shut down – a move 
that seems at odds with the favourable comment from most respondents. 
The SIU probably received the most favourable comment, particularly in terms of 
comprehensiveness of service and streamlined operation. There were some concerns 
about the SIU’s political independence (the need to protect this), their funding, their 
perceived ‘elitism’ and their high case load – which sometimes affected the quality of 
investigations. The Scorpions were similarly well regarded, although with a few concerns 
about their elitism, experience and investigative capabilities. There was some concern 
that the two most prestigious agencies (SIU and Scorpions) were under increasing 
pressure to take on only the ‘winnable’ cases. 
The Provincial Treasury advisor drew attention to the effort and resources that go into 
what he regarded as mainly symbolic or political gestures against corruption. He cited the 
‘Pillay Commission’, launched in 2005 and focusing on corruption in the Eastern Cape 
government: 
The Pillay Commission, for example, is likely to be swamped with the cases 
they have undertaken, but it is unlikely they will produce anything new. What 
will the outcome be? Where are they going with this? It’s a paper storm. The 
whole thing is a political exercise launched by the Premier who is under 
pressure to reduce corruption. 
Powers of investigation and subpoena as well as the capacity to properly research cases 
were valued by some respondents, including the Scorpions investigator, for effective anti-
corruption work: 
The Asset Forfeiture Unit under the National Prosecuting Authority is probably 
the most effective because it can do ‘deep research’ and it has extensive 
powers. Under the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) the AFU can conduct 
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investigations where the perpetrator must answer to the AFU to avoid direct 
action. 
Amid clear indications of competition, one respondent said ‘…there is competition 
between the different agencies and the Scorpions tend to get the cream of the cases’. It 
was also alleged that this had deteriorated into active non-co-operation from some 
agencies, in particular the SAPS Commercial branch in East London (described as weak, 
unco-operative and ‘generally not interested’). The JACT model was generally 
considered a good example of co-ordination, apparently because of their willingness to 
include officials from different agencies: 
JACT (Joint Anti-corruption Team) is East London based and we (and the 
police) second people to them. They focus mostly on municipalities and deal 
with smaller cases of fraud. There is strong co-ordination with them because 
the Scorpions’ second in command is part of JACT. 
Combining the resources and efforts of all agencies was clearly a priority for some 
respondents who felt that the large corruption caseload demanded a more co-ordinated 
and co-operative approach: 
There is too much work for these agencies and not enough resources. The 
DHLG&TA, for example, has to provide the funds for SIU investigations and 
the investigators are not always competent. ‘Corruption is the norm not the 
exception.’ The JACT model is supposed to streamline the process but the 
courts often let us down – the department of justice does not always 
understand the cases they have to prosecute. {Some discussion on need for 
special courts / magistrates to deal with corruption – but led by interviewer – 
respondent felt that these would help.] ‘The SAPS is more used to criminal 
cases – they do not always know the (anti-corruption) legislation…we work 
with all agencies – you have to co-operate to make headway. We have too 
much evidence of corruption to leave out any of the agencies. 
For those charged with practical departmental strategies against corruption, the 
challenge seemed to be to get reliable and pragmatic service from these agencies in 
actual prosecutions. This was seen as far more important than the more political gestures 
of high-profile arrests geared towards presenting an image of ‘being tough on corruption’. 
I’m not so happy with them (the court and investigative components);11 
sometimes the investigators don’t pitch-up in court and things are delayed. I 
like to come together and make deals with the investigators, prosecutors, 
magistrate, defendant – things reach a conclusion more smoothly that way 
and its better to obtain some form of conviction and sentence than to take a 
hard line and drag things out or get no conclusion. Some of the agencies 
(anti-corruption) take a harder line – if you go to jail for two years or 12 years 
it’s much the same thing – it’s not nice. The Scorpions need help. 
The Inspectorate valued the communication and feedback that it was able to receive from 
the SIU on joint cases, and praised the SIU’s ability to process large volumes of 
investigations: 
The SIU has over 700 cases and have handed 150 over for prosecution – 
they are good at streamlining. All the SIU are ex-SAPS, that is, they are 
experienced investigators. The SIU also get good management from Frank 
Khan and they have political backing (although they have to put effort into 
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this). The Scorpions lack experience – many of their staff are graduates with 
no practical skills. They work as an elite but do not provide good feedback on 
cases referred. The SIU report back on cases and have good liaison. 
 
A2.13.9 Public confidence in the anti-corruption agencies 
The respondents had very mixed views on this topic but the majority view appeared to be 
that the public view of these agencies is not positive. The reasons for this varied from the 
view that the public do not see the results of their work or that ‘visible justice’ is lacking, 
to the idea that the public has unrealistic expectations of these agencies and everyone 
wants their own interests served. One respondent suggested that the agencies are ‘over-
hyped’ and that the public perceives as much. Two respondents felt that the agencies 
were reasonably well perceived largely due to good marketing (especially in the case of 
the Scorpions), but that the SAPS had a poor image. The SIU respondent said his 
organization had less need of positive PR but conceded that all agencies appreciate 
good PR because it boosts their prestige. 
Few respondents appeared to consider public confidence from a governance perspective 
or that partnerships with civil society might assist their work and broaden civil co-
operation. Public confidence was almost exclusively discussed as a public relations 
function. 
 
A2.13.10 Should anti-corruption agencies have some link to poor 
communities who suffer the loss of services due to corruption? 
All but one respondent felt that such links would be useful – it was not explicitly said, but 
it was implied that this would give communities more ownership of anti-corruption 
programmes. While it may not always be possible to target those who were directly 
disadvantaged by the corruption, a report back could be directed at the community where 
the problem occurred. 
… you can’t always pinpoint who has lost out, for example in the building of a 
road. Where someone has been ‘done-in’, that is, an individual, you can make 
reparation. But it is worth doing report backs at the community level. 
One respondent suggested that this would be best facilitated by giving the agencies more 
independence to report back to the public on the outcome of cases. The purpose of this 
would be not just to address those who had been aggrieved by the corruption (the Asset 
Forfeiture Unit sometimes returns misappropriated state assets directly to the effected 
community), but to build a stronger form of citizenship by showing that corruption does 
not go unpunished and that it has consequences. It was even suggested that ‘posters be 
erected on a concluded case with the photos of those convicted and the jail sentences 
handed down’. The BCM internal auditor proposed that local government should take the 
responsibility for reporting back to communities and that cases should be reflected on 
and analysed to facilitate this. The DHLG&TA managers felt that provincial government 
would welcome such practice, that is, good governance, but could do little to enforce it: 
The department’s approach is one of promoting good governance – we do not 
involve ourselves in sanctions – we just want results. We also try to educate 
the community about their role but we cannot force this – it is up to council to 
take up the AG report, for example, and do report backs to the public. All of 
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this is within the reporting frameworks. The problem is enforcement – what do 
you do if they do not comply – what are the penalties? 
Only one respondent (the Scorpions investigator) was wary of doing this, suggesting that 
such interventions may not be welcomed by communities where tribal or familial 
networks would ensure on-going support for those convicted of corruption. 
 
A2.13.11 Is corruption effectively prosecuted and are the consequences 
of conviction sufficient to function as an effective deterrence? 
This issue had already been partially addressed in other questions and most respondents 
had indicate some dissatisfaction with the measures / sentences involving corruption 
cases. Most respondents affirmed this as a problem and indicated reasons like 
intervention by politicians. It is also widely acknowledged that there is a reluctance to act 
firmly because of alleged implications in terms of fair labour practice – the following 
example was outlined: 
…the biggest problem is suspensions – there are long-term suspensions with 
pay. In Butterworth / Mnquma two officials (Waka and Van Schalkwyk) went 
home for three years on full pay and then got ‘golden handshakes’. There are 
many other examples. There is a reluctance to prosecute – accusations 
should not be made without follow-up, they must fire the guilty party and, if 
necessary, face the consequences in the CCMA / labour courts. 
Municipalities need to try for prosecutions but they are scared and try to 
extricate themselves – they must fire and then review the position – not back 
off because they anticipate legal costs or a rough time in court. 
The municipal auditor held a slightly different view and suggested that a limited range of 
options for local government in sanctioning corrupt behaviour often led to paralysis 
because the only available sanction was too harsh. 
The problem can go very high, for example, the Municipal manager in BCM is 
currently suspended – this makes the process of investigation / prosecution 
very difficult and the usual sanction is dismissal – which is not always 
appropriate and is prone to challenge… 
The auditor also observed that a pattern had developed in local government where local 
councillors appeared to be beyond challenge unless they had committed a particularly 
serious offence that warranted criminal action: 
The system for regulating the behaviour of councillors does not work well – 
the Speaker has to do this and s/he is prone to political influence and often 
finds it difficult to act independently. There is a need for an ombudsman to do 
arbitration in these instances. 
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A2.14. Concluding remarks 
The seven respondents provided a credible cross-section of views on corruption, why it 
occurs and how it is best combated. The perspectives outlined were independent but 
tended to reflect a degree of common experience derived from different agencies and 
their respective roles in working to reveal, prosecute and deter corruption. 
An important revelation is that corruption is seen as more important at the executive 
(political) level than at the administrative level. This may be partly attributable to the fact 
that respondents were all employees of the state rather than holders of public office. The 
point was strongly made, however, and was frequently reinforced by interviewees relating 
their experiences. The severity of the problem lies in the political precedent that is set, 
that is, corruption is often disguised as an alternative political culture – norms and values 
are questioned in order to regularize irregular practice. This form of corruption is insidious 
and becomes blurred in social consciousness because, unlike fraud or graft, its 
‘wrongness’ is contested. 
Corruption at the local government level was seen as the most significant in terms of 
impact on infrastructure services to the poor. The most commonly cited reasons were 
that local government is at the ‘coalface’ of such delivery. Other reasons included the 
perception that local government, especially small municipalities, does not draw upon 
significant amounts of state funds and therefore requires less scrutiny in terms of 
deploying state monies. An obvious reason is that because local government has the 
lowest capacity of all other spheres of government, it is the most easily cheated. 
Frontline corruption, that is, bribes for preferential service, is not seen as important in the 
larger context of corrupt transactions. Corruption occurs at this level and is difficult to 
trace because it often leaves no ‘paper trail’, however its impact in monetary terms was 
negligible according to most respondents. 
The most significant corruption occurs in large infrastructure projects. The respondents 
did not link degrees of corruption with a particular type of service but suggested that all 
large infrastructure projects are vulnerable – especially housing provision. The larger 
projects pose the greatest temptation to corrupt intervention but also have the strongest 
safeguards. Corruption in large contracted projects has other complex dimensions. It is 
often mixed in with racially targeted empowerment policy and legitimate efforts to affirm 
the role of emerging small contractors. Furthermore it often involves political leadership 
(councillors). This makes it difficult to investigate and poses political risks for those who 
expose and prosecute it. 
The involvement of councillors in corruption was described as ‘one of the most 
disappointing developments’. One of the more convincing explanations linked it to the 
recent notion of councillors as ‘career politicians’, that is, the idea that it is a full-time job 
with an entitlement to full remuneration and benefits. The link between this and corruption 
was ambiguous, however, in that both well- and poorly paid local politicians seemed to 
be implicated in corruption. 
The impact of political transition has played a role in the incidence of corruption. 
Municipal councillors are often from a poor background. Their political naivety allows 
them to be easily tempted into kickbacks, particularly once they become aware of the 
huge sums of infrastructure project funds that pass through the municipal coffers on the 
way to poor communities. 
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Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy has played a role in expanding corruption. 
Endorsed by all as a general observation, there are conflicting views about the reason for 
this. First there is the view that the dilution of the principle that contracts should go to the 
most competent and cost-effective service providers makes corruption inevitable. This is 
frequently accompanied by the idea that BEE is a new form of racial solidarity geared 
simply at generating material benefits to select black business people by regular or 
irregular means. Second, there is a view that BEE policy is not inherently conducive to 
corruption but that the misinterpretation of BEE principles and clauses within the policy 
has created fertile ground for corruption. 
The most significant corruption is seen to occur within the tendering and procurement 
transactions between local government and the private sector, however the staffing of 
local municipal administrations is also seen as problematic. Race and party affiliation 
have often pushed aside other criteria including the most elementary considerations of 
competence. The problem does not only emanate from the state, however – frequently 
the local general public expects that municipal jobs should be reserved for local people 
and sometimes even family and acquaintances. Where these appointments go to local 
people who are not qualified for the job, it weakens the capacity of local government. 
The widespread use of suspensions in government cannot be seen simply as the 
legitimate outcome of departmental discipline or performance management functions. 
Suspensions are being invoked for more sinister purposes and are used to take actual or 
potential dissidents out of the system without entering into a legal process that demands 
that the facts and details of the issue be revealed. 
The underlying reasons for the growth of corruption is a fraught issue. Some ascribe this 
to culture and tradition per se and it would be easy to dismiss these views as racist or 
ethnocentric. However within the political and cultural discourse of the Eastern Cape 
there are elements of ‘espoused culture’ which do appear to endorse practises that are 
undemocratic or built on patronage. Where traditional leaders exercise powers in respect 
of rural land and services and where such power is based on lineage, there are important 
questions to be asked about the basis of such power and accountability. This raises the 
spectre of Mamdani’s bifurcated state, that is, the notion of a parallel or competing ‘state’ 
(traditional authority) to which certain but not all segments of the populace owe 
allegiance. 
Possibly more important is the ‘learned culture’ that may be a factor in poor communities 
that had become accustomed to the unequal and unaccountable public service that was 
the hallmark of apartheid. Unfortunately this convention survived and is now manifest in 
new configurations of state dysfunctionality. The culture referred to by the respondents 
was that of ‘acceptance’, that is, little expectation that the state will be even-handed, and 
a readiness to embrace the corrupt networks and practices that ensure survival and the 
partial overcoming of these failures within the state. As one respondent noted, 
challenging entrenched corruption requires resources, skills and a degree of economic 
immunity – all attributes that the poor do not have. 
Municipal finance policy may also have unwittingly contributed to corruption. As the 
significance of the Equitable Share (operating grant) and Municipal Infrastructure Grant 
have increased, there has been less emphasis on local revenue generation. Less 
pressure on poor communities to contribute to the operating costs of services has also 
meant less responsibility for the manner in which those operating funds and capital 
investments are deployed. Thus citizens as a whole, but particularly poor citizens, are 
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inadvertently but increasingly distanced from the machinery of public infrastructure and 
services funding. 
The new laws and policies to combat corruption are seen to be only partially effective and 
the perceived reasons vary. The most optimistic view is that it is too early to assess the 
effectiveness of these laws. A promising aspect of the new laws in the Municipal Finance 
Management Act is the ‘supply chain management’ provisions, which have the potential 
to clean up procurement and contracting through vastly more transparent tendering and 
assessment provisions. Another view is that BEE policy nullifies the good governance 
safeguards, largely because the BEE provisions are not being properly interpreted in 
awarding tenders. A more entrenched problem is that the legislation cannot always 
distinguish between wilful corruption and the unintended results of incapacity and 
incompetence. There is also a view that suggests that under particular social and political 
circumstances, even the best laws and policies will be subverted by well-prepared private 
sector players in partnership with more sophisticated public servants and politicians. 
Laws need a degree of political will to be effective and few of the respondents felt that the 
current governance environment was conducive to building compliance with the 
legislation. This view seemed to be particularly shaped by the experiences of the Eastern 
Cape where successive layers of government seem to be incapable of generating an 
unambiguous commitment to clean governance. One way of demonstrating such 
commitment would be to take a consistent and firm stand in matters of non-compliance 
and ensure that severe sanctions are invoked. 
There is little capacity within both government and civil society to make the available 
checks and balances operate more effectively. A contributing factor is the lack of 
accurate and reliable information – the non-provision of financial statements to the 
Auditor General being a key example. Public accountability is not a strong feature of the 
current system even where some watchdog bodies are fulfilling their brief. The Auditor 
General’s work, for example, does not have a broad impact on society and the 
implications of the AG reports are not unpacked in a clear and understandable way – this 
appears to be an obvious issue for intervention by NGOs. Public opinion is being misled 
and manipulated and only a handful of civil society / NGO interventions have been 
effective in remedying this, including PSAM and some journalists. The many public 
review processes like IDP reviews and public presentation of the AG’s report tend to be 
ignored or weakly followed. 
In view of the problems outlined above it was unsurprising that all respondents thought 
that the poor had little meaningful access to procedures that ensure government 
accountability. Factors underpinning this included: 
• poor neighbourhoods are susceptible to political manipulation; 
• poor neighbourhoods have few resources to take issues up; 
• watchdog functions are not premised on partnerships with the poor (but some act in 
the interests of the poor); and 
• the systems of accountability require an organized form of civil society (civil 
monitoring groups, ratepayer bodies, etc.) rarely found in poor / rural areas. 
Very few respondents thought that poor communities were capable of analysing the 
effects of corruption on their lives. Instead their experiences were largely characterized 
as that of passive ‘victims’. Their responses are limited to the channels already under the 
control of the prevailing political powers. As previously noted, the expectations of the 
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poor are framed by historical experiences of spatial and social marginalization. Being 
economically and socially vulnerable, poor neighbourhoods fear the consequences of 
confronting corruption. 
The involvement of public servants in corruption was overwhelmingly attributed to greed 
and the pressures of living in a society dictated to by the market. Rampant materialism 
was frequently cited as the reason for both growing debt and for people resorting to 
corrupt behaviour. Real need was rejected by all respondents as a motivating factor. 
Whistle-blowers are seldom protected in the long-term after exposing corruption despite 
vigorous efforts by government and anti-corruption agencies to do so. The most effective 
forms of protection rely on retaining anonymity, but this cannot be assured over time. 
Informal alliances and co-operative networks often offer a better form of protection. 
Respondents were reluctant to make comparisons between the different anti-corruption 
agencies, explaining that they had different roles and operated under different constraints 
and enabling factors. Relations between the various bodies vary from the co-operative 
and co-ordinated to outright competition and hostility. The SIU seems to put most effort 
into co-ordination with other agencies, whereas the South African Police Services special 
units were least well-regarded. Obstacles confronted by these agencies included 
increasing pressure to prioritize winnable cases and getting caught up in demonstrations 
of ‘the fight against corruption’ that are largely for political symbolism and public relations. 
Respondents conceded that the public perception of these agencies is generally not 
good, as the public tend to see through the PR aspect. The SIU and Scorpions may have 
overcome this to some extent with more sophisticated marketing and good results. 
The application of effective sanctions against corrupt behaviour, including the facilitation 
of prosecution and sentencing by the courts, was regarded as flawed and often not 
conducive to deterrence. Fear of labour legislation and related litigation often means that 
no effective disciplinary action is taken. It was also apparent that this reticence is often 
contrived and may merely be an excuse not to act. Councillors exist largely beyond 
sanction unless their own party decides to act. The Code of Conduct for councillors and 
the role of the Speaker (in investigating irregular conduct) have proved ineffective. 
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A2.15. Endnotes 
1.  Section 57 of the Municipal Systems Act relates to senior managers appointed by 
council itself where remuneration and benefits are at the discretion of council – these 
employees are appointed on performance contracts. 
2.  Suggestion that this could be followed up with Lawrence James. 
3.  Nkalo was mentioned in media reports at the time in connection with a tender to 
supply furniture to the education department and the fact that this deal had gone 
awry. It subsequently emerged that Nkalo was already under investigation for a 
previous contract that had not been fulfilled. 
4. See accompanying article on this topic  
5. It is unlikely that the municipality actually has 50 full-time councillors – they may 
however regard themselves as, de facto, full-time. 
6. There is some recognition of this within social theory, that is, the notion of the 
traditional state and the modern democratic state competing for the loyalties of its 
citizens – Mamdani referred to this as the ‘bifurcated state’. 
7. Some discussion ensued on this issue, that is, how a largely transformed civil service / 
police structure, predominantly African with many former liberation figures in key 
posts, can still be called ‘the boers’ under certain circumstances, and even by those 
who have responsible positions within the police / civil service. 
8. Many driver-testing facilities in South Africa have had to be shut down because of 
widespread fraud in the issuing of driver’s licences. 
9. The last observations are my own and based largely on anecdotal experience of this 
term and its usage. 
10. An independent NGO watchdog that focuses on the Eastern Cape provincial 
government and analyses departmental finances, planning and other performance 
aspects. 
11. The SD Inspectorate works extensively with the JACT, SIU, Scorpions and Auditor 
General. 
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